THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE 
OF  CENTRAL  AFRICA 

By  EMIL  ZIMMERMANN 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY  EDWYN  BEVAN 


DT34 
.2  7 


NEW  YORK : 


GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  OF 
CENTRAL  AFRICA 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2015 


https://archive.org/details/germanempireofceOOzimm_0 


THE 

GERMAN  EMPIRE 

of 

CENTRAL  AFRICA 

As  the  Basis  of  a  New  German 

World-Policy  /^^fOFfWif^^ 

,  (    JAN  21  1919 

EMIL  ZIMMERMANN  V^. 

Translated  from  the  Original  German 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

EDWYN  BEVAN 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION  vii 

1.  — OsKAR  Karstedt   •  ix 

2.  — Paul  Leutwein  xii 

3.  — Hans  Delbruck   xiv 

4.  — Hermann  Oncken  xviii 

5.  — Paul  Rohrbach  xx 

6.  — Franz  Kolbe   xxiii 

7.  — Freiherr  Albrecht  von  Rechenberg    .    .    .  xxvii 

8.  — Davis  Trietsch   .  xxix 

9.  — Emil  Zimmermann  xxxiii 

10.  — Dr.  Wilhelm  Sole  xliv 

11.  — "Deutsche  Weltpolitik  und  KEiN  Krieg"     .  xlix 

12.  — British  Opposition  TO  Af/rrEL-^Fi?/KA    ...  Iv 

V 


Contents 

THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  OF  CENTRAL  AFRICA 

PAGE 

1. — Position  as  a  World-Power   i 

II. — The  Way  to  Become  a  World-Power  ...  5 

III.  — The  Building  up  of  German  World-Power  .  16 

IV.  — The  Oversea  Foundations  of^German  World- 

Power   22 

V. — The  White  Man  in  Central  Africa    ...  37 

VI. — Mittel-Afrika  as  a  Factor  in  the  Economic 

Struggle   .  49 

VII. — The  Organization  of  German  Mittel-Afrika  56 


INTRODUCTION 


TJRACTICALLY  all  Germans,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Minority  Socialists,  are  agreed  that  when  this  war,  pro- 
voked by  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  comes  to  a  final 
settlement,  somehow  or  somewhere  Germany  must  be  able 
to  point  to  a  gain,  in  order  to  prove  that  the  huge  agonizing 
effort  was  not  made  for  nothing.  There  are,  on  the  other 
hand,  notable  varieties  of  opinion  in  Germany  as  to  the  direc- 
tion in  which  the  gain  is  to  be  sought.  The  Pan-Germans 
declare  that  the  thing  that  matters  supremely  is  that  Germany 
should  annex  more  territory  in  Europe — especially  the 
Flanders  coast  and  the  French  mining-districts  of  Briey  and 
Longwy.  Unless  Germany  gets  these,  they  say,  she  will  have 
lost  the  war.  A  very  larg-e  body  of  opinion,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  strongly  opposed  to  the  ''Flanders  politicians,"  as  Emil 
Zimmermann  calls  them  in  his  book.  This  body  of  opinion 
stands  for  the  formula  "no  annexations" — none,  at  any  rate, 
in  Europe.  It  says  that  even  if  the  war  were  to  end  on  the 
basis  of  the  status  quo  in  Europe,  Germany  would  have  won. 
It  is  often  described  as  "Moderate"  opinion,  as  against  the 
Pan-German  annexationists.  It  differs  from  the  Pan-Germans 
also  in  internal  politics.  Pan-German  opinion  is  mainly  re- 
actionary and  anti-democratic;  "Moderate"  opinion  is,  gener- 
ally speaking,  in  favour  of  democratic  reform,  of  a  govern- 
ment more  representative  of  the  people  and  more  responsible 
to  the  people.  Very  often  you  may  see  utterances  of  "Moderate" 
circles   in   Germany,   protesting   against   annexations  and 

vii 


viii 


Introduction 


advocating  democracy,  commented  upon  in  English  papers, 
as  proving  that  the  Germans  are  abandoning  all  ambitious 
schemes.  This  book  is  the  product  of  such  "Moderate" 
opinion ;  it  will  perhaps  serve  to  show  that  the  comforting 
view  of  the  ^'Moderates"  needs  reconsideration. 

The  ''Moderates,"  no  less  than  the  Pan-Germans,  desire 
that  Germany  should  be  able  to  show  her  position 
strengthened  after  the  war.  There  are  two  sub-varieties  of 
"Moderate"  opinion  with  regard  to  the  direction  in  which 
Germany  is  to  gain.  One  is  the  Mittel-Europa  school.  This 
lays  the  emphasis  upon  a  closer  union,  political,  military  and 
economic,  between  the  German  Empire  and  its  Allies — 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey — in  such  wise  that 
there  is  a  continuous  belt  of  German  power  from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf,  a  great  Central-European  realm  capable 
of  defying  the  world.  This  scheme  could  be  realized  with 
practically  no  annexation.  The  other  sub-variety  .  sees 
Germany's  future  greatness  secured  by  a  great  Empire  in 
tropical  Africa,  in  Mittel-Afrika,  extending  right  across  the 
Continent  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Indian  Ocean.  This  in- 
volves considerable  annexations,  but  annexations  in  Africa, 
not  Europe.  Very  often  the  two  schemes — Mittel-Europa  and 
Mittel-Afrika — are  held  both  together.  But  commonly  even 
those  who  hold  both  ideas  lay  greater  stress  on  one  than  on 
the  other. 

It  may  be  questioned  whether  any  strong  spontaneous 
interest  is  felt  by  the  German  masses  in  the  lost  oversea 
colonies.  We  find,  for  example,  the  champions  of  the 
Colonial  Idea  occasionally  complain  of  wide-spread  popular 
indifference,  though  they  note  with  satisfaction  that  "the  war 
has  turned  the  great  mass  of  the  working-classes,  who  had 
hitherto  been  indifferent  to  the  Colonial  movement,  or  even 
averse  from  it,  into  its  most  convinced  friends"  (Dr.  Solf, 


Introduction 


ix 


'  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies,  quoted  in  the  Kreuz- 
Zeitung  for  January  9,  1918).  But  if  gain  is  not  to  be  had 
in  other  directions,  then  the  gain  of  colonial  territory  acquires 
value  as  a  salve  to  national  pride,  which  would  be  wounded, 
if  the  war  ended  in  loss  all  round.  It  is  perhaps  for  this 
reason  that  of  late  the  idea  of  the  African  Empire  has  seemed 
to  be  in  the  ascendant. 

It  is  important  that  the  English-speaking  peoples  should 
have  a  clear  statement  put  before  them  of  this  German  pro- 
gramme, a  statement  exhibiting  the  hopes  and  intentions 
attached  to  it  in  the  German  mind.  A  circumstantial  state- 
ment by  a  German  is  of  special  value,  as  a  first-hand  document, 
and  this  is  just  what  we  have  in  the  book  by  Emil  Zimmer- 
mann  here  translated.  The  book  was  written  for  German 
readers;  British  and  American  readers  may  be  trusted  to 
draw  their  own  conclusions. 

But  Emil  Zimmermann  is  not  the  only  publicist  who  is 
busy  displaying  the  magnificent  possibilities  of  Central  Africa 
to  the  German  people  and  working  up  enthusiasm  for  the 
scheme.  It  may  be  well,  in  an  introduction  to  Zimmermann's 
book,  to  take  some  note  of  statements  of  the  same  gospel  by 
others.  It  will  be  seen  how  closely  parallel  all  the  statements 
are,  and  their  combination  may  give  the  British  reader,  like 
a  composite  photograph,  a  good  idea  of  what  Mittel-Afrika 
means. 

1.— OSKAR  KARSTEDT 

We  may  begin  with  a  summary  statement  of  it  by  Dr.  Oscar 
Karstedt,  editor  of  the  Deutsche  Kolonialzeitung,  in  a  little 
pamphlet  called  Koloniale  Friedensziele  (Colonial  Peace- 
Aims),  which  is  one  of  a  series  published  by  Duncker  in 
Weimar  for  the  purposes  of  popular  enlightenment.  He 
begins  by  explaining  generally  that  the  Germans  need  tropical 


X 


Introduction 


dependencies  for  two  reasons,  (i)  in  order  to  have  a  supply 
of  raw-materials  for  their  industries  without  depending  upon 
foreigners,  (2)  in  order  to  have  naval  stations  overseaj. 
As  to  the  latter  Dr.  Karstedt  says : — 

Oversea  fleets  in  the  future  will  have  no  more  value 
than  old  scrap-iron,  unless  they  have  the  support  of  points 
d'appui  overseas  which  would  be  capable  of  serving  at  any 
moment    as    munition-depots,    coaling-stations,    docks,  etc. 

-(p.  10.) 

Think  for  a  moment  how  far  more  deadly  the  work  of 
German  cruisers  might  have  been,  if  Dar-es-Salaam  on  the 
Indian  Ocean  or  Liideritz  Bay  and  Duala  on  the  Atlantic 
had  been  fully  fitted-out  naval  bases,  in  which  our  ships 
would  have  had  facilities  for  getting  in  fresh  supplies  or 
effecting  repairs! — (p.  11.) 


He  presently  rehearses  the  Mittel-Afrika  gospel  as  follows : 

An  appropriation,  as  extensive  as  possible,  of  French, 
English,  Belgian  and  Portuguese  possessions  in  Central 
Africa  would  yield  another  advantage  besides  those  already 
specified.  The  colonial,  possessions  which  have  hitherto 
belonged  to  us  in  Africa  had  an  essentially  disconnected, 
scattered  character.  .  .  .  Togo,  the  Cameroons,  German 
South-West  Africa  and  German  East  Africa  had  no  kind 
of  connexion  with  each  other  by  land.  English,  French, 
Belgian  and  Portuguese  territories  intruded  between  them 
from  all  sides.  Since,  moreover,  in  consequence  of  the 
defect  of  our  naval  policy,  it  was  impossible  to  defend  our 
colonies  from  the  sea,  they  lay  one  and  all  at  the  outbreak 
of  war  like  isolated  fortresses,  round  which  an  unbroken 
line  of  investment  could  be  drawn.  In  this  fact  lies  the 
principal  reason  why  they  all,  with  the  exception  of  East 
Africa,  fell  comparatively  quickly  a  prey  to  the  enemies 
who  assailed  them  from  all  sides.  At  the  same  time  it 
was  shown  that  the  larger  tropical  colonies  are,  the  easier 
they  are  to  hold.  The  Cameroons  and  East  Africa,  the 
two  largest  German  colonies  in  Africa,  one  over  750,000 
square  kilometres,  the  other  a  full  million  square  kilo- 
metres, were  able  to  hold  out,  although  wholly  unprepared 
for  a  war  with  European  enemies,  in  a  way  which  the  most 
expert  opinion  could  not  have  foreseen.  .  .  .  The  secret  is 
to   be    found   in   the   stupendous   difficulties    which  every 


Introduction 


xi 


extensive  tropical  area,  owing  to  climate  and  other  physical 
impediments,  offers  to  an  invader.  If  even  a  Napoleon  could 
not  but  fail  in  the  attempt  to  conquer  gigantic  Russia,  could 
not  dominate  so  vast  a  space,  a  German  Mittel-Afrika, 
reaching  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Indian  Ocean,  would, 
under  the  physical  conditions  of  the  tropics,  be  prac- 
tically invulnerable.  Tropical  colonial  territory  finds  its 
best  security  in  its  size.  The  more  extensive  and  co- 
herent the  territory  is,  the  better  it*  is  protected  against 
attack. 

A  German  Mittel-Afrika,  as  it  is  here  sketched  in  outline, 
would  besides  yield  the  great  advantage,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  world-policy,  that  it  would  set  a  bar,  once  for  all, 
to  England's  effort  to  become  mistress  of  Africa  from  the 
Cape  to  Cairo.  Within  the  territory,  further,  there  would 
be  enough  places  on  the  coast,  which,  when  properly  forti- 
fied and  equipped,  would  be  capable  of  furnishing  Germany 
with  the  naval  bases  which  it  absolutely  must  have  upon 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Indian  Oceans.  Such  a  German  over- 
sea Empire  in  Africa  would  be  able  to  bid  defiance  to  the 
strongholds  of  British  power  in  Africa  (Egypt  and  South 
Africa),  the  mainstays  of  the  whole  British  world-power. 
It  would  give  us,  not  only  a  great  part  of  what  we  want 
in  order  to  be  economically  independent  of  England,  but  it 
would  also  put  the  means  into  our  hands  of  striking  Eng- 
land home  at  any  moment  with  the  help  of  our  navy  and 
the  man-powder  latent  in  this  future  dominion. —  (pp.  13-16.) 

Some  of  the  exponents  of  Mittel-Afrika,  as  v^e  shall  see, 
would  be  willing  for  Germany  to  give  up  many  of  her  former 
colonies,  if  thereby  she  could  secure  the  Central-African 
continuous  Empire.  But  Dr.  Karstedt  is  unwilling  to  give 
up  anything  except  Kiao-chou — not  the  South  Sea  colonies, 
not  German  South-West  Africa.  Of  his  ambitions  in  the 
South  Seas  we  need  say  nothing  here,  where  we  are  concerned 
with  Africa.  As  to  the  dimensions  of  the  German  African 
domain,  Karstedt  says : — 


With  regard  to  the  extent  of  our  colonial  domain  in 
Africa,  the  first  consideration  must  be  the  rounding-off  of 
our  territory  in  such  a  way  that  the  German  possessions, 
which  have  hitherto  been  wholly  detached  from  each  other, 
should   be   welded   together    into   a   single   block   by  the 


xii 


Introduction 


annexation  of  enemy  territory.  Such  a  block,  by  its 
magnitude,  would  furnish  a  sufficient  guarantee  that  any  fresh 
attempt  to  conquer  the  country  by  force  of  arms  would  be 
to  bite  upon  granite.  The  Belgian  Congo  by  itself  might 
serve  the  purpose  of  making  the  connexion  between  German 
East  Africa  and  the  Cameroons.  But  the  Belgian  Congo 
alone,  even  when  our  former  colonies  are  joined  to  it,  could 
never  give  us  economic  independence  in  the  matter  of  raw 
materials.  For  that  purpose  we  need  in  particular  an  ex- 
tension of  our  territory  towards  the  North-West  by  the 
acquisition  of  the  French  West-African  possessions  and, 
if  possible,  that  of  British  Nigeria  and  the  Gold  Coast. — 
(pp.  18-19.) 

There  is  another  point  upon  which  Dr.  Oskar  Karstedt 
insists.  German  prestige  has  been  lowered  before  the  eyes  of 
the  natives:  atonement  must  also  be  made  before  their  eyes. 

Nothing  makes  any  impression  upon  the  native  except 
what  he  sees  with  his  own  eyes.  He  has  seen  the  Germans, 
his  former  lords  and  masters  (Beherrscher),  in  a  condition 
of  the  deepest  humiliation,  a  humiliation  which  no  doubt 
our  enemies  designed  for  the  special  reason  of  its  effect 
upon  native  psychology.  Even  if,  in  the  peace  negotiations, 
the  demand  for  a  personal  compensation  to  the  victims  of 
these  brutalities  is  enforced,  that  will  not  do  away  with  the 
great,  perhaps  the  irreparable,  injury  which  the  prestige  of 
the  Germans,  and  their  colonial  future  in  Africa,  has  sus- 
tained. Successful  colonial  policy  among  the  lower  races 
makes  the  unquestioned  prestige  of  the  colonizing  people  a 
fundamental  consideration.  A  people  whose  representatives 
have  been  treated  before  the  eyes  of  the  natives  as  the  Ger- 
mans have  been,  is  burdened  in  consequence  of  these  things 
with  a  handicap  affecting  all  its  future  colonial  activity,  which 
may  be  a  crushing  one  if  the  proper  measures  are  not  taken. 
Whatever  else  therefore  happens,  care  must  be  taken  that 
such  an  atonement  is  made  before  the  eyes  of  the  natives  as 
may  be  most  suitable  to  impress  people  of  their  psychology  and 
ideas. —  (p.  21.) 

2.— PAUL  LEUTWEIN 

Another  writer  who  has  made  Mittel-Afrika  his  special 
theme  is  Dr.  Paul  Leutwein,  the  son  of  General  Theodor 
Leutwein,  who  was  Governor  of  German  South- West  Africa 


Introduction 


xiii 


from  1898  to  1905.  I  have  before  me  a  little  book  of  some 
50  pages  called  Mittel-Europa — Mittel-Afrika,  published  by 
Paul  Leutwein  in  1917. 

He  draws  the  sam-e  conclusions  as  Dr.  Karstedt  from  the 
surprisingly  tough  resistance  put  up  by  the  German  colonies 
in  this  war : — 


If  the  three  colonies  (South-West  Africa,  the  Cameroons, 
East  Africa),  severed  as  they  were  from  each  other  and 
unprepared,  have  been  a  really  positive  factor  among  the 
forces  engaged  in  this  war,  how  much  greater  would  be  the 
effect  of  a  single  great  colonial  Empire,  fitted  out  with  all  the 
means  of  modern  scientific  warfare  against  every  hostile 
attack  by  land  or  sea !  Such  a  colonial  dominion,  in  view 
of  the  experiences  of  this  war,  would  be  absolutely  invincible, 
—(p.  47') 


Leutwein  states  the  Mittel-Afrika  scheme  very  much  in 
the  same  terms  as  Karstedt,  but  he  has  a  more  sober  sense 
of  the  uncertainty  of  the  future,  which  must  throw  upon  all 
imperial  projects  a  shadow  of  doubt.    He  says : — 

The  course  of  the  war  in  the  colonies  has  taught  us  that 
small  colonial  territories  are  scarcely  capable  of  serious 
defence.  These  therefore  we  must  in  the  future  renounce. 
Further,  the  disconnectedness  of  our  colonial  possessions, 
far-scattered  and  without  good  frontiers,  has  made  its 
disadvantages  sensibly  felt.  ...  It  is  natural  that  an 
urgent  desire  should  now  exist  that  our  colonial  territory 
should  take  a  new  shape.  ...  It  has  been  proclaimed  in 
many  quarters  that  the  honour  of  the  German  Empire 
requires  that  we  should  get  back  all  our  colonies.  This  point 
of  view  is  sentimental,  and,  besides  that,  it  is  not  true. 
By  means  of  equivalent  compensation,  territorial  or  com- 
mercial, Germany's  honour  would  be  no  less  safeguarded 
and  at  the  same  time  the  way  made  easier  for  an  agreement 
with  our  present  enemies.  .  .  .  Many  colonial  politicians 
have  come  more  and  more  to  the  conviction  that  an  ex- 
tensive territory  in  Central  Africa,  bordering  both  on  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  on  the  Atlantic,  would  afford  the  most 
favourable  conditions  for  our  future  colonial  activity.  This 
domain  would  have  to  include  our  most  important  posses- 


xiv 


Introduction 


sions — the  Cameroons,  East  Africa  and  the  northern  half 
of  South-West  Africa,  and  be  amalgamated  into  a  single 
whole  by  the  addition  of  the  Belgian  Congo,  together  with 
strips  of  territory  from  the  British,  French,  and  Portuguese 
possessions  and  from  British  South  Africa.  The  precise  de- 
limitation of  German  Mittel-Afrika  had  better  be  left  undis- 
cussed on  grounds  of  political  sagacity.  Careful  memoranda 
have  been  drawn  up  on  the  subject,  which  must  for  the  present 
remain  confidential.  Only  let  so  much  be  said:  German  Mif- 
tel-Afrika,  as  a  field  for  the  life  of  peoples,  as  an  economic 
factor,  and  as  a  basis  of  political  power,  will  be  found  to 
satisfy  all  requirements.  The  thought  guiding  its  delimitation 
has  been  to  provide  a  good  prospect  of  success  for  the  neces- 
sary negotiations  with  regard  to  give-and-take  arrange- 
ments, and  to  draw  the  new  frontiers  in  such  a  way  as 
to  give  the  least  possible  occasion  for  friction  later  on. 
The  scheme  includes  a  maximum  and  a  minimum  demand 
between  which,  according  to  the  ultimate  issue  of  the 
war,  and  according  to  the  skill  of  our  negotiators,  the 
final  delimitation  will  in  all  probability  be  drawn. — 
(PP-  5051-) 

3.— HANS  DELBRUCK 

In  the  front  rank  of  those  who  preach  Mittel-Afrika  is 
Dr.  Hans  Delbriick,  one  of  Germany's  leading  historians  and 
publicists,  author  of  a  standard  work  on  the  Art  of  War 
from  ancient  times,  and  the  successor  of  Treitschke,  in  the 
editorial  chair  of  the  great  monthly  periodical,  the  Preiissische 
Jahrhiicher.  In  his  book  Bismarcks  Erhe,  published  in  191 5, 
he  wrote : — 

The  most  sure  of  all  modes  of  colonization  is  that  by 
agricultural  settlers  (Bauernkolonie) .  .  .  .  But  colonies  of 
this  kind  we  cannot  think  of  estabhshing,  for  the  simple 
reason  that  we  have  no  surplus  population  of  workers  on 
the  land  (Bauern).  Our  whole  oversea  emigration  has 
sunk  since  the  middle  of  the  nineties  to  between  twenty  and 
thirty  thousand  souls  a  year,  whilst  at  the  same  time  we 
employ  in  Germany  near  on  a  million  foreign  labourers  and 
workmen,  Russians,  Poles,  Ruthenians,  Slovaks,  Italians, 
Scandinavians.  Germany  is  not  a  country  from  which  there 
is  a  flow  of  population  from  within  outwards,  but  a  country 


Introduction 


XV 


into  which  there  is  a  flow  of  population  from  outside.  The 
peasant-farmers  and  agricultural  labourers,  who  are  suit- 
able for  settlement  on  the  land,  we  need  most  urgently  at 
home,  and  have  very  few  whom  we  can  afford  to  send 
overseas.  The  people  who  must  fill  our  colonies  and  must 
give  them  their  special  characteristics  are  the  upper  stratum 
— the  thousands  of  men  of  medium  or  of  high  education 
whom  our  rich  school-system  continues  incessantly  to  turn 
out,  and  for  whom  we  cannot  find  adequate  occupation  in 
the  Fatherland.  Men  in  their  thirties,  in  the  prime  of 
their  strength,  who  have  acquired  all  the  knowledge  and 
all  the  skill  necessary  for  a  large  circle  of  activities,  sit 
here  amongst  us  with  nothing  or  little  to  do,  and  wait  for 
some  post  with  mean  remuneration.  These  are  the  men 
whom  we  must  send  out,  as  technical  experts,  merchants, 
planters,  doctors,  inspectors,  oflScers  and  civil  servants,  to 
rule  over  the  great  multitudes  of  the  lower  races,  just  as 
the  English  rule  over  India.  But  it  cannot  meet  the  case 
simply  to  spread  out  these  upper  strata  here  and  there 
over  a  few,  greater  or  smaller,  areas;  the  only  way  of 
attaining  a  durable  and  secure  gain  for  our  nation  is  to  con- 
stitute a  continuous  dominion,  large  enough  to  contain 
regions  of  different  physical  characteristics,  which  supple- 
ment each  other  and  lend  each  other  mutual  support  and 
strength.  A  very  large  continuous  extent  of  territory,  if 
it  is  under  one  central  administration,  acquires  a  certain 
political  coherence;  the  fact  that  it  is  a  single  customs- 
area  creates  connexions  and  interests  which  are  not  lightly 
dissolved.  Towns  with  any  considerable  white  population 
and  their  own  communal  life  require  a  very  large  hinterland. 
In  order  to  bind  such  an  oversea  Empire  quite  firmly  to 
the  mother-country,  some  portions  at  any  rate  of  the 
dominion  must  be  of  such  a  kind  that  a  German  com- 
munity may  maintain  and  propagate  itself  there — not  a 
changing  community  only,  but  one  planted  in  the  soil, 
possibly  in  some  places  even  an  agricultural  one.  .  .  . 
—  (pp.  192-1950 

The  first  and  most  important  of  all  the  national  demands 
which  we  must  raise  at  the  future  Peace  Congress  must 
be  for  a  really  big  colonial  Empire,  a  German  India.  The 
Empire  must  be  large  enough  to  be  capable  of  conducting 
its  own  defence  in  the  event  of  war.  A  really  big  territory 
no  enemy  can  completely  occupy.  A  really  big  territory 
feeds  its  own  troops  and  contains  abundant  man-power  for 
reserves  and  militia.  When  the  principal  points  are  linked 
up  by  railways,  the  various  districts  are  able  to  furnish  each 
other  mutual  support.    A  really  big  territory  can  have  its 


xvi 


Introduction 


own  factories  of  ammunition  and  implements  of  war.  A 
really  big  territory  can  have  its  harbours  and  coaling-stat- 
ions. .  .  . — (p.  202.) 

Is  Central  Africa — the  region  which  one  naturally  first 
thinks  of — capable,  even  in  its  largest  extent,  of  meeting 
all  these  requirements?  Has  it  a  suitable  soil?  Is  it  fertile 
enough — fertile,  I  mean,  not  only  in  the  merely  physical 
sense,  but  all  around?  Can  it  bear  the  weight  we  would  put 
upon  it?  Or  should  we  rather  turn  our  thoughts  to  Further 
India  or  Cochin  China?  This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  these 
questions. — (p.  206.) 

A  footnote  runs : — 


In  order  to  obviate  misunderstandings,  I  should  like  to 
add  expressly  that  the  Belgian  and  French  Congo  alone 
would  not  suffice  to  make  the  German  India  which  we  must 
strive  for  and  which  we  must  claim  according  to  our  success 
in  the  war.  These  equatorial  regions  may,  it  is  true,  yield 
riches  later  on,  which  to-day  we  can  hardly  imagine,  but 
for  the  next  generation,  in  consequence  of  their  extremely 
thin  population,  they  must  remain  unremunerative,  indeed, 
cost  more  than  they  bring.  Not  till  the  rich  surround- 
ing lands,  now  in  English  possession^  are  joined  to  them 
will  the  adequate  material  basis  for  a  German  India  be 
there. — (p.  206.) 

The  question  whether  Africa  was  capable  of  furnishing 
the  requirements  for  the  "German  India,"  which  Hans 
Delbriick  left  unanswered  in  191 5,  he  has  since  then  answered 
by  an  emphatic  Yes.  He  has  made  Mittel-Afrika  together 
with  the  German  control  of  the  Turkish  Empire  an  essential 
part  of  his  programme.  As  lately  as  last  June  (1917)  he 
wrote  in  the  Preussische  Jahrbiicher: 

Supposing  that  either  by  victories  on  land_or  by  the 
submarine  war  we  so  far  brought  England  down  that,  in 
spite  of  the  help  of  America,  she  gave  up  further  fighting 
and  was  willing  to  concede  us  a  direct  or  indirect  dominion 
over  Belgium,  even  so  we  ought  to  say:  "Not  Belgium, 
but  Africa;  not  the  coalfields  of  Charleroi,  but  Nigeria;  not 


Introduction 


xvii 


Zeebriigge,  but  the  Azores,  Madeira,  and  the  Cape  Verde 
Islands;  not  Antwerp,  but  Lagos,  Zanzibar,  and  Uganda,  and 
Gibraltar  for  Spain.  Not  economic  advantages  by  commer- 
cial treaties  wrung  from  the  enemy,  but  war-indemnities  either 
in  cash  down  or  in  raw  materials.  .  . 

If  our  victory  is  great  enough,  we  may  hope  to  unite  the 
whole  of  Central  Africa  together  with  our  old  South-West 
under  our  hand — Senegambia,  Sierra  Leone,  the  Gold 
Coast,  Dahomey,  populous  Nigeria  with  his  harbour  Lagos, 
the  Cameroons,  the  luxuriant  islands  of  San  Thome  and 
Principe,  the  French  and  the  Belgian  Congo,  Angola  with 
its  great  potentialities  and  its  excellent  harbours,  the  region 
of  Katanga  rich  in  minerals,  Northern  Rhodesia,  Nyassa- 
land,  Mozambique  with  Delagoa  Bay,  Madagascar,  Ger- 
man East  Africa,  Zanzibar,  Uganda,  in  addition  to  this 
the  great  well-constructed  harbour  of  Ponta  Delgada  in 
the  Azores,  one  of  the  most  important  and  most  frequented 
coaling-stations  in  the  world,  and  Horta,  one  of  the  most 
important  central  stations  of  the  Transatlantic  Telegraph 
cable.  "There  are  very  few  points  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean 
so  admirably  situated  for  purposes  of  traffic,  of  such 
importance  from  the  point  of  view  of  political  geography, 
and  of  such  strength  from  the  point  of  view  of  military 
and  naval  strategy  as  the  Azores  will  be,  so  soon  as  they 
pass  into  the  possession  of  a  Power  with  a  strong  fleet," 
so  Hans  Meyer  writes  in  Deutsche  Politik  (Heft  20).  To- 
day they  belong  to  Portugal,  which  is  at  war  with  us.  To 
Portugal  belong  also  to-day  the  Cape  Verde  Islands 
with  the  harbour  of  Porta  Grande,  likewise  one  of 
the  most  frequented  coaling-stations  of  the  Eastern 
Atlantic.  .  .  . 

Is  it  true  that  we  should  get  no  enjoyment  out  of  a  colonial 
Empire,  that  we  should  be  only  in  the  position  of  "precarious 
tenants"  unless  we  permanently  kept  England  intimidated  by 
our  possession  of  the  Flemish  coast?  There  can  be  no  more 
baseless  superstition?  Even  suppose  the  U-boats  failed  to 
end  England's  sea-hegemony  for  good  in  this  war,  even  sup- 
pose England  remained  permanently  our  superior  on  sea — 
even  so,  that  Central-African  Germany  would  be  strong 
enough  in  itself  to  repel  every  attack  from  outside.  Has 
not  our  East  Africa,  as  it  is,  maintained  itself  for  nearly 
three  years  with  nothing  but  its  own  diminutive  forces?  But 
we  should  so  equip  our  African  Empire  with  weapons  and 
munition  factories  and  depots  that  it  would  be  able  to  hold 
its  own  against  a  world  of  enemies.  By  means  of  our  mer- 
cantile U-boats  it  would  remain  in  communication  with  the 
home  country,  even  supposing  the  English  were  once  more 


xviii 


Introduction 


complete  masters  of  the  open  seas.  A  certain  number  of 
war  U-boats  stationed  there  would  even  defend  the  islands 
and  their  harbours  against  English  men-of-war. 

Will  the  English  ever  concede  us  such  a  colonial  Empire? 
I  hope  they  will  be  compelled  to  do  so.  If  they  are  con- 
fronted with  the  choice  of  either  allowing  us  to  have  these 
colonies  or  of  seeing  us  establish  a  direct  or  indirect  dominion 
over  Belgium,  it  will  come  easier  to  them  to  let  us  have  the 
colonial  Empire. 


4.— HERMANN  ONCKEN 

Another  name  scarcely  less  well-known  than  that  of  Hans 
Delbriick  is  that  of  the  Heidelberg  Professor  of  History, 
Hermann  Oncken,  the  editor  of  the  great  German  universal 
history.  Oncken,  like  Delbriick,  is  a  ''Moderate,"  an 
opponent  of  the  Pan-Germans,  and  was  one  of  the  men  of 
distinction  who  joined  the  ''German  National  Committee  for 
the  Preparation  of  an  Honorable  Peace,"  formed  in  the  summer 
of  1 91 6  to  combat  the  Pan-German  propaganda  and  support 
Bethmann  Hollweg.  A  few  months  ago  (in  191 7)  he 
published  a  small  book  entitled  Das  alte  und  das  neue  Mitt  el- 
Euro  pa  (The  Old  and  the  New  Mittel-Europa) .  In  the  course 
of  this  he  devotes  some  pages  to  Mittel-Afrika: — 

Completely  to  upset  the  English  calculations,  it  will  be 
necessary  that  the  German  war  programme,  instead  of  con- 
fining itself  to  Mittel-Europa,  should  mark  out  in  firm  out- 
line yet  another  attainable  aim  on  beyond.  This  aim  would 
not  consist  in  annexations  on  the  West  [the  Pan-German 
programme],  which  we  might  feel  disposed  to  demand  in 
view  of  the  military  situation,  but  in  utilizing  our  military 
successes,  which  have  given  us  pawns  outside  our  frontiers 
in  Belgium  and  Northern  France,  in  order  to  obtain  com- 
pensations in  Africa.  If  England  to-day  is  prosecuting  the 
war  with  such  intense  efforts,  that  is  in  order  to  deprive 
us  of  these  pawns;  unless  she  recovers  them  she  cannot  safely 
garner  in  her  colonial  gains  and  fight  the  economic  war 
through  to  a  victorious  end.  England  is  fighting  for  a  war- 
aim  which  lies  outside  Europe.  We,  on  our  side,  are  fighting 
in  Flanders  and  Champagne,  in  the  first  instance,  indeed, 


Introduction 


xix 


against  the  implacable  will  which  desires  to  tear  German 
land  away  from  the  body  of  the  Empire,  but  at  the  same 
time  indirectly  in  order  to  get  back  our  colonial  territory, 
and  to  increase  it.  We  are  fighting  for  an  Empire  in  Central 
Africa. 

Our  experience  in  the  war  has  taught  us  that  our  scat- 
tered colonial  possessions  could  not  be  held  in  war  against 
the  British  sea-power.  To  that  extent  the  words  which 
Bismarck  addressed  to  the  English,  when  we  first  entered 
upon  a  colonial  policy,  have  proved  true:  "We  know  that 
you  could  attack  our  colonies  successfully,  and  that  we  could 
not  retaliate,  because  you  have  command  of  the  sea."  What 
we  want  therefore  is  a  colonial  Empire  which  we  do  not 
hold  by  England's  good  pleasure,  an  Empire  so  self-sufficing 
that  it  can  draw  upon  its  own  forces  for  its  defence.  The 
fact  that  a  numerically  quite  weak  body  of  German  heroes 
could  hold  East  Africa  for  three  years  has  proved  that  a 
largish  oversea  country,  with  a  numerous  population,  can  be 
defended  by  its  own  resources,  even  if  cut  off  from  the 
mother-country.  After  this  experience  we  are  entitled  to  say 
that  a  German  Africa  which  stretched  right  across  the  body 
of  the  African  Continent,  would  really  possess,  in  a  yet  much 
higher  degree,  the  capability  of  defending  itself.  Indeed,  if 
the  military  communications  and  the  native  man-power  were 
properly  organized,  if  naval  stations  and  coaling-stations  were 
established  in  connexion  with  our  new  arm,  the  U-boat,  a 
continuous  territory  of  adequate  extent  could  be  rendered 
as  good  as  unassailable.  If  before  the  war  the  disconnected 
character  of  our  colonial  possessions  constituted  a  weakness 
in  our  world-possession,  the  bringing  of  them  together  would 
mean  such  a  strengthening  of  our  position  as  would  have 
effects  radiating  outwards,  and  make  our  power  in  the  world 
tell  far  beyond  our  own  frontiers  {eine  St'drkiing  von  innen 
heraus,  die  sich  auch  nach  aussen  hin  machtpolitische  Geltung 
verschaffen  wird).  It  is  not  the  case  therefore  that  unless 
we  have  control  of  the  Flemish  coast,  with  the  attendant 
naval  advantages,  we  cannot  feel  secure  in  the  possession  of 
colonies,  that  in  order  to  be  able  to  defend  our  colonies  against 
England  we  must  hold  in  our  hands,  as  an  indispensable  con- 
dition, the  celebrated  "pistol  pointed  at  England's  heart" 
[Antwerp].    There  is  another  way,  and  a  surer  way. 

We  shall  be  able  to  make  sacrifices  at  other  points  in  order 
to  gain  an  extensive  compact  colonial  dominion.  So  long  as 
it  is  a  question  of  a  restoration  of  the  status  quo  all  round, 
we  shall  insist  on  having  back  our  possessions  in  the  South 
Seas  and  in  East  Asia  among  the  rest.  If  on  the  other  hand 
the  status  quo  is  dropped,  then  we  shall  reconcile  ourselves 


XX 


Introduction 


to  the  loss  of  our  other  possessions  in  order  to  bring  our 
African  possessions  into  territorial  connexion.  For  such  a 
consolidation  we  shall  have  to  get  the  main  part  of  the  Bel- 
gian Congo  State  and  of  the  Portuguese  colonies,  i.  e.,  in  part 
territories  which  the  English  before  the  war  were  prepared 
to  recognize  as  belonging  in  principle  to  our  sphere  of  in- 
fluence. Local  accommodations  would  not  be  ruled  out,  so 
long  as  East  Africa,  so  gloriously  defended,  was  not  sacri- 
ficed. We  should  have  to  seek  a  completion  of  our  domain 
in  the  West-African  districts,  which  have  such  high  economic 
value  for  us,  and  which  France  would  have  to  cede  in  order 
to  redeem  the  part  of  her  soil  in  our  occupation.  One  may 
emphatically  assert  that  a  colonial  Empire  of  such  an  extent — 
always  provided  that  it  can  be  made  as  good  as  unassailable 
to  correspond  with  our  own  position  of  unassailable  power — 
would  have  far  greater  value  for  the  whole  economic  system 
of  Mittel-Europa  than  this  or  that  piece  of  colonizable  land 
in  the  East  [i.  e.  in  Russia],  than  this  or  that  rectification  of 
our  frontier  on  the  West,  desirable  as  that  might  be  from  the 
point  of  view  of  our  industries.  A  colonial  Empire,  if  one 
takes  a  large  view,  might  become  a  life-and-death  matter  for 
our  economic  policy.  Even  a  strengthened  Mittel-Europa,  as 
we  have  emphasized  already,  would  still  be  far  from  self- 
sufficing;  in  the  matter,  at  any  rate,  of  a  whole  number  of 
important  raw  materials,  vegetable  fats  and  fodder-stuffs, 
cotton  and  rubber,  it  would  have  needs  which  could  not  be 
supplied  from  European  soil  (even  if  the  frontiers  of  "Europe" 
be  carried  forward  in  any  direction),  but  only  from  tropical 
or  sub-tropical  colonies.  Only  through  the  assured  possession 
of  such  colonies  should  we  attain  at  any  rate  a  certain  measure 
of  self-sufficiency.  Without  such  assured  possession  we 
should,  in  view  of  our  enemies'  plans  for  boycott,  be  in  dan- 
ger of  sinking  into  a  position  of  economic  dependence,  how- 
ever great  our  military  strength  might  be,  and  thereby  be- 
coming permanently  a  second-class  Power. 

On  this  condition  alone  should  we  be  prepared  to  re- 
nounce all  conquests  in  the  West,  and  especially  to  give 
back  undiminished  the  pawn  which  we  hold  in  our  hand — 
Belgium.  .  .  .—(pp.  I44-I47-) 

5.— PAUL  ROHRBACH 

Dr.  Paul  Rohrbach,  another  man  who  occupies  a  foremost 
place  among  Germany's  influential  publicists,  is,  like  Delbriick 
and  Oncken,  a  strong  advocate  of  Mittel-Afrika.    Like  them, 


Introduction 


xxi 


too,  he  is  a  stout  opponent  of  the  Pan-German  scheme  for 
annexations  in  Flanders.  Already  before  the  war  he  was 
known  as  the  writer  of  books  on  the  expansion  of  Germany 
overseas.  In  one  of  these,  Der  deutsche  Gedanke  in  der 
Welt,  he  indicated  that  although  the  existing  German  colonies 
were  poor  in  extent,  compared  with  the  oversea  dependencies 
of  Great  Britain  and  France,  "the  real  epoch  of  colonial  policy 
on  the  grand  scale  in  Africa  was  for  Germany  still  to  come" 
(dass  die  eigentliche  Epoche  grosser  afrikanischer  Kolonial- 
politik  uns  noch  hevorsteht).  Dr.  Rohrbach  now  stands 
principally  for  the  Berlin-to-Bagdad  Idea  and  for  a  policy  of 
uncompromising  hostility  to  Russia.  But  he  is  anxious  to 
insist  that  although  he  advocates,  as  the  thing  of  most  imme- 
diate urgency,  Germany's  obtaining  control  of  the  Near  East, 
he  does  not  regard  this  as  the  iinal  satisfaction  of  Germany's 
claims,  but  as  the  necessary  basis  for  more  magnificent  expan- 
sion later  on: — 

There  are  already  almost  200  millions  of  men  who  speak 
English,  and  more  than  400  millions  more  are  under  the  in- 
fluence of  Anglo-Saxon  supremacy  and  culture.  Unless  we, 
too,  expand  as  a  strong  oversea  people,  the  world  will  end 
by  becoming  Anglo-Saxon.  We  need  territories  in  which  to 
plant  offshoots  of  our  stock  overseas  and  procure  the  raw 
materials  of  other  climates  upon  German  soil.  In  this  sense 
our  policy  in  the  Near  East  is  only  the  preliminary  step 
(Vorstufe)  in  German  world-policy,  and  nothing  is  more 
mistaken  than  to  represent  our  plan  with  regard  to  Turkey 
as  a  rival  to  our  colonial  plan — or  the  other  way  round! — 
(Die  Hilfe,  May  25,  1916,  p.  343.) 

A  few  months  later  he  wrote : — 

Africa  is  one  of  the  three  worlds  which  are  going  through 
a  process  of  reconstruction  (Umbau)  from  within  and  from 
without  before  our  eyes.  ...  In  Africa  the  thing  needed  is 
to  bring  the  enormous  quantities  of  utilizable  ground  and  the 
enormous  quantities  of  utilizable  human  labour-power  which 


xxii 


Introduction 


now  lie  fallow  into  a  fruitful  and  productive  relation  to  each 

other — to  the  advantage  of  the  black,  and  the  advantage  of 
the  superior  white,  race.  The  German  people  must  and  shall 
secure  its  proportionate  share  in  that  work.  Finally — and  this 
is  almost  more  important  than  any  other  point — Africa  on  its 
healthy  uplands  affords  enough  territory  for  settlement,  upon 
which  a  prolific  people  may  grow  up,  German  in  stock,  rooted 
from  African  soil.  Those  are  the  aims  which  we  set  before 
ourselves ;  and  if  the  war  gives  us  for  these  purposes  a  broader 
territorial  basis  in  Africa  than  we  had  before,  it  is  our  ene- 
mies whom  we  shall  have  to  thank  for  it ! — (Die  Hilfe,  No- 
vember 2,  1916,  p.  718.) 

The  unexpectedly  long  resistance  oflfered  by  the  German 
colonies  in  Africa  confirmed,  as  v^e  have  seen,  the  hopes  of 
the  enthusiasts  for  Mittel-Afrika.  In  the  same  article  from 
v^hich  we  have  last  quoted,  Rohrbach  wrote : — 

Our  black  soldiery  has  given  a  very  good  account  of  itself 
in  East  Africa.  In  the  Cameroons,  too,  our  black  troops 
fought  well,  but  the  bravery  and  devotion  to  the  German 
cause  shown  by  the  askaris  of  East  Africa  is  something  won- 
derful. This  is  another  proof,  if  one  were  needed,  that  our 
way  of  handling  natives,  severe  and  at  the  same  time  just, 
is  the  right  way  for  the  Africans  and  superior  to  the  Enf^lish 
system  of  spoiling  them  {dem  englischen  Verhdtschelungs- 
system  iiberlegen). 

In  his  own  paper,  Deutsche  Politik,  Rohrbach  rebuked 
those  who  had  suffered  their  hope  as  to  the  future  German 
African  Empire  to  grow  faint.  The  war,  he  argued,  was 
admittedly  going  to  compel  Germany's  enemies  to  recognize 
the  new  Great  Power  of  Mittel-Eiiropa-plus-TurkQy,  and  if 
it  could  do  that,  it  could  certainly  compass  the  much  smaller 
thing,  compel  Britain  and  France  to  give  back  to  Germany 
her  African  colonies: — 


That  Botha  will  be  seriously  in  a  position,  as  soon  as  the 
war  as  a  whole  is  decided,  to  refuse  obedience  to  the  British 
Government,  when  it  instructs  him  to  give  back  South-West 
Africa,  is  an  idea  which  cannot  be  seriously  entertained. — 
(Deutsche  Politik,  February  18,  1916.) 


Introduction 


xxui 


If  Germany  can  compel  its  enemies  to  recognize  Mittel- 
£wr(9/>a-plus-Turkey,  "then  we  can  also  compel  them  not  only 
to  give  us  back  our  colonies  in  Africa,  but  to  cede  to  us  what- 
ever we  need." 

6.— FRANZ  KOLBE 

In  the  number  of  Deutsche  Politik  for  December  22,  1916, 
is  an  article  by  Franz  Kolbe,  explaining  Germany's  need  of 
a  big  colonial  Empire  with  all  the  stereotyped  arguments. 
The  necessity  of  a  supply  of  raw  materials  for  German  indus- 
tries from  Germany's  own  territories  is,  as  usual,  put  in  the 
forefront.  But  Kolbe  also  indicates  the  importance  of 
Mittel-Afrika  as  a  factor  in  future  wars  between  Germany 
and  the  British  Empire: — 

If  German  Mittel-Africa  comes  about  and  our  former 
colonies  are  given  back  to  us,  German  Central  Africa,  ade- 
quately supplied  with  munitions,  could  hold  out  for  the  longest 
war.  The  larger  this  German  colonial  Empire  is,  the  more 
troops  will  it  be  able  to  furnish,  the  more  risky  will  an  attack 
upon  it  be  for  our  enemies,  and  the  more  enemy  troops 
will  our  colonial  troops  keep  engaged  in  Africa  in  the  event 
of  war.  The  larger  this  German  colonial  Empire  in 
Mittel-Afrika  is,  the  greater  part  will  it  play  in  future  naval 
warfare,  on  the  supposition  that  the  most  important  har- 
bours— Duala,  Dar-es-Salaam,  etc. — are  fitted  out  as  naval 
bases. 

Kolbe  followed  up  the  subject  in  the  same  periodical  on 
February  2,  191 7 : — 

We  must  take  into  consideration  that  the  Peace  is  certain 
to  bring  us  a  big  increase  of  our  colonial  Empire.  .  .  .  We 
may  anticipate  with  assurance  that  our  new  colonial  Empire 
will  be  capable  of  supplying  a  considerable  part  of  our 
demand  for  certain  raw  materials,  as  soon  as  it  is  properly 
opened  up,  so  that  from  year  to  year  it  will  be  able 
to  furnish  increasing  quantities  of  raw  materials  to  Ger- 
many. .  .  .—(p.  153.) 

With  regard  to  the  value  of  African  territory  as  land 


xxiv 


Introduction 


for  settlement — one  may  say  that  the  value  of  German  South- 
West  Africa  and  of  the  uplands  of  German  East  Africa 
have  never  yet  been  sufficiently  recognized;  when  Angola 
passes  into  our  possession,  we  should  acquire  new  territories 
there  also,  adapted  for  colonization  by  white  men.  .  .  .  After 
the  war  we  may  expect  with  certainty  a  reflux  of  Germans 
on  a  large  scale  from  various  foreign  countries,  especially 
of  German  agriculturists.  It  will  largely  be  a  case  of  people 
who  have  already  gained  experience  in  tropical  or  sub-tropical 
agriculture.  .  .  . 

A  discussion  of  the  extent  of  the  future  colonial  Empire 
is  at  present  ruled  out  for  obvious  reasons.  Let  us  assume 
that  the  Peace  gives  us  a  Central-African  colonial  Empire 
which  corresponds,  roughly  speaking,  with  the  territory  which 
England  was  ready  to  concede  to  us  in  the  negotiations  of 
1914 — let  us  assume  that,  besides  the  recovery  of  our  German 
colonies,  we  get  as  our  future  domain  the  whole  of 
the  Belgian  Congo,  the  whole  of  French  Equatorial  Africa, 
and  Angola. 

What  will  the  capabilities  of  this  German  Central-African 
empire  be  for  defence?  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that 
the  frontiers  of  our  several  colonies  will  be  far  less  exposed. 
The  danger  in  the  case  of  the  Cameroons,  for  instance,  will 
be  reduced  by  two-thirds,  since  the  only  frontier  still  needing 
to  be  defended  will  be  that  towards  Nigeria;  the  whole 
French  frontier  will  be  eliminated.  For  German  East  Africa, 
the  need  to  defend  the  western  frontier  will  have  gone;  for 
German  South-West  Africa,  the  need  to  defend  the  northern 
frontier.  We  should  indeed  have  a  new  frontier  to  defend 
in  the  old  French  Equatorial  Africa,  the  northern  Sahara 
frontier — no  very  hard  task — and  in  the  east  there  would 
be  the  frontier  between  ourselves  and  the  Egyptian  Sudan. 
But  this  latter  frontier,  again,  is  far  from  being  exposed  to 
the  same  danger  as  the  French  Cameroon  frontier  in  former 
days,  because  the  Egyptian  Sudan  is  inhabited  by  fanatical 
Moslems,  who  could  much  more  easily  be  stirred  up  to  revolt 
by  instigations  from  the  German  territory  than  induced  to 
attack  the  territory  of  Germany,  the  friend  and  ally  of  the 
Khali f.  German  East  Africa,  it  is  true,  would  still  have  the 
frontier  towards  British  East  Africa  to  defend,  and  thus  be 
still  threatened  from  the  north.  The  south  of  the  Belgian 
Congo,  the  east  of  Angola,  the  east  and  south  of  German 
South-West  Africa  are  conterminous  with  British  territory. 
England  therefore  in  this  quarter,  too,  would  be  our  chief 
enemy.  If,  however,  one  considers  that  German  South-West 
Africa,  with  nothing  but  much-reduced  colonial  troops,  which 
were  intended  (like  the  garrisons  of  our  other  colonies)  only 


Introduction 


XXV 


to  maintain  internal  order  against  native  risings,  held  out  for 
twelve  months,  and  the  Cameroons  for  seventeen  months, 
whilst  German  East  Africa  is  still,  after  twenty-six  months, 
offering  a  brave  resistance,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
English,  if  they  undertook  a  campaign  against  this  future 
Central-African  Empire,  would  have  a  pretty  difficult  job, 
in  order  to  gain  even  such  successes  as  they  have  gained 
in  German  East  Africa,  supposing  we  had  taken  precau- 
tions beforehand  to  put  the  German  colonial  Empire  in  a 
proper  state  of  defence.  We  should  have  no  lack  of  man- 
power, none  certainly  of  native  man-power.  The  principal 
reason  why  German  South-West  Africa  and  the  Cameroons 
had  to  give  in  was  deficiency  of  munitions,  the  second  reason 
was  deficiency  of  foodstuffs.  But  our  supply  both  of  muni- 
tions and  of  foodstuffs  could  be  rendered  secure  without  diffi- 
culty, as  the  different  parts  of  Mittel-Afrika  v/ere  linked  up 
by  railways,  so  that  the  points  of  strategic  importance  might 
be  occupied  in  the  shortest  possible  time  and  the  available 
foodstuffs  transported  from  the  places  where  they  were  pro- 
duced to  the  places  where  they  were  needed.  That  this 
Central-African  colonial  Empire  could  produce  sufficient  food- 
stuffs for  the  white  population — especially  wheat,  maize,  rice, 
meat,  etc. — cannot  be  doubted.  In  marking  out  the  territories 
to  be  ceded  to  us  particular  account  would,  of  course,  be  taken 
of  the  need  to  secure  the  strongest  frontiers  from  the  point 
of  view  of  strategic  defence.  It  would  no  doubt  be  easy  to 
provide  the  colonial  troops  with  arms  and  ammunition  in  the 
first  instance,  and  also  to  equip  adequate  reinforcements  in 
the  event  of  war,  from  the  rifles,  machine-guns,  guns  and 
ammunition,  which  we  have  captured  in  the  war.  Our  con- 
cern would  principally  be  how  to  create  an  adequate  reserve 
stock  of  munitions  and  how  to  make  it  possible  to  replace 
the  munitions  used  up  by  new  supplies  in  the  colonies  them- 
selves, i.  c,  the  erection  of  munition-factories.  Besides  that, 
points  of  strategic  importance  would,  of  course,  be  fortified. 
The  cool  insolence  with  which  the  English  penetrated  into 
the  unfortified  harbour  of  Dar-es-Salaam,  although  they  had 
been  expressly  prohioite'd  from  carrying  out  warlike  opera- 
tions there,  has  proved  to  us  that  the  safety  of  our  colonies 
will  not  be  sufficiently  guaranteed,  unless  we  establish 
an  adequate  number  of  fortified  naval  bases.  Besides  that, 
we  should  have,  of  course,  to  keep  ready  at  hand  a 
squadron  of  fast  cruisers  of  the  necessary  strength,  as  well 
as  the  other  kinds  of  auxiliary  vessels  for  defence — 
submarines,  gunboats,  mine-layers,  etc. — all  in  sufficient 
numbers. 

But  how  are  we  to  find  the  money  for  all  this?  I  hear 


xxvi 


Introduction 


my  readers  ask.  On  this  point,  too,  it  is  not  difficult  to 
see  our  way.  All  the  African  colonies  have  at  present  bor- 
rowed smaller  or  larger  sums  from  their  respective  mother- 
countries  for  the  construction  of  railways,  harbours,  etc.  For 
instance,  the  Belgian  Congo  has  borrowed  about  lOO  million 
marks,  French  Equatorial  Africa  about  20  million  marks, 
Angola  about  the  same  sum.  We  ought  at  the  conclusion  of 
peace  to  be  able  to  insist  that,  in  addition  to  the  indemnities 
paid  us  in  money,  the  colonies  ceded  to  us  should  be  given  over 
absolutely  free  of  debts  and  incumbrances.  By  this  means  we 
should  have  on  the  one  hand  the  certainty  of  the  ceded 
colonies  paying  their  way,  and  on  the  other  hand  we  might 
expect  the  annual  revenue  to  yield  such  a  surplus  as  would 
make  it  possible  to  raise  a  loan,  immediately  the  colonies 
were  handed  over  to  the  German  Empire,  for  the  purposes 
of  defence.  It  ought  to  be  easy  to  provide  the  interest  on  a 
defence-loan  of  from  50  to  100  million  marks.  For  that  sum 
of  money  a  number  of  harbours  might  be  fitted  out  as  naval 
bases — e.  g.,  Dar-es-Salaam,  the  mouth  of  the  German 
Cameroon  estuary,  the  mouth  of  the  Congo,  a  harbour  on  the 
coast  of  South-West  Africa  (perhaps  Liideritz  Bay). 

What  results  would  follow  from  this  erection  of  the  Ger- 
man colonial  harbours  into  points  d'appui  for  the  fleet?  Tne 
whole  coast  of  West  Africa  from  the  mouth  of  the  Cross 
River  to  the  mouth  of  the  Orange  River  would  be  in  German 
possession.  If  one  remembers  what  great  things  were  done  by 
our  Emden  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  by  the  Karlsruhe  in  the  At- 
lantic, without  any  naval  base,  without  any  possibility  of 
replenishing  their  stores  of  munitions,  foodstuffs  and  other 
kinds  of  equipment  in  any  harbour,  one  begins  to  get  some 
sort  of  idea  what  the  fortification  of  half  the  Western  coast 
of  West  Africa  {sic)  would  mean  for  Germany  and  for  Eng- 
land !  As  soon  as  the  Suez  Canal  in  another  war  is  blocked 
against  England  by  the  Turks,  the  whole  traffic  between 
England  and  her  colonies — India,  Australia,  and  South  Africa 
— will  have  to  go  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  But  the 
whole  maritime  traffic  round  the  Cape  would  then  have  to  go 
past  the  coast  of  German  Mittel-Afrika!  What  would  the 
result  be?  It  would  be  impossible  for  England  any  more  to 
concentrate  her  whole  fleet  in  the  North  Sea  and  threaten 
Germany.  Far  from  that,  Englarkd  would  be  compelled  to 
station  a  fairly  large  fleet  in  South  Africa  to  safeguard  her 
commerce,  lhat  would  mean  no  inconsiderable  weakening  of 
the  naval  fighting  forces  in  European  waters. 

The  German  colonies  would  not  only  [not]  constitute  a 
drag  upon  German  sea-power — as  is  asserted  by  a  good  part 
of  the  German  press — but  would  actually,  as  Dr.  Solf,  Secre- 


Introduction 


xxvii 


tary  of  State  for  the  Colonies,  has  already  explained  in 
his  addresses,  furnish  German  sea-power  with  a  valuable 
support.* 

7.— FREIHERR  ALBRECHT  VON  RECHENBERG 

Freiherr  Albrecht  von  Rechenberg,  known  as  a  former 
Governor  of  German  East  Africa,  contributed  an  article, 
entitled  ''Kriegs-  und  Friedenziele/'  to  the  monthly  periodical 
Nord  und  Sud  (February,  1917).  In  the  course  of  it  he 
discusses  the  question  of  German  colonies: — 

That  the  German  Empire  needs  colonies  has  been  so  often 
shown,  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  go  further  into  the  reasons 
why — for  the  supply  of  raw  materials,  of  the  products  of 
oversea  countries,  etc.  All  parties  are  agreed  in  this — that 
the  German  colonial  empire  cannot  be  abandoned.  ...  It 
will  be  best  to  confine  ourselves  to  the  question  what  colonial 
territory  we  ought  to  desire  and  what  territory  it  is  possible 
for  us  to  obtain. 

A  sufficient  extent  of  land  suitable  for  settlement  is  often 
stated  to  be  the  kind  of  colonial  territory  we  should  desire. 
This  seems  prima  facie  a  sound  proposition.  The  question, 
however,  is  whether  such  land  is  to  be  had.  .  .  .  Those  re- 
gions which  offer  quite  certainly  the  sum  of  conditions  neces- 
sary for  European  colonization  are  already  occupied  by  settled 
populations,  which  govern  themselves  and  upon  \yhich  we 
neither  could  impose,  or  want  to  impose,  German  supremacy. 

And  if,  on  the  one  hand,  available  land  for  settlement  is 
lacking,  we,  on  the  other  hand,  equally  lack  suitable  German 
settlers.  The  people  who  cry  out  that  we  should  acquire 
large  territories  for  settlement,  are  thinking  of  times  gone 
by,  when  the  German  peasant-farmer,  who  was  unable  to 
support  himself  from  his  plot  of  ground,  made  up  his  mind 
to  emigrate  and  found  a  scope  for  his  activity,  mainly  in 
America,  to  the  profit  of  his  new  country.  Conditions  have 
changed  since  then.  For  a  number  of  years  now  emigra- 
tion from  Germany  has  been  much  more  than  counterbalanced 
by  immigration  into  Germany.  .  .  . 

Regrettable  as  it  is,  the  fact  remains  that  at  the  future 
peace  there  can  be  no  question  of  our  acquiring  wide  lands 


*  The  end  of  the  article  seems  to  have  been  hurriedly  written.  The 
last  sentence  in  German  is  nonsense  as  it  stands,  but  the  above  render- 
ing gives  what  is  obviously  its  meaning. 


xxviii 


Introduction 


for  settlement:  there  is  no  suitable  land  and  we  have  no  ag^ri- 
cultural  population  suitable  to  be  settlers. 

Of  the  other  regions  which  come  into  consideration,  we 
must  rule  out  all  such  .as  it  would  be  difficult  or  impossible 
for  us  to  hold  in  days  to  come,  either  because  the  native 
population  would  eventually,  as  they  developed,  threaten  the 
colony  in  virtue  of  their  numbers  or  their  degree  of  civiliza- 
tion, or  because  there  were  neighbouring  Powers  whose  in- 
fluence, in  consequence  of  the  local  conditions,  might  jeop- 
ardize the  existence  of  our  colonies. 

New  acquisitions  on  the  coast  of  China  would  fall  into 
the  first  category.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  opening-up 
and  development  of  China  will  continue  to  take  its  course 
after  the  war,  and  that  European  Powers  will  have  to  par- 
ticipate in  that  process,  through  the  persons  of  their  subjects, 
if  they  do  not  want  to  leave  everything  to  the  Japanese. 
But  it  is  most  certainly  irrational  to  hold  colonial  posses- 
sions on  Chinese  territory,  where  they  must  be  felt  by  the 
Chinese  as  an  encroachment  upon  their  soil  and  the  embodi- 
ment of  a  foreign  supremacy,  while  all  the  time  instructors 
and  directors  of  industry  are  bringing  the  military  resources 
of  China  up  to  the  European  standard.  If  the  instructors  do 
their  business,  the  first  use  to  which  the  Chinese  Empire  will 
apply  its  new  means  of  power  is  sure  to  be  the  freeing  of 
its  territory  from  foreign  rule — that  is  to  say,  it  will  deprive 
the  very  people  who  sent  it  instructors  of  their  colonies  in 
China.  Germany  has  already  had  bitter  experience  in  this 
line.  We  may  remember  how  much  Japan  owes  to  German 
military  instructors,  and  we  have  seen  in  this  war  how  Japan 
repays  the  debt.  The  experiment  does  not  tempt  one  to 
repeat  it. 

Colonies  in  the  South  Pacific  belong  to  the  second  category. 
The  development  of  the  Powers  already  established  there  will 
go  forward.  Australia,  for  instance,  will  grow  stronger  with 
the  course  of  time — even  if  England  has  to  relinquish  her 
absolute  command  of  the  seas.  Any  colonies  we  might  ac- 
quire in  that  region  would  be  exposed  to  a  menace  which 
would  grow  greater,  not  less,  with  time. 

The  present  war  has  taught  us  what  characteristics  our 
future  colonial  domain  must  have,  in  order  that  it  may  be 
maintained  even  in  time  of  war.  It  must  be  sufficiently  exten- 
sive to  be  able  by  its  own  inherent  strength  to  defend  the 
main  part  of  its  territory — at  any  rate  defend  it  till  such 
time  as  the  war,  which  decides  its  destiny,  has  itself  been 
decided  in  other  fields,  in  fields  where  the  decision  will  be 
brought  about  by  our  Army  and  our  Navy. 

The  only  German  colony  still  maintaining  itself  against 


Introduction 


xxix 


enemies  superior  in  numbers  is  German  East  Africa.  Ad- 
joining this  is  the  Belgian  Congo.  On  the  supposition  that 
Belgium — as  we  hope  and  as  its  population  desires  [!] — is 
partitioned  between  France  and  Germany,  the  Belgian  Congo 
and  the  French  Congo,  including  the  districts  of  Chad,  Shari, 
and  Wadai,  would  be  attached  to  the  German  domain.  Our 
domain  would  further  be  completed  by  the  acquisition  of 
British  East  Africa  and  Uganda,  in  exchange  for  which 
Kiao-chou,  New  Guinea,  and  our  possessions  in  the  South 
Seas  would  have  to  be  given  up.  This  compact  colonial 
domain  would  offer  within  itself  sufficient  securities  for  de- 
fence and  development.  Togoland  would  be  left  isolated,  and 
would,  it  is  true,  see  its  prospects  of  further  development  thus 
cut  off.  It  would  be  worth  considering  whether  it  would  not 
be  well  to  cede  Togoland  to  England  in  exchange  for  Northern 
Rhodesia  and  Nyassaland,  since  these  British  possessions  are, 
even  as  it  is,  hemmed  in  by  non-British  territory.  As  for  the 
Portuguese  colonies,  the  treaty  would  have  to  be  re-affirmed, 
which  Germany  and  Great  Britain  at  a  former  moment  con- 
cluded with  regard  to  them. 

In  this  way  Germany  would  have  a  colonial  domain  com- 
pact in  itself,  defensible  and  easily  accessible  on  the  West 
coast;  the  domain  would  offer  an  adequate  field  of  activity 
to  the  German  spirit  of  enterprise,  and  would  thereby  help  to 
procure  us  the  raw  materials  we  lack — whether  minerals  or 
products  of  tropical  agriculture.  If  by  our  administration  we 
gain  the  sympathy  of  the  natives,  we  can  count  upon  them  in 
the  event  of  war — as  has  been  seen  in  the  case  of  East  Africa 
Our  colonial  domain  would  have  such  an  extent  that  it  would 
not  be  in  the  power  of  our  enemies  to  conquer  it,  even  if  for  a 
period  the  colonies  were  thrown  upon  their  own  resources. 
Again,  such  a  colonial  scheme  would  altogether  correspond 
with  the  German  programme — territorial  expansion  tor  the 
purpose  of  security  only — and  it  would  not  impose  upon  our 
opponent  any  sacrifices  which  he  would  feel  intolerable.  That 
such  a  colonial  domain  would  confront  German  colonial  ad- 
ministration with  new  tasks  can  no  more  be  questioned  than 
that  these  tasks  would  often  be  difficult  ones;  yet  they  are  not 
incapable  of  achievement,  neither  do  they  demand  any  exces- 
sive financial  outlay,  provided  we  resolve  to  adjust  the  meas- 
ure of  intensive  administration  to  the  amount  of  the  resultant 
profit. 

8.— DAVIS  TRIETSCH 

Trietsch  is  the  author  of  a  pamphlet,  published  in  1917, 
entitled  Afrikanische  Kriegsziele  (African  War- Aims).  We 


XXX 


Introduction 


may  conjecture  that,  unlike  the  writers  already  cited,  he  is 
a  Pan-German,  since  another  of  his  small  books,  Tatsachen 
imd  Ziffern,  is  published  by  the  Pan-German  firm  of  Lehmann, 
and  warmly  recommended  and  circulated  by  Pan-Germans. 
Although  the  principal  exponents  of  Mittel-Afrika  deny  that 
Germany  needs  the  things  for  which  the  Pan-Germans 
clamour  in  Europe,  there  is  no  reason  why  Pan-Germans 
should  not  regard  an  African  Empire  as  one  of  the  things 
which  would  be  thrown  in,  as  a  matter  of  course,  if  their 
European  aims  were  realized.    Trietsch  writes  : — 


The  nearer  the  peace  negotiations  seem  to  be,  the  more 
timely  is  it  to  get  clear  ideas,  not  only  about  possible  or 
desirable  changes  of  frontiers  in  Europe,  but  about  the 
changes  in  territory  overseas  made  necessary  or  attainable 
by  the  war.  Discussions  on  this  head  have  hitherto  turned 
mainly  upon  the  demand  for  a  "Mittel-Afrika,"  as  a  parallel 
to  the  new  Mittel-Europa,  The  joining-up  of  the  most  impor- 
tant German  colonies — whether  in  their  .present  shape  or 
diminished  or  enlarged  need  not  for  the  moment  be  discussed 
— by  means  of  the  intervening  region,  corresponding  roughly 
with  the  present  Belgian  Congo  State,  would  be  a  sine  qua 
non.  Then  the  immense  Congo  region,  which  little  Belgium 
would  be  far  too  weak  to  develop  properly,  would  be  attached 
to  that  European  colonial  Power,  which  got  far  less  than  its 
rightful  share  in  the  partition  of  Africa.  Then  not  only 
would  Germany's  principal  colonies  have  gained  a  new  terri- 
torial coherence,  but  their  strategic  situation  and  their  facili- 
ties for  communication  from  Ocean  to  Ocean  would  appear 
in  quite  a  new  light.  Then  a  German  Mittel-Afrika  would 
enclose  and  round  off  the  Mohammedan  North,  and  help  it 
to  closer  union  with  Turkey,  the  premier  Power  (Vormacht) 
of  Islam,  and  with  Turkey's  political  and  military  allies. 

By  this  Germany's  position  in  the  world  would  gain  in 
essential  strength  of  a  particular  kind.  Even  before,  Ger- 
many's strength  consisted  in  its  being  a  State  economically 
and  politically  compact,  strongly  centred  upon  its  main  posi- 
tion, whereas  the  other  colonial  Powers,  in  the  event  of  any 
conflict,  could  always  be  hard-hit  by  blows  dealt  on  outlying 
parts,  far  from  the  main  seat  of  their  strength.  This  war 
has  shown  that  for  a  Power  in  Germany's  position  the  loss 
of  its  colonies  is  no  decisive  blow,  whilst  for  England  or 


Introduction  xxxi 

France  it  is  unquestionable  that  grave  unrest  or  disturbances 
in  their  subject  oversea  territories — or  even  their  being  threat- 
ened by  Germany  and  her  allies — would  have  changed  the 
whole  military  situation  of  the  mother-countries  for  the 
worse.  .  .  . 

In  future  wars  Germany,  if  only  by  using  the  new  military 
weapons  acquired  and  perfected  in  this  war,  would  be  able  to 
threaten  England's  colonial  dominion  to  a  far  greater  ex- 
tent. The  cruisings  of  the  Emden  off  the  coast  of  India  have 
given  an  indication  of  the  possibilities  in  this  direction.  Sup- 
posing Germany  now,  in  rising  to  a  new  height  of  world- 
power,  can  succeed  in  rounding  off  and  increasing  its  colonial 
territory,  so  changing  a  European  compactness  into  a  Europeo- 
African  compactness,  then  the  junction  of  Mittel-Europa  with 
Mittel-Afrika  by  way  of  Turkey  and  Mohammedan  North 
Africa  would  bring  the  third  Mitt  el  region,  i.  e.,  the  Mediter- 
ranean [in  German  Mitteltdndische  Meer],  to  a  degree  one 
hardly  could  have  hoped  before,  within  the  sphere  of  power  of 
the  group  constituted  by  Germany  and  her  allies.  With  a 
compactness  extending  now  not  only  over  one  Continent, 
but  over  a  great  part  of  the  globe,  Germany  could  deal  such 
blows  to  the  world-wide  interests  and  far-scattered  colonies 
of  her  opponents,  as  would  pre-eminently  deter  them  from 
challenging  her  again.— (pp.  3-5.) 

This  author  lays  great  stress  upon  the  Mohammedan 
element  in  Africa  as  a  factor  v^hich  can  be  utilized  to 
Germany's  advantage: — 

From  whatever  standpoint  we  regard  the  new  world- 
situation  created  by  the  German-Turkish  alliance,  it  is  of 
the  greatest  possible  consequence  that  Turkey,  as  the  premier 
Power  of  the  whole  Moslem  world,  has  an  importance  reach- 
ing far  beyond  the  limits  of  its  territory  and  its  popula- 
tion. .  .  .  The  truth  that  religious  connexions  are  more  im- 
portant in  world-history  than  political  is  illustrated  by  the 
fact  that  most  colonial  ties  carry  in  themselves  from  the 
outset  the  germ  of  their  ultimate  dissolution.  The  popu- 
lations of  colonies  .  .  .  are  bound  sooner  or  later  to 
shake  off  the  foreign  yoke,  and  he  whose  patience  can 
equal  that  of  the  religious  communities  is  certain  to  win  in 
the  end. 

These  general  considerations  have  especial  applicability 
to  Africa — the  "most  colonial"  of  the  Continents !  Africa 
can  be  regarded  as  consisting  of  three  main  divisions — the 


xxxii 


Introduction 


Arabian  or  Arabianized  North,  including  the  Sudan,  the  black  | 
Central  region,  and  the  white  Southern  extremity.  Of  these 
three  regions,  the  whole  of  the  North  and  the  northern  part 
of  the  Centre  may  be  regarded  as  already  Mohammedan,  and 
in  addition  a  long  strip  of  the  coast  stretching  along  the  Indian 
Ocean  southwards  must  be  reckoned  as  belonging  to  Islam.  The 
statistics  and  estimates — very  defective,  it  is  true,  in  the  case 
of  Africa — show  the  majority  of  the  population  as  still  heathen 
(according  to  Ritter,  the  total  population  is  150,000,000,  out 
of  which  80,000,000  are  heathen,  60,000,000  Mohammedans, 
9,600,000  Christians,  and  400,000  Jews),  but  all  agree  that, 
whilst  heathenism  is  receding,  the  gain  falls  in  far  greater 
measure  to  Islam  than  to  Christianity.  .  .  .  The  gains  of 
Christian  missions  are  estimated  at  the  most  as  so  many  tens 
of  thousands  a  year,  whilst  the  annual  increase  of  the  Moham- 
medan community  is  to  be  reckoned  by  millions.  This  was 
the  state  of  the  case  even  when  Islam  as  a  political  Power 
seemed  to  be  on  the  decline.  How  much  more  vigorous  and 
rapid  will  the  expansion  of  Islam  in  heathen  Africa  be,  now 
that  its  premier  Power,  Turkey,  has  got  itself  included  in  the  \ 
most  mighty  group  of  states  in  the  world  and  has  made  vic- 
torious head  against  all  its  foes  on  all  fronts !  The  result 
ought  to  be  that  we  can  even  to-day  look  forward  to  an  Africa 
nine-tenths  Mohammedan,  and  it  will  be  one  of  Germany's 
most  important  tasks  in  Africa  to  further  energetically  her 
political  predominance  alongside  of  the  growing  influence  of 
Islam.  No  other  means  so  effectual  present  themselves  to  stem 
the  encroachments  of  England  and  France  upon  the  Moham- 
medan domain  in  Africa.  But  if  this  policy  is  successful, 
then  we  have  an  altogether  new  world-situation  with  the  most 
extraordinary  prospects! — (pp.  10-12.) 

Trietsch    sums    up    in    conclusion    the  Mittel-Afrika 
scheme : — 

To  found  a  big  colonial  Empire  in  Africa,  reaching  from 
the  South-West  to  the  South-East  [sic,  misprint  for  North- 
East?]  and  up  as  far  as  the  Cameroons  and  Togo,  bound 
into  one  by  regions  which  were  once  French,  Belgian,  or 
(it  may  be)  British — that  must  be  our  aim.  It  is  a  necessity 
for  our  independence  in  the  matter  of  the  supply  of  raw 
materials;  it  is  no  less  so  for  our  position  on  the  seas.  Such 
a  realm,  properly  organized,  would  be  self -maintaining,  and 
could  be  administered  somewhat  after  the  pattern  of  the  Brit- 
ish "Dominions."  The  pawns,  which  ought  to  bring  it  to 
us,  we  hold  in  Northern  France  and  in  Belgium.  .  .  .  We 
might  almost  say  that  this  factor  in  the  terms  of  peace  would 


Introduction 


xxxiii 


offer  the  strongest  evidence  that  we  were  unconquerable. — 
(pp.  30-31.) 

9.— EMIL  ZIMMERMANN 

During  the  last  two  years  Emil  Zimmermann  has  become 
the  most  industrious  preacher  of  the  Mittel-Afrika  gospel. 
Articles  from  his  pen  on  the  subject  have  appeared  in  Das 
grossere  Deutschland,  the  Pan-German  weekly ;  in  Rohrbach's 
weekly,  Deutsche  Politik;  in  the  Liberal  weekly,  the  Euro- 
pdische  Staats-  und  Wirtschafts-Zeitung ;  and  especially  in  the 
Preussische  Jahrhiicher — to  say  nothing  of  articles  contributed 
to  the  daily  press. 

He  himself  wandered  about  a  good  deal  in  Africa  before 
the  war,  through  the  rich  tropical  region  upon  which  he  now 
casts  rapacious  eyes.  In  1910  he  went  through  Rhodesia 
into  the  Congo  State  and  from  the  Congo  State  into  German 
East  Africa.  In  1912  he  made  a  journey  through  the 
Cameroons,  and  together  with  Frau  Zimmermann  visited  the 
French  and  the  Belgian  Congo.  In  1913  he  went  right  across 
the  Continent  from  the  mouth  of  the  Congo  to  Dar-es- 
Salaam.  * 

Zimmermann's  articles  repeat,  but  with  significant 
elaborations,  all  the  stock  arguments,  which  we  have  found 
brought  forward  by  other  writers — the  need  of  Germany  to 
have  a  secure  supply  of  tropical  raw  materials  from  its  own 
territory,  the  value  of  Mittel-Afrika,  as  supplying  military 
and  naval  bases  from  which  the  bands  of  the  British  Empire 

*  An  account  of  these  journeys  will  be  found  in  the  Preussische 
Jahrbiicher  for  December,  1916,  and  January,  1917.  Emil  Zimmermann 
is  not  to  be  confounded  with  Alfred  Zimmermann,  who  was  a  colonial 
attache  in  the  Foreign  Office  service,  and  has  written  a  standard  his- 
tory of  modern  European  colonization;  nor  with  Arthur  Zimmermann, 
the  late  German  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs;  nor  with  Eugene 
Zimmermann,  Director  of  the  Scherl  publishing  firm  and  leading  man 
on  the  Berliner  Local-Anzeiger ;  nor  with  Adolf  Zimmermann,  the  war 
correspondent 


xxxiv 


Introduction 


could  be  broken  up,  whenever  Germany  chose.  On  the  latter 
topic  he  enlarges  with  edifying  freedom : — 

For  our  present  unfavourable  position  in  the  Far  East 
England — apart  from  Japan — is  chiefly  responsible;  the  prin- 
cipal opponent  of  our  expansion  in  the  Pacific  is  Austraha. 
But  we  shall  never  be  able  to  exercise  pressure  upon  Aus- 
tralia from  a  base  in  the  South  Seas ;  we  might  very  well  do 
so  from  East  Africa.  Australia  needs  for  its  exports  (min- 
erals, wool,  meat,  tallow,  butter,  cheese,  wheat)  an  open  road 
through  the  Indian  Ocean.  This  road  can  be  gravely  menaced 
from  East  Africa.  It  is  true  Australian  commerce  might  take 
the  route  round  the  Cape;  but  even  on  this  route  merchant 
ships  would  hardly  be  safe  against  attacks  directed  from  East 
Africa.  The  policy  therefore  both  of  Australia  and  of  India 
might  be  very  strongly  influenced  by  pressure  from  German 
Mittel-Afrika,  and  British  policy,  too,  since  England  has  as 
strong  an  interest  in  unimpeded  commercial  intercourse  with 
India  and  Australia  as  India  and  Australia  have  in  unimpeded 
intercourse  with  England. 

If  we  have  a  position  of  strength  in  Mittel-Afrika,  with 
which  India  and  Australia  must  reckon,  then  we  can  compel 
both  of  them  to  respect  our  wishes  in  the  South  Seas  and  in 
Eastern  Asia,  and  we  thereby  drive  the  first  wedge  into  the 
compact  front  of  our  opponents  in  Eastern  Asia. 

We  are  confronted  in  Africa,  too,  with  a  multitude  of 
enemies,  but  we  can  diminish  their  number  by  compelling 
them  to  cede  great  bits  of  Africa  to  us  and  to  our  allies. 
Besides  that,  we  do  not  stand  alone  in  the  Black  Continent. 
In  the  North-African  Mohammedan  we  have  a  faithful  ally, 
who  in  the  present  war  has  given  notable  proofs  of  his  cour- 
age and  bravery.  By  a  well-directed  policy  we  could  attach 
the  Mohammedans  of  Africa  permanently  to  our  side. 

It  is  therefore  a  comparatively  easy  matter  to  create  a 
strong  position  for  German  power  in  Mittel-Africa — 
(Etiropdische  Staats-  und  Wirtschafts-Zeitung,  June  23, 
1917,  p.  631.) 

Zimmermann  argues  against  those  who  proclaim  that,  if 
Germany  has  a  strong  position  in  Europe,  that  is  enough: — 

A  Germany  weak  at  home  would,  of  course,  not  have  any 
prestige  abroad.  But  if  one  thing  is  certain,  it  is  that  the 
strongest  position  at  home  would  not  sufiice  by  itself.  Japan, 
for  instance,  is  unassailable  in  Eastern  Asia;  but  Japan  can 
hardly  be  called  a  World-Power.  Its  influence  is  quite  small 
even  in  a  region  so  near  to  it  as  the  Indian  Ocean.    A  very 


Introduction 


XXXV 


strong-  Germany,  commanding  the  North  Sea,  would  no  doubt 
be  able  to  prevent  England  from  again  closing  the  English 
Channel  to  it ;  it  would  have  a  free  sea.  But  what  would  a 
free  sea  profit  it  against  the  antagonism  of  America  and 
Japan,  against  the  hostility  of  South  Africa  and  Austra- 
lia? .  .  . 

The  Great  War  determines  the  evolution  of  mankind  for 
the  next  hundred  years.  If  it  makes  Central  Africa  German, 
then  fifty  years  hence  it  may  well  be  that  beside  fifty  millions 
of  blacks  there  will  be  living  500,000  and  more  Germans. 
Then  perhaps  in  German  Africa  an  army  of  a  million  men 
will  be  ready  to  march,  and  the  colony  will  have  its  own  war- 
fleet,  like  Brazil.  It  will  be  a  valuable  ally  for  South  America 
against  North-American  aggression;  the  United  States,  too, 
will  have  to  reckon  with  a  country  so  powerful.  With  this 
country,  well-developed  and  well-furnished,  as  a  basis,  we 
shall  have  been  able  in  the  meantime  to  develop  a  stronger 
position  in  the  South  Seas  as  well.  ...  It  would  be  a  mistake 
to  make  England  strong  in  Africa  in  return  for  British  prom- 
ises to  back  us  up  in  the  Far  East.  An  England  strong  in 
Africa  commands  the  situation  in  South  Europe,  and  could 
get  on  without  us.  But  from  Central  Africa  we  should  com- 
mand the  British  connexions  with  South  Africa,  with  India 
and  with  Australia,  and  compel  British  policy  to  take  account 
of  us.  The  United  States  could  not  permanently  thwart  our 
interests  in  Eastern  Asia  and  the  South  Seas,  if  a  strong 
German  Mittel-Afrika  made  its  influence  felt  upon  develop- 
ments in  South  America.  ,  .  . —  (pp.  631-633.) 

With  regard  to  Mittel-Europa-'p\viS-TvLvkQy,.  the  scheme  to 
which  many  ''Moderates"  attach  the  first  ir^portance, 
Zimmermann,  the  spokesman  of  the  Mittel-Afrika  school, 
takes  the  line  that  though,  in  combination  with  Mittel-Afrika, 
Mittel-Europa  would  be  valuable,  apart  from  Mittel-Afrika, 
it  would  profit  Germany  little.  In  the  first  place,  the  riches 
to  be  got  out  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  he  argues,  are  not 
really  as  great  as  the  more  fervent  enthusiasts  for  ''Berlin-to- 
Bagdad"  imagine: — 


I  have  never  fallen  into  the  error  of  over-estimating  the 
potentialities  of  Nearer  Asia.  Mesopotamia,  in  particular, 
with  its  scanty  population  of  a  little  over  a  million  to  184,000 
square  kilometres,  never  seemed  to  me  the  Promised  Land 
which  within  a  calculable  time  could  even  approximately  sup- 
ply our  demand  for  wool  and  vegetable  oils.    It  is  only  under 


XXXVl 


Introduction 


British  rule,  supposing  that  Britain  throws  some  five  or  six 
million  Indians  into  the  country  and  expends  great  sums  in 
developing  it,  that  Mesopotamia  might  within  a  generation 
become  something  like  Egypt.  Turkey  could  not  develop  it. 
Nor  have  we  the  kind  of  man-power  at  our  disposal  necessary 
for  the  achievement  of  such  a  task. — (Preussische  Jahrbilcher, 
February,  1917,  p.  329.) 

Zimmermann  goes  on  to  appeal  to  German  geographical 
authorities  and  to  the  reports  of  Sir  William  Willcocks,  to 
prove  that  the  stories  of  the  astonishing  wealth  of  ancient 
Babylonia  are  greatly  exaggerated.  On  the  basis  of  Will- 
cocks's  plans,  one  may  calculate  that  the  area  probably  culti- 
vated in  antiquity,  30,000  square  kilometres — the  maximum 
w^hich  the  available  volume  of  v^ater  would  irrigate — would 
take  twenty-four  years  to  reclaim  and  cost  1,200,000,000 
marks  (£60,000,000). 

In  the  second  place,  Zimmermann  argues,  without  a 
German  Mittel-Afrika  to  protect  its  flank,  a  German  Turkey 
could  not  defend  itself: — 

German  East  Africa,  whose  magnificent  resistance  has  had 
far-reaching  effects  upon  the  whole  of  African  Mohammedan- 
ism, has  shown  itself  to  be  the  real  rampart  of  Nearer  Asia. 
The  whole  truth  will  not  come  out  till  after  the  war;  but  even 
to-day  we  can  reckon  approximately  what  an  immense  volume 
of  force  our  East-African  colonial  troops,  in  alliance  with  the 
Mohammedan  peoples,  have  diverted  to  Africa.  If  it  was 
the  object  of  the  British  (and  Russians),  as  is  now  proved, 
to  break  up  Turkey-in-Asia,  it  was  needful  that  North  Africa 
should  be  absolutely  tranquil  before  any  attack  on  Syria  and 
Palestine  from  the  Suez  Canal  could  take  place. —  {Preussische 
Jahrbilcher,  May,  1917,  p.  315.) 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  Africa  has  saved  Turkey- 
in-Asia.  And  if  Turkey  now  desires,  no  less  than  we  our- 
selves do,  a  durable  peace,  which  may  guarantee  it  a  long 
period  of  quiet  work,  we  cannot  fail  to  see  that  the  restora- 
tion of  the  status  quo  ante  in  Africa  is  absolutely  the  mini- 
mum condition.  Without  adequate  flank  protection  in  Africa 
Asiatic  Turkey  cannot  survive.  Without  this  protection  all 
the  money  which  we  have  advanced  to  Turkey  during,  the  war 
will  he  lost.  [The  last  sentence  in  spaced  type  in  the  origi- 
nal.]—(p.  317.) 


Introduction 


xxxvii 


One  cannot  see  how  Mittel-Eiiropa  by  itself  would  be  the 
step  forwards  which  our  own  evolution  and  the  course  of  the 
world  before  the  war  make  it  incumbent  upon  us  to  take. 
The  end  in  view  was  clear :  to  supplement  our  domestic  re- 
sources by  a  great  productive  economic  field  in  the  tropics 
which  was  our  very  own.  And  Mittel-Europa  has  a  value 
only  if  it  helps  us  to  attain  this  end  by  making  it  easier  for 
us  to  hold  fast  our  tropical  dependencies  in  future  world- 
storms.  We  shall  never  be  able  to  render  unselfish  (sic) 
service  to  Bulgaria  and  the  Turkish  Empire  unless  these 
countries  form  a  bridge  to  a  tropical  region  of  economic  value, 
binding  that  region  to  us  by  connexions  which  it  would  be 
impossible  for  England  to  break.  (As  for  the  "freedom  of 
the  seas,"  that  is  not  worth  the  drop  of  ink  used  to  write 
the  phrase).  .  .  .  — (Das  grossere  Deutschland,  July  22, 
1916.) 

The  most  important  decisions  of  the  Great  War  have 
taken  place  in  the  East.  In  that  direction  we  have  attained 
almost  the  whole  of  our  aims — the  enlargement  of  Mittel- 
Europa,  the  clearing  of  all  Russian  influence  out  of  the 
Balkans,  the  securing  of  our  connexions  with  Turkey,  with 
the  Turkish  and  Arab  world.  But  Islam  is  powerful  in  Africa 
as  well ;  it  constitutes  the  bridge  to  our  chief  colonies,  the 
Cameroons  and  German  East  Africa,  which  have  stood  like 
stubborn  corner-pillars  in  the  world-storm.  Clearer  and  ever 
clearer  the  great  thought  stands  out:  Mittel-Europa  and 
Mittel-Afrika  with  the  Turkish  and  Arab  ivorld  as  the  con- 
necting bridge  between  them.  ... 

It  was  a  great  mistake  that  the  old  lines  of  communica- 
tion between  Central  Europe  and  the  Orient  were  allowed 
to  pass  completely  out  of  use  and  oceanic  navigation  came 
to  dominate  men's  minds  exclusively.  This  changed  the  Medi- 
terranean, which,  till  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages,  had  been 
the  connecting  road  between  Europe,  the  Near  East,  and 
North  Africa,  into  a  barrier  of  separation.  Certainly  the 
weakness  and  the  internal  divisions  of  Central  Europe,  which 
prevented  any  effective  influence  upon  the  destinies  of  North 
Africa,  were  partly  responsible;  and  this  rich  land  fell  into 
decay. 

When  a  strong  Mittel-Europa  and  a  promising  Mittel- 
Afrika  are  there,  the  Mediterranean  can  no  longer  be  under 
the  predominant  influence  of  the  Western  Powers;  then  North 
Africa  is  bound  to  rise  rapidly  in  importance.  For  Mittel- 
Europa  the  way  to  Lake  Chad  and  the  interior  of  Africa  goes 
across  the  Mediterranean  Sea  and  through  Tripoli.  We  are 
always  talking  about  the  great  Berlin-Constantinople-Basra 
route;  but  we  ought  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  line  from 
Berlin  to  Lake  Chad  through  Tripoli  is  not  any  longer. 
From  Berlin,  again,  the  way  through  Vienna,  Ragusa,  and 


xxxviii 


Introduction 


Benghazi  in  North  Africa  to  the  north  end  of  Lake  Tan- 
ganyika is  no  longer  than  the  way  from  Moscow  to  Lake 
Baikal. 

If  to-day  anyone  says  in  Berlin:  "I  am  of¥  on  a  journey 
to  Lake  Tanganyika  V  he  is  looked  upon  as  a  curiosity,  so 
immensely  far  away  to  ordinary  German  thinking  is  the  lake 
in  the  interior  of  Africa.  But  in  Russia  a  journey  from 
Petersburg  to  Irkutsk  on  Lake  Baikal  does  not  presumably 
appear  anything  extraordinary.  It  takes  from  six  to  seven 
days. 

To-day  the  interior  of  Africa,  even  the  comparatively  near 
Sudan,  seems  to  us  so  remote  because  we  are  accustomed  to 
have  our  gaze  riveted  on  the  sea,  to  make  long  sea-voyages  to 
the  African  coast  and  thence  penetrate  into  the  interior;  the 
consciousness  that  a  shorter  way  exists,  a  way  already  much 
frequented  in  grey  antiquity,  we  have  lost.  But,  when  we 
have  once  secured  a  flourishing  Mittel-Afrika,  the  conscious- 
ness might  revive.    Why  not? 

It  seems  to  me  that  history  will  lead  us  by  another  way 
than  that  which  for  decades  past  has  been  in  the  mind  of 
our  German  politicians.  We  shall  not  go  by  the  Bagdad 
railway  to  the  Far  East,  in  order  to  seek  there  the  founda- 
tion for  a  Greater  Germany;  we  shall  find  the  foundation 
for  it  in  Mittel-Afrika  and  in  its  connexion  with  the  Arab 
and  Turkish  world.  .  .  . 

If,  fifty  years  hence,  German  Mittel-Afrika  contains,  to- 
gether with  fifty  million  negroes,  five  hundred  thousand  Ger- 
mans, if  great  cities  with  a  rich  life  have  grown  up  on  Lake 
Chad,  on  the  Congo,  on  Lake  Tanganyika,  then  it  will  no 
longer  be  anything  strange  for  a  Berlin  mercantile  firm  to 
give  orders  to  its  traveller  at  the  beginning  of  September: 
'Tack  up  your  box  of  samples,  take  the  Congo  express,  and 
attend  the  autumn  fair  at  Wilhelmstadt"  (as  Stanleyville  will 
then  be  called)  ;  "we  shall  expect  to  receive  your  orders  in 
three  to  four  weeks.  There  will  then  be  time  to  execute 
them  so  that  the  goods  may  be  delivered  at  their  destination 
in  Africa  by  the  beginning  of  December" ! 

It  will  be  a  seven  days'  journey  from  Berlin  to  the  Congo 
or  to  Lake  Tanganyika.  Express  traffic  will  go  across  the 
Mediterranean  and  North  Africa;  sea-borne  traffic  will  go 
from  the  ports  on  the  North  Sea  by  ship  along  the  old  sea- 
routes.  A  new  flourishing  world  will  have  grown  up  round 
the  Mediterranean.  .  .  . — (Preiissische  Jahrhiicher,  February, 
PP-  335-337-) 

Zimmermann  notices  in  one  place  the  proposal  made  in 
England  that,  instead  of  Germany  being  given  back  her 


Introduction  xxxix 

African  colonies,  all  ''colonial  territory  all  over  the  world 
should  be  internationalized."  This  proposal  has,  one  gathers, 
been  supported  by  Sir  Harry  Johnston  in  the  interests  of  the 
black  races.    Zimmermann  is  very  angry  v^^ith  Sir  Harry: — 


It  is  mere  dishonesty  and  lown-down  hypocrisy  {nieder- 
trdchtige  Heuchelei)  when  to-day  Sir  Johnston  raises  his 
voice  for  the  liberation  of  the  Hottentots,  Ovambo  and  Bantu 
negroes  from  German  rule.  And  when  one  reads  the  wilder- 
ness of  lies,  hypocrisies,  distortions,  and  utter  misunderstand- 
ing of  the  actual  situation,  which  English  and  American  states- 
men exhibit  in  speech  and  writing,  one  is  almost  driven  to 
despair  of  such  people  having  any  capacity  left  to  recognize 
the  vital  needs  of  their  own  countries,  let  alone  those  of 
enemy  countries. —  (Europdische  Staats-  und  Wirtschafts- 
Zeitung,  October  6,  1917,  p.  948.) 


With  regard  to  the  internationalization  of  Central 
Africa : — 

Sir  Harry  Johnston  and  his  set  must  not  expect  that  in 
Germany  one  single  person  in  his  senses  (anch  nur  ein  verniin- 
ftige  Mensch)  - will  entertain  such  a  notion.  As  for  the  per- 
mission to  work  alongside  of  others  in  Central  Africa — no 
thank  you  (bedanken  wir  tins  bestens).  As  things  now  are, 
neither  an  internationalization  of  all  colonial  territories  nor 
the  famous  "freedom  of  the  seas"  are  likely  to  help  us  much. 

One  argument  Zimmermann  us€s,  in  order  to  intimidate 
Great  Britain  and  America  by  the  prospect  of  the  conse- 
quences for  themselves,  if  they  prevent  the  creation  of 
Mittel-Afrika: — 

Suppose  the  Anglo-Saxons  succeeded  in  blocking  our  way 
to  oversea  possessions,  the  result  would  be  that  a  process 
would  begin  in  Europe,  which  would  make  Mittel-Europa  find 
its  future  America  in  the  East,  the  South-East  and  Nearer 
Asia.  America  would  then  lose  the  greater  part  of  its  im- 
migrants and  forfeit  an  enormous  part  of  its  power  of  re- 
sistance to  the  yellow  race.  Very  soon  the  American  West 
would  become  a  field  for  yellow  colonization.  .  .  . 

Nothing  worse  could  happen  to  Australia,  South  Africa 
and  America  than  the  exclusion  of  Central-European  man 


xl 


Introduction 


from  oversea  regions —(Etiropdische  Staats-  und  Wirtschafts- 
Zeitung,  October  6,  1917,  p.  948.) 

Since  Zimmermann  has  already  explained  that  if  Mittel- 
Afrika  does  come  about,  it  will  have  the  trade  communica- 
tions of  Australia  and  South  Africa  at  its  mercy,  the  prospect 
for  these  countries  would  seem  pretty  gloomy  either  way! 
They  might  not  impossibly  prefer  to  risk  the  consequences  of 
Mittel-Afrika's  being  prevented.  The  same  may  be  said  of 
the  United  States,  since  Zimmermann  has  indicated  that  one 
of  the  advantages  of  Mittel-Afrika  is  that  it  will  be  able  to 
drive  North-American  influence  out  of  South  America.  This 
point,  indicated  in  an  article  already  quoted,  he  developed  at 
large  in  later  articles,  and  in  this  book : — 

The  interests  of  South  America,  especially  of  the  so- 
called  A. B.C.  States  [Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile],  are  by  no 
means  identical  with  those  of  the  United  States. 

South  America  can  only  develop  vigorously  if  it  continues 
to  draw  to  itself  a  strong  stream  of  immigration;  Brazil  and 
Argentina  especially  are  making  great  efforts  to  attract 
men.  They  are  in  this  way  strong  rivals  of  the  United 
States,  which,  without  the  regular  influx  of  immigrants, 
cannot  keep  up  the  rapid  rate  of  their  development.  For 
the  last  three  years  the  stream  of  immigration  into  America 
has  almost  run  dry;  even  the  United  States  are  hungry  for 
men.  They  will  try  their  hardest  to  draw  to  themselves 
in  the  near  future  the  peoples  now  allied  to  them — Italians, 
Serbs,  Belgians — so  that  not  many  will  be  left  over  for  South 
America.  All  the  more  welcome  will  it  be  to  states  like 
Brazil  and  Argentina,  if  they  are  able  to  get  men  by  our 
means,  and  we  ought  to  commence  an  agitation  on  the  grand 
scale  after  the  war  for  inducing  the  North-American  Germans 
to  emigrate — so  far  as  they  do  not  betake  themselves  to  the 
new  German  colonial  Empire — to  South  America.  We  must 
do  this  on  condition  that  the  South  Americans  adopt  a  policy 
favourable  to  us  in  the  matter  of  raw  materials.  .  .  , 

For  the  Anglo-Saxons  cannot  keep  South  America  per- 
manently within  their  sphere  of  influence,  because  the  in- 
terests of  the  two  sides  are  too  divergent,  and  we  have  it 
in  our  power  to  accentuate  considerably  the  antagonism  be- 
tween North  and  South  America  after  the  war  by  directing 
the  stream  of  German  emigration  on  a  definite  plan. 


Introduction 


xli 


The  aim  of  a  far-seeing  policy  must  accordingly  be  to 
turn  systematically  to  account,  as  required  by  world-wide 
German  economic  and  political  interests,  the  unrest  which, 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  will  seize  great  multitudes 
of  the  Germans  abroad — in  Australia,  South  Africa,  North 
America,  Russia — and  so  prevent  our  enemies'  obtaining 
advantage  over  us  in  getting  control  of  the  cheap  fields 
of  supply.  The  Anglo-Saxon  world  is  systematically  work- 
ing, as  its  straining  after  China  and  South  America  shows, 
to  bar  our  access  to  the  cheap  fields  of  supply,  either  by 
bringing  about  an  agreement  which  will  allow  us  only  to 
purchase  raw  materials  at  increased  rates  or  by  compelling 
all  the  states  which  adhere  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  bloc  to  sell 
raw  materials,  tropical  foodstuffs  and  tropical  luxuries  to 
Germany  by  way  of  English  or  North-American  ports  ex- 
clusively. .  .  . 

The  most  important  condition  in  our  peace-terms  must 
be  the  breaking  up  of  this  World-Syndicate  for  the  supply 
of  raw  materials.  .  .  . 

The  foundation  for  an  independent  German  world-wide 
economic  system  can  only  be  a  territory  of  our  own  amon^ 
the  cheap  fields  of  supply,  a  big  German  colonial  Empire, 
and,  as  things  are,  the  main  part  of  this  Empire  must  be 
situated  in  Central  Africa. —  (Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  July, 
1917,  pp.  135-138.) 

The  idea  of  a  German  Mittel-Afrika  is  so  important,  not 
because  Central  Africa  would  be  able  immediately  to  deliver 
us  any  considerable  quantity  of  raw  materials,  but  because 
it  gives  occasion  to  the  sifting  of  spirits  in  foreign  countries 
as  well.  The  Anglo-Saxon  opposition  will  lose  strength  as 
soon  as  the  Anglo-Saxons  realize  that  our  purpose  is  not 
to  press  them  hard  in  their  own  colonial  territories;  and, 
above  all  else,  a  deep  cleavage  will  immediately  come  to 
exist  between  North  and  South  and  Central  America.  .  .  . 

The  interests  of  these  countries  are  by  no  means  in 
accord.  Especially  they  stand  as  rivals  to  each  other  in 
the  struggle  to  attract  immigrants.  .  .  .  We  have  it  in  our 
power  to  intervene  energetically  in  favour  of  South  America. 
We  and  our  allies  must — always  supposing  that  Central  and 
South  America  pursue  a  policy  favourable  to  us  in  the 
matter  of  raw  materials — turn  to  full  account  the  great  un- 
rest which  has  seized  our  kinsmen  in  North  America  and 
the  Germans  in  South  Africa  and  Australia,  by  ftifluencing 
the  migration  of  Germans,  Austrians,  Hungarians,  Bulgarians 
and  Turks  overseas.  They  must  be  urged  to  go  to  South 
and  Central  America,  except  in  so  far  as  they  are  disposed 
to  betake  themselves  to  Germany  or  the  German  colonies 
or  the  countries  allied  with  us.  By  this  means  we  shall  draw 
the  Central  and  South  American  States  into  our  alliance  and 


xlii  Introduction 

break  their  connection  with  the  Anglo-Saxons,  with  whom 
they  have  practically  no  economic  interests  in  common.  The 
principal  Anglo-Saxon  Powers,  possessing  as  they  do  them- 
selves large  territories  which  supply  raw  materials,  have  no 
interest  in  the  development  of  Central  and  South  America. 
These  States,  on  the  other  hand,  and  the  Empires  of  Central 
Europe  supplement  each  other  admirably. 

The  combination  Mittel-Eiiropa,  Nearer  Asia,  Mittel- 
Afrika,  Central  and  South  America — that  is  what  we  must 
strive  to  bring  about. —  {Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  August,  1917, 
pp.  294-295.) 

To  the  November  number  of  the  Preussische  Jahrbiicher 
last  year  (1917)  Emil  Zimmermann  contributes  an  articie 
pitched  in  quite  a  different  key.  The  variation  is  not  without 
its  humorous  quality.  We  have  seen  him  in  former  articles 
display,  with  exultation,  how  Mittel-Afrika  would  give 
Germany  an  unassailable  position  from  which  it  could,  when- 
ever it  chose,  break  up  the  bands  of  the  British  Common 
wealth,  dominate  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Near  East,  and 
strengthen  South  Am-erica  against  North  America.  Then 
suddenly  he  discovers  that  one  of  his  recent  articles  has  been 
read  with  interest  over  the  frontiers.  A  leading  article  in 
The  Times  of  September  3,  191 7,  had  quoted  from  his  article 
in  the  August  number  of  the  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  and  had 
seemed  to  detect  in  it  a  certain  unfriendly  intention.  Instantly 
Zimmermann  becomes  the  inoffensive,  peaceful,  misjudged, 
oppressed  German.  Mittel-Afrika  is  no  longer  an  armed 
and  menacing  fortress,  but  a  paradise  of  quiet  work  and 
pastoral  refreshment. 

It  is  all  very  well  (so  w-e  are  given  to  understand)  to 
accuse  the  Germans  of  greed  because  they  want  to  get  pos- 
session of  the  Congo  State,  but  if  the  Germans  do  not  take 
it,  it  is  likely  to  be  seized  by  another  Power — Great  Britain 
or  the  United  States ! 

When  in  the  year  1913  I  was  travelling  in  the  Belgian 
Congo,  I  came  across  English  agents  everywhere,  and  the 


Introduction 


xliii 


American  missions  were  so  numerous  and  had  such  abundant 
means  at  their  disposal,  that  they  were  able  to  have  their 
own  big  river-steamers.  On  the  steamer  which  carried  me 
from  Europe  to  the  mouth  of  the  Congo,  an  American  mis- 
sionary was  one  of  my  fellow-travellers,  and  he  had  travel- 
ling with  him  a  simple  sort  of  a  man,  one  Mr,  Hillhouse.  "An 
artizan  attached  to  the  Mission"  {Missionshandwerker) ,  the 
missionary  described  him  to  me.  Information  as  to  this 
so-called  "artizan"  w^as  given  to  the  Belgian  Chamber  by 
the  Minister  for  the  Colonies,  Renkin,  on  March  ii,  1914. 
An  agriculturist  {Landwirt)  from  Kentucky,  he  stated,  named 
Hillhouse,  had,  by  the  instrumentality  of  the  Presbyterian 
Mission  at  Kasai,  started  the  cultivation  of  fruit  trees,  cot- 
ton and  sugar-cane,  and  live-stock  farming,  and  he  intended 
to  induce  a  number  of  married  farmers  from  Kentucky  to  join 
him. 

So  already  in  1913  the  United  States  were  beginning, 
through  the  agency  of  the  Presbyterian  Mission,  to  colonize 
the  Belgian  Congo  with  American  farmers !  Now  let  us 
suppose  Germany  fails  to  get  possession  of  the  Belgian 
Congo.  In  that  case,  Belgium  itself  is  done  with  {auch 
erledigt),  because  Germany  will  in  that  case  refuse  to  give 
it  up.  Then  the  Belgian  Congo  is  without  an  owner.  Of 
course,  England  will  then  lay  claim  to  it.  Or  can  it  be  that 
Herr  Wilson  has  his  eye  on  it? 

/  ask  the  Latin  Republics  of  South  and  Central  America, 
I  ask  the  Brazilians,  what  their  future  is  likely  to  he,  if 
the  English  dominate  the  ivhole  of  South  and  Central  America, 
or  if  Mittel-Afrika  becomes  a  colony  of  the  United  S tales f 

The  feelings  which  came  to  me  on  the  wide  steppes  of 
Central  Africa  must  awake  in  thousands  of  German  hearts, 
and  the  thousand  soul-forces  in  the  German  must  find  full 
scope  in  the  broad  free  New  Germany,  and  beget  a  new 
spirit  in  a  new  generation,  steeped  in  the  feeling  of  large 
spaces — a  spirit  which  will  react  fruitfully  upon  the  old 
Germany. 

Of  course,  this  new  German  stock  must  not  be  allowed  to 
wither  away  again.  It  must  be  able  to  grow  in  quiet  and  in 
peace.  For  that  reason  Mittel-Afrika  must  be  strong.  .  .  . 
It  is  wretched  nonsense,  when  The  Times  talks  as  if  this 
idea  of  Mittel-Afrika  were  suggested  by  a  policy  of  Power 
(Machtp'olitik),  "whatever  may  be  the  garb  it  wears  for  the 
moment."  .  .  . 

The  Times  cannot  understand  that  there  are  hearts  beat- 
ing in  Germany,  whose  dream  is  a  great  New  Germany,  the 
land  of  freedom  over  the  seas,  the  Garden  ^of  Eden  that 
beckons  to  all  that  is  German  all  over  the  earth,  all  that 
travails  and  is  heavy-laden,  whose  spirit  has  been  broken  in 


xliv 


Introduction 


this  unhappy  world-catastrophe  by  the  persecuting  rage  of  the 
English  and  the  North-Americans. 

In  a  great  German  Mittel-Afrika,  where  a  thousand  tasks 
wait  for  accomplishment,  there  can  be  no  room  for  thoughts 
of  conquest  and  world-dominion.  .  .  .  — {Preussische  Jahr- 
biicher,  November,  1917,  pp.  293-299.) 

This  alternation  in  Emil  Zimmermann  between  schemes 
of  far-reaching  mastery  and  the  mood  of  self-pity  and  injured 
innocence  is  something  which  those  who  study  the  recent 
literature  of  German  IVeltpolitik  are  likely  to  recognize  as 
familiar.  It  is  characteristic  of  the  emotional  German,  who 
is  disi)osed  always  to  look  at  himself  in  a  melodramatic  light — 
either  as  trampling  down  the  earth  like  the  invincible  hero 
of  a  saga,  or  as  a  pathetic  figure  of  simple  honesty  ill-used  by 
a  malignant  world.  It  probably  does  not  in  most  cases  denote 
any  conscious  duplicity.  Only  it  is  astonishing  to  outsiders. 
Anyone,  for  instance  who  having  read  the  last  sentence 
quoted  from  Zimmermann's  November  article  in  the 
Preussische  Jahrbiicher  turns  back  to  read  the  article  which 
he  contributed  in  June  to  the  Europdische  Staats-  und  Wirt- 
schafts-Zeitung,  and  from  which  extracts  are  given  above 
on  pages  xxxiii — xxxv,  is  likely  to  find  the  comparison 
sufficiently  remarkable. 

10.— DR.  WILHELM  SOLF 

The  German  Government  is,  of  course,  not  bound  by  the 
statements  of  any  of  the  writers  we  have  passed  in  review; 
the  writers  are  all  unofficial,  although  some  of  them  are  men 
of  high  standing  and  influence,  as  writers  on  public  affairs,  in 
Germany.  It  is,  therefore,  important  to  see  how  far  the 
Mittel-Afrika  scheme  is  endorsed  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment. The  authoritative  exponent  of  the  views  of  the 
Government*  is  Dr.  Wilhelm  Solf,  Secretary  of  State  for  th-e 
Colonies.    Dr.  Solf  is  himself  a  scholar,  whose  studies  earlier 


Introduction 


xlv 


in  life  lay  in  the  field  of  Sanskrit  and  Indian  languages. 
After  holding  an  official  post  for  some  time  in  Calcutta,  he 
was  appointed  Governor  of  German  Samoa  in  1900,  and 
has  first-hand  experience  of  colonial  administration. 

Dr.  Solf  has  made  rarious  speeches  during  the  war  which 
may  be  taken  as  revealing  the  mind  of  the  Government.  So 
far  as  his  manner  goes,  he  is  strikingly  temperate  and 
reasonable,  and  only  passes  into  polemical  asperity,  where 
he  is  concerned  to  rebut  English  allegations.  **The  under- 
lying tone  of  my  address  can  be  only  deep  indignation  and 
fierce  anger  at  the  latest  pronouncements  of  British  states- 
men," he  said,  when  speaking  at  Leipzig  in  June,  1917. 

When  we  examine  the  substance  of  Dr.  Solf's  utterances, 
they  cannot  be  construed  in  any  sense  except  one  which 
endorses  the  Mittel-Afrika  plan.  He  seems  to  avoid  using 
the  term  Mittel-Afrika ;  he  does  not  specify  circumstantially, 
as  the  unofficial  writers  do,  the  regions  which  must  be  taken 
to  form  the  new  German  African  Empire.  But  he  advances 
the  same  propositions,  which  the  unofficial  writers  put  forward 
as  proving  the  necessity  of  their  Mittel-Afrika;  he  lays 
down  their  premises,  and  it  is  therefore  natural  to  suppose 
that  he  draws,  if  he  does  not  enunciate,  their  conclusion. 

In  the  first  place.  Dr.  Solf  is  quite  clear  that  when  people 
on  our  side  talk  about  ''giving  back"  Germany  her  colonies, 
meaning  the  restoration  of  the  territorial  frontiers  in  Africa 
as  they  were  before  the  war,  they  are  talking  nonsense. 
Germany,  he  says  emphatically,  can  never  be  satisfied  with 
the  territorial  partition  which  existed  before  the  war.  Africa 
must  be  re-divided  up  and  portions  allotted  according  to  the 
size  of  the  mother-countries  and  the  amount  of  territory  they 
have  already  elsewhere.  On  this  principle,  Germany  would 
get  a  great  deal  more,  and  Belgium  and  Great  Britain  a  great 
deal  less. 


xlvi 


Introduction 


Gentlemen,  the  position  of  Africa  has  changed  astonish- 
ingly during  the  last  decades  both  from  the  political,  and 
from  the  economic,  point  of  view.  Africa  is  no  longer  the 
Black  Continent,  no  longer  the  unexplored  world  with  a  be- 
wildering multitude  of  dark  possibilities.  To-day  it  is  a 
foreland  of  Europe,  with  appreciable  present  values.  Africa 
will  play  a  part  of  rapidly  growing  significance  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  globe.  The  increasing  demand  for  raw  materials, 
and  before  long  the  anxiety  to  find  a  market  for  manufactured 
articles,  will  lead  to  an  intenser  competition,  in  order  to 
tap  the  African  sources  of  supply.  The  existing  partition  of 
Africa  amongst  the  European  colonizing  states  is  the  result  of 
a  comparatively  recent  development,  in  which,  alongside  of 
antiquated  pretensions  to  sovereignty,  more  or  less  accidental 
events  have  been  the  determining  factors.  .  .  .  There  has  been 
no  question  of  an  organic  process.  No  wonder  that  the 
present  partition  should  to  a  large  extent  lack  any  inherent 
justification !  We  see  states  in  possession  of  gigantic  areas, 
eighty  times  the  size  of  the  mother-country,  which  they  are 
incapable  of  developing  from  a  deficiency  of  men  and  means — 
at  any  rate  incapable  of  developing,  as  civilized  mankind  re- 
quires. This  applies  to  Belgium,  France  and  Portugal.  Great 
Britain,  which  has  already  incorporated  in  its  Empire  im- 
mense tracts  in  other  continents,  has  known  how  to  secure 
for  itself  an  important  share  of  Africa,  a  share  approaching 
that  of  France.  On  the  other  hand,  we  Germans  see  our- 
selves confined  to  territories  which  are  considerably  smaller 
and  which  are  far-scattered.  He  who  desires  a  durable  peace, 
a  peace  of  just  contentment,  cannot  wish  the  present  partition 
of  territory  in  Africa  to  be  maintained,  since  it  in  no  wise 
corresponds  either  with  the  colonizing  capabilities  or  with  the 
relative  strength  of  the  nations  concerned. —  (Address  to  the 
German  Colonial  Society  in  Berlin  on  December  21,  1917, 
reprinted  in  Deutsche  Politik  for  December  28,  1917.) 

As  for  the  suggestion  of  ''internationalization,"  Dr.  Solf 
expresses  himself  as  follows : — 

The  idea  of  a  complete  internationalization  of  the  tropical 
regions  with  a  joint  administration  by  the  European  pro- 
tecting states  is  propagated  by  certain  philanthropic  circles 
in  England.  The  most  emphatic  opponents  of  such  an  in- 
ternationalization are  likely  to  arise  in  England  itself.  But, 
quite  apart  from  that,  an  organization  of  this  kind  would 
be  feasible,  only  if  it  were  supported  by  a  feeling  of  solidarity 
in  the  European  states.  Such  a  feeling  of  solidarity  will  no 
doubt  arise  in  the  form  of  an  aspiration  out  of  the  ruins  of 
this  war,  indeed,  be  established  as  a  fundamental  demand  of 


Introduction 


xlvii 


the  new  spirit  in  international  compacts;  but  before  one  can 
lay  such  a  stupendous  task  as  that  of  ruling  oversea  terri- 
tories in  harmonious  co-operation  upon  the  belligerents  of 
to-day — one  might  say,  upon  the  whole  of  Europe,  as  it  is 
to-day — the  international  consciousness  will  have  to  have 
been  developed  and  confirmed  in  Europe  by  the  actual  prac-  * 
tice  of  international  dealings.  We  must  therefore  hold  fast 
to  the  principle  which  has  hitherto  prevailed  in  colonization — a 
partition  of  the  tropical  countries  amongst  the  civilized 
European  states.  In  the  treaty  of  peace  there  can  only  be 
the  question  of  a  fresh  partition. 

Germany  must  have  her  colonial  Empire,  Dr.  Solf  insists, 
not  because  she  needs  a  field  for  emigration — she  has  no 
surplus  population — but  because  she  needs  raw  materials : — 

We — I  mean  ourselves  and  all  the  European  states — are 
not  likely  to  have  any  superfluity  of  enterprising  young 
men  to  settle  in  Africa — quite  apart  from  the  question,  still 
undecided,  how  far  Africa  is  colonizable  by  Mediterranean 
man.  But  exhausted  Europe  will  have  an  immense  hunger 
for  the  products  of  the  tropics. 

Again,  Dr.  Solf  lays  stress,  just  as  the  unofficial  exponents 
of  M^ittel-Afrika  do,  upon  the  necessity  of  a  continuous 
empire  instead  of  the  former  detached  territories  and  upon 
the  possibility  of  making  a  continuous  area  practically 
unassailable  if  it  is  large  enough : — 

Have  not  our  colonies,  with  such  military  resources  as 
they  had,  displayed  a  resistance  of  which  we  may  well  be 
proud,  and  that  under  the  most  unfavourable  conditions 
conceivable?  Have  not  the  Cameroons  and  German  South- 
West  Africa  been  occupied  by  the  enemy  for  no  other 
reason  than  that  the  war  has  been  protracted  beyond  every 
expectation?  Is  not  German  East  Africa  holding  out  even 
to-day  against  superior  forces  assailing  it  from  all  sides? 
In  view  of  these  facts,  we  have  every  right  to  hope  that 
we  shall  make  our  dependencies  secure  against  all  possible 
attacks  in  the  future,  if  we  lay  to  heart  the  lessons  of  the 
war.  Just  as  the  war  has  shown  that  the  solid  block  of 
Mittel-Europa  is  a  match  for  any  military  coalition,  so  the 
war  has  taught  us  that  in  the  tropics,  too,  the  power  of 
military  resistance  and  the  capacity  for  self -maintenance  is 


xlviii  Introduction 

in  direct  proportion  to  the  sine  of  the  continuous  area.  Just 
as  at  home  we  make  it  a  leading  consideration  to  shape  our 
future  frontiers  in  such  a  way  that  we  need  no  longer 
fear  any  hostile  attack,  so  we  shall  have  to  bear  this  con- 
sideration in  mind  when  we  re-shape  our  colonial  possessions. 

If  at  the  conclusion  of  peace  we  can  draw  the  frontiers 
of  our  colonies  in  such  a  way  that  we  acquire  compact 
territories,  less  exposed  to  attack  from  many  sides,  if  we 
turn  to  account  the  experiences  of  naval  warfare  gained 
in  these  years  in  order  to  safeguard  our  oversea  possessions, 
no  less  than  the  home-lands,  and  make  their  coasts  strong  for 
defence,  if  we  elaborate  a  legal  system  upon  which  a  closer 
organization  of  the  white  population  can  be  based,  if  we 
raise  the  numbers  of  the  troops,  white  and  coloured,  main- 
tained on  a  peace-footing  (erhdhen  wir  die  Friedensstdrke  der 
weissen  und  farbigen  Truppen),  if  we  institute  a  well-thought- 
out  system  of  supplies,  with  great  stores  of  arms,  ammunition, 
clothing  and  miscellaneous  articles  of  equipment,  as  well  as 
of  foodstuffs  and  medical  requirements,  if  we  develop  com- 
munications of  all  kinds  within  the  colonies  and  wireless  con- 
nexions with  the  home-country,  then  we  need  not  in  any 
future  war  look  forward  to  the  certainty  of  losing  our 
colonies  over  again,  but  rather  to  the  possibility,  at  worst,  of  a 
temporary  separation. — (Speech  made  in  the  summer  of  1916, 
reprinted  under  the  title  of  Die  Lehren  dcs  Weltkrie^es  fiir 
unsere  KolonialpoUtik,  in  Jackh's  series  Der  deutsche  Krieg.) 

Dr.  Solf  further  agrees  with  the  exponents  of  Mittel- 
Afrika  in  seeing  the  future  German  African  Empire  as  a 
means  for  increasing  Germany's  power  on  the  globe,  and  he 
indicates,  as  they  do,  how  valuable  its  harbours  might  be,  if 
turned  into  naval  bases : — 

The  motive  which  prompted  us  in  the  first  instance  to 
acquire  our  colonies  was  not  the  desire  for  power.  But 
during  the  war  various  facts  have  emerged,  which  make 
the  continuance  and  elaboration  of  a  colonial  policy  a  neces- 
sity for  us  even  from  the  consideration  of  power.  In  this 
connexion  I  will  only  indicate,  as  a  question  of  prime  im- 
portance, the  creation  of  naval  bases.  The  inestimable  value 
which  such  bases  would  have  for  German  sea-power  was 
generally  recognized  even  before  the  war.  But  to  discuss  that 
matter  lies  outside  my  official  province. — {Die  Lehren  des 
Weltkrieges,  p.  19.) 


Introduction 


xlix 


What  is  all  this  except  to  adopt  the  Mittel-Afrika  scheme 
in  all  its  essentials,  even  in  those  most  calculated  to  alarm 
British  statesmen? 

The  German  Government  is  evidently  determined  to  come 
to  the  Peace  Congress  well  equipped  with  the  fullest 
data  as  to  Central  Africa.  We  read  in  the  Sosialistische 
Monatshefte  (February  5,  1918)  : — 

Paul  Sprigade  and  Max  Moisel,  the  expert  map-makers, 
have  begun,  by  command  of  the  Imperial  Colonial  Office, 
to  elaborate  a  new  series  of  sheets  covering  Mittel-Afrika. 
Of  this  imposing  work,  on  the  scale  of  i :  2,000,000,  the  two 
sheets  covering  the  Eastern  Sudan  have  now  been  issued 
by  Dietrich  Reimer  in  Berlin.  They  are  admirable  in  every 
respect.  With  the  most  conscientious  thoroughness  they 
have  laid  every  accessible  source  under  contribution — esp- 
cially  the  official  French,  British,  German  and  Belgian  maps, 
as  well  as  the  publications  of  unofficial  investigators,  and 
may  well  bring  the  knowledge  of  these  regions  a  good  step 
forwards.  ...  At  the  coming  peace  negotiations  the  geog- 
raphy of  Mittel-Afrika  will  play  a  principal  part. 

11.— "DEUTSCHE  WELTPOLITIK  UND  KEIN  KRIEG" 

The  utterances  of  Dr.  Solf  would  by  themselves  suffice  to 
prove  that  the  scheme  of  Mittel-Afrika  is  not  merely  the 
dream  of  a  group  of  private  individuals,  but  a  project  which 
has  behind  it  the  deliberate  will  of  the  German  Government. 
Such  a  conclusion  is  confirmed  by  further  evidence.  From 
this  we  may  gather  that  the  scheme  was  not  first  adopted  by 
the  German  Government  in  the  heat  of  the  world- war,  but 
represents  a  purpose  of  old  standing.  It  was  in  pursuance  of 
such  a  purpose  that  the  German  Government  before  the  war 
had  entered  upon  negotiations  with  the  British  Government, 
which  had  almost  succeeded  in  getting  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  agree  to  arrangements  calculated  to  bring  German 
Mittel-Afrika  about,  automatically  as  it  were,  in  process  of 
time.    For  in  those  days  there  was  a  very  general  disposition 


1 


Introduction 


among  British  statesmen  to  give  all  reasonable  gratification 
to  the  German  desire  for  a  place  among  the  colonizing 
Povvers.  Dr.  Solf  alluded  to  these  transactions  in  his 
Leipzig  speech  of  June,  1917: — 

In  the  time  before  the  war,  clearly  recognizing  the  im- 
portance of  continuous  colonial  territories  for  the  safety  of 
the  German  nation,  we  had  made  far-reaching  preparations, 
in  order  that  by  peaceful  understanding  and  agreement 
we  might  shape  our  colonial  possessions  in  a  way  correspond- 
ing to  the  most  urgent  colonial  necessities.  .  .  ." 

For  a  long  time  it  has  been  an  open  secret,  even  in 
England,  that  even  before  the  war  we  had  plans  for  making 
a  united  whole  of  our  African  possessions  by  means  of  peace- 
ful arrangements. 

In  this  connexion,  especial  interest  attaches  now  to  a 
little  book  which  appeared  in  191 3,  to  expound  this  very 
policy,  and  which  was  entitled  Deutsche  Weltpolitik  und 
kein  Krieg  {German  World-Policy  and  No  War).  The 
importance  of  this  book  is  that  it  is  declared  by  common 
report  in  Germany  to  have  emanated  from  the  German 
Embassy  in  London.  It  is  even  attributed  by  many  to 
Kiihimann  himself.  Whether  he  actually  wrote  it  seems 
doubtful,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  in  its  main 
purport  it  reflects  his  views.  We  may  infer  that  the  scheme 
of  Mittel-Afrika,  as  presented  in  191 7,  largely  coincides  with 
the  project  which  was  favoured  in  191 3  by  the  man  who  is 
now  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  German 
Empire. 

The  Pan-German  writer.  Count  Reventlow,  recognized  in 
1916,  when  Dr.  Solf  began  to  lecture  on  Germany's  colonial 
aims,  that  his  programme  practically  resumed  that  of  the 
well-known  anonymous  pamphlet  {Deutsche  Tageszeitung, 
May  20,  1916). 

When  the  pamphlet  was  written,  it  would  not  have  been 
possible  to  represent  the  immediate  acquisition  of  the  Belgiaa 


Introduction 


li 


and  Portuguese  territories  in  Africa  as  a  policy  essentially 
pacific.  The  author's  proposal  was  that  Germany  should  in 
the  first  instance  penetrate  these  regions  economically  on  a 
friendly  understanding  with  the  Belgians  and  the  Portuguese. 


No  man  of  intelligence  can  suppose  that  we  would  wish 
to  despoil  Belgium  and  Portugal  of  their  colonial  posses- 
sions. But  it  is  undeniable  that  neither  Portugal  nor  Bel- 
gium has  the  requisite  means  and  resources  for  properly 
developing  its  African  possessions  in  an  economic  sense.  .  .  . 
Since  Portugal  is  thus  reduced  to  require  the  collaboration 
of  foreign  nations  in  order  to  make  anything  of  its  colonies, 
the  question  is,  What  nation  is  to  be  the  one  to  collaborate? 
In  our  opinion  Germany  has  the  most  legitimate  claims  and 
the  most  favourable  prospects.  ,  .  .  Now  if  we  were  to  em- 
ploy a  considerable  proportion  of  our  economic  energy — with 
the  consent,  of  course,  of  the  Portuguese  Government — in 
developing  the  Portuguese  colonies,  it  would  be  on  the 
supposition  that  this  labour  was  not  to  be  lost  to  our  nation, 
as  the  work  of  German  culture  in  the  United  States  and 
in  South  America  is  lost.  In  the  event  of  Portugal's  coming 
later  on  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  profitable  for  it 
to  dispose  of  its  colonies,  we  should  need  to  have  secured 
to  us  a  first  claim  upon  them.  For  this  an  understanding 
with  the  other  European  Powers  is  even  more  necessary  for 
us  than  an  understanding  with  Portugal.  But  we  have  no 
reason  to  expect  that  England  would  oppose  such  claims  on 
the  part  of  Germany.  As  we  have  already  pointed  out 
more  than  once.  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  in  his  speech  in 
Parliament  of  November  27,  191 1,  that  England  did  not  re- 
gard Central  Africa  as  belonging  to  her  sphere  of  interest. 
.  .  .  We  have  every  right  to  count  upon  England's  good 
will.  .  .  . 


Next  to  the  political  considerations,  we  must  look  at 
the  strategical  ones  which  would  bear  upon  the  question  of  a 
colonial  enterprise  in  Central  Africa.  We  have  emphasized 
that,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  we  ought  not  to  contemplate  a 
direct  acquisition  of  territory  in  Central  Africa,  in  the  near 
future.  But  since  Portugal  would  be  quite  incapable  of 
defending  its  possessions  against  the  attack  of  a  Great 
Power,  the  case  might  occur  of  our  having  to  defend  the 
economic  interests  we  had  created — all  the  more,  since  at  a 
more  distant  future  the  possibility  of  a  formal  acquisition 
might  present  itself.  ... 


lii 


Introduction 


There  is  no  strong  military  Power  in  Central  Africa;  in- 
deed, no  territorial  Power  at  all,  which  might  become  a 
danger  to  us.  In  the  neighbouring  foreign  colonies  only 
relatively  small  colonial  forces  are  stationed,  which  could 
never  act  effectively  over  such  immense  areas.  The  militia 
of  the  South  African  Union  constitute  indeed  an  excellent 
force  for  the  defence  of  the  country  itself,  but  would  not 
lend  themselves  in  anything  like  the  same  degree  to  purposes 
of  attack  or  conquest.  We  should  be  absolutely  safe  against 
attacks  from  European  Powers  by  land.  As  for  attacks  by 
sea,  the  strongest  enemy  fleet  could  as  little  conquer  an 
African  colony  as  an  African  colonial  force  could.  Besides, 
the  conditions  of  a  naval  war  in  the  open  Ocean  are  much 
more  favourable  to  us  than  those  of  a  war  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean Sea.  ...  As  soon  as  we  have  got  clear  of  the  North 
Sea  and  the  English  Channel,  we  have  the  free  Ocean  before 
us.  .  .  .  The  English  twenty-five  years  ago  recognized  quite 
clearly  that  they  would  have  to  abandon  all  commercial  traf- 
fic, as  well  as  the  regular  transport  of  troops  to  India,  by 
the  Suez  Canal,  and  fall  back  upon  the  old  route  round  the 
Cape,  if  ever  a  maritime  war  broke  out  in  Mediterranean 
waters.  ... 

From  the  point  of  view  of  international  law,  the  creation 
of  large  German  economic  interests  in  foreign  colonies  might 
appear  an  anomaly;  but  this  anomaly  has  become  a  regular 
feature  of  modern  colonial  policy.  [Here  the  author  gives 
the  instances  of  Austria  in  Bosnia,  England  in  Egypt,  France 
in  Morocco,  Russia  and  England  in  Persia.]  The  experience 
of  modern  colonial  policy  teaches  that  the  point  to  which 
the  chief  importance  should  be  attached  in  the  first  instance 
is  to  get  assured  possession  by  diplomatic  methods  of  certain 
spheres  of  economic  interest  to  start  with,  and  then  effect 
economic  penetration.    The  rest  will  come  of  itself.  .  .  . 

One  of  the  first  considerations  would  be  to  develop  the 
lines  of  communication. 

It  is  not  part  of  our  present  purpose  to  discuss  the  princi- 
ples which  ought  to  guide  us  in  the  matter  of  communica- 
tions and  railways  in  Central  Africa.  We  will  confine  our- 
selves to  pointing  out  this  single  fundamental  principle :  From 
the  point  of  view  of  ways  and  communications  the  whole  of 
Central  Africa  must  be  treated  as  a  single  area.  All  projects 
must  start  with  this  principle.  If  we  want  to  pursue  a 
parochial  policy  in  Africa,  we  shall  only  end  by  arresting 
economic  development,  and,  in  the  long  run,  we  shall  have  in- 
curred heavier  expenditure.  But  if  we  want  to  inaugurate 
in  Central  Africa  a  policy  on  the  grand  scale  with  regard  to 
communications,  we  must  likewise  secure  the  inclusion  of  the 
Belgian  Congo  within  the  future  system,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose we  must  try  to  obtain  the  consent  of  Belgium.  .  ,  .  We 


Introduction 


liii 


have  reason  to  hope  that  Belgium,  by  its  new  policy  of 
reforms,  will  now  repair  the  mistakes  and  the  crimes  of  the 
past.  Nevertheless,  it  appears  doubtful  whether  the  Belgian 
people  is  able  and  willing  to  devote  the  large  sums  of  money 
necessary  to  transform  the  Belgian  Congo  into  a  flourishing 
colony.  .  .  .  Another  difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  Belgium  is 
hard  put  to  it  to  recruit  its  present  body  of  officials,  and,  in 
particular,  to  find  individuals  of  a  better  sort  than  those  em- 
ployed since  the  Leopold  regime.  .  .  . 

In  certain  anti-German  organs,  the  idea  has  sometimes  been 
propagated  that  Germany  cherishes  secret  designs  on  the  Bel- 
gian colony !  Against  such  suggestions  the  most  vigorous 
protest  must  be  made.  Germany  and  Belgium  have  be- 
come neighbours  at  more  than  one  point  in  Central  Africa, 
and  both  sides  recognize  ever  more  and  more  the  community 
of  our  colonial  interests  and  the  necessity  of  a  close  collabora- 
tion; Apart  from  the  seamy  sides  of  the  Leopold  regime,  the 
Belgians  have  shown  themselves  vigorous  and  courageous 
colonists;  and,  practical  people  as  they  are,  they  will  warmly 
welcome  the  help  of  German  capital,  since  it  is  difficult  for 
them  to  turn  their  colony  to  account  by  their  own  resources. 


In  his  interesting  pamphlet  on  the  New  Cameroons,  Emil 
Zimmermann  shows  how  intimately  intertwined  the  interests 
of  Belgium  and  Germany  in  Central  Africa  with  regard 
to  the  development  of  communications  are  bound  to  be. 
He  insists  rightly  that  Belgium  could  only  regard  with  plea- 
sure the  advent  of  the  German  spirit  of  enterprise  in  the 
navigation  of  the  Congo.  On  the  basis  of  his  first-hand  study 
of  local  conditions,  Zimmermann  comes  to  this  conclusion: 
"To-day  it  might  seem  rash  to  predict  that  in  lo  or  12  years 
Central  Africa  will  have  a  trade  of  1,000,000,000  marks:  when 
the  next  four  or  five  years  of  peaceful  development  [1914, 
1915,  1916,  1917,  1918!]  have  passed  over  this  region,  this 
'prophecy'  will  no  longer  seem  anything  incredible." 

Already  therefore  in  1913  v^c  find  a  contact  of  thought 
between  the  entourage  of  Kiihlmann  and  the  chief  exponent 
of  Mittel-Afrika,  the  author  of  the  book  here  presented  to 
the  English  reader.  There  is  another  point  of  contact  in  the 
relative  depreciation  of  the  potentialities  of  Turkey-in-Asia 
by  the  author  of  the  1913  pamphlet.  He  does  not  indeed 
want  Germany  to  give  up  all  her  interest  in  the  future  of 


liv  Introduction 

Turkey,  but  he  lays  great  stress  on  the  dangers,  should  Ger- 
many allow  herself  to  become  entangled  with  the  Turkish 
Empire. 

He  is  concerned  to  show  how  much  safer,  and  how  much 
richer,  the  prospects  are,  which  are  afforded  by  Central 
Africa.  With  this  we  may  compare  the  views  of  Zimmermann 
in  1917  (pages  xxxv  and  xxxvi). 

Again  the  author  of  the  anonymous  pamphlet  uses 
language  closely  parallel  to  Hans  Delbriick's,  quoted  above, 
as  to  the  kind  of  people  for  whom  Germany  needs  an  outlet 
overseas.  Germany,  the  author  points  out,  like  Delbriick, 
has  no  surplus  population  in  the  proper  sense.  But  there  is 
a  surplus  of  the  German  educated  class  who  could  go  and 
direct  native  labour.  Germany  does  not  need  colonies  to 
give  her  emigrants  a  permanent  home  (Siedlungskolonien)  ; 
but  she  needs  spheres  reserved  to  her,  within  which  German 
capital  and  German  brains  and  German  technical  science 
could  find  scope  in  the  production  and  export  of  raw  materials 
for  German  industries. 

As  a  commentary,  it  is  interesting  to  see  what  one  of  the 
best-informed  Englishmen,  Mr.  George  Saunders,  formerly 
correspondent  of  The  Times  in  Berlin,  wrote  in  the  autumn 
of  1914: — 

The  settlement  of  the  Morocco  crisis  of  191 1  was  one  of 
the  worst  products  of  modern  diplomacy.  It  may  have 
temporarily  freed  the  hands  of  France  for  her  task  in 
Morocco,  but  the  partition  of  the  French  Congo  which  it 
affected,  with  two  horns  of  territory  from  the  German  Came- 
roons  abutting  upon  the  Congo  River,  manifestly  established 
an  untenable  situation,  and  can  only  have  been  designed  as 
a  prelude  to  aggressive  German  action  against  the  Congo  Act 
and  the  Congo  State.  German  designs  upon  the  Colonies  of 
France,  which  have  since  been  openly  confessed  by  the 
German  Chancellor  (White  Paper  on  the  European  Crisis, 
No.  85)  assuredly  embraced  the  acquisition  of  France's  re- 
versionary rights  to  the  Belgian  Congo.  Moreover,  it  seems 
probable  that  the  invasion  of  Belgium  and  the  destruction  of 


Introduction 


Iv 


her  towns  by  the  methods  of  the  Huns  was  part  of  a  plan 
for  securing  at  the  end  of  a  successful  war  the  surrender  of 
Belgium's  Congo  possessions  as  the  price  of  peace.  The 
wholesale  destruction  of  Belgium's  economic  resources,  it  was 
doubtless  calculated,  would  render  it  impossible  for  her  in 
any  case  to  prosecute  her  great  Central  African  enterprise. — 
(The  Last  of  the  Huns,  pp.  150,  151.) 

In  the  ultimatum,  it  is  true,  sent  to  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment on  August  2,  1914,  the  German  Government  "pledges 
itself  to  guarantee  in  the  fullest  extent  at  the  conclusion  of 
peace  the  existing  territories  (Besitzstand)  and  independence 
of  the  kingdom."  This  phrase  does  not  seem  to  bind 
Germany  in  respect  to  the  B-elgian  territory  in  Africa. 
The  French  translation  given  in  the  Belgian  Grey  Book: 
"Le  '  Gouvernement  allemand  de  son  cote  s'engage,  au 
mom-ent  de  la  paix,  a  garantir  le  royaume  et  ses  possessions 
dans  toute  leur  etendue,"  is  now,  I  believe  regarded  by  the 
Belgian  Government  as  incorrect. 


12.— BRITISH  OPPOSITION  TO  MITTEL-AFRIKA 


Dr.  Solf  knows  that  the  scheme  for  a  German  African 
Empire  is  now  likely  to  encounter  opposition  from  the  British 
Commonwealth,  and  the  opposition  arouses  his  anger.  It 
seems  to  him  so  manifestly  unreasonable.  Indeed  if  one  could 
accept  his  postulate,  that  the  extent  of  colonial  territory 
possessed  by  any  European  Power  ought  in  all  cases  to  be 
proportionate  to  the  size  of  the  Power,  it  would  be  mathe- 
matically demonstrable  that  Germany  had  too  little  and 
Belgium  and  Great  Britain  too  much.  But  the  question 
becomes  less  simpk,  if  we  have  to  consider,  not  only  the 
size  of  a  Power  but  its  character.  It  is  no  good  pretending 
that  the  question  of  an  increase  of  German  power  in  Africa 
has  not  become  a  very  different  one  since  the  revelation  of  the 
character  of  Germany  as  a  State  which  the  world  has  had 


Ivi  Introduction 

since  1914.  Dr.  Solf  talks  as  if  all  the  suspicions  of  what 
Germany  might  do,  if  she  had  her  African  Empire,  were 
gratuitous  inventions : — 

Our  enemies,  with  their  characteristic  dexterity,  twist  the 
facts;  they  tax  us  with  preparing  for  colonial  war  in  ad- 
vance, and,  as  a  deterrent,  they  depict  the  fearful  highhanded 
acts  of  aggression  which  the  world  must  be  prepared  for  on 
our  part  in  the  future,  if  we  continued  to  be  a  colonial  Power 
and  if  Prussian  militarism  had  a  field  for  its  rage  in  Africa. 


But  one  has  only  to  look  back  at  the  quotations  on 
preceding  pages  to  see  that  what  we  fear  is  no  more  than 
what  the  Germans  themselves  proclaim  that  they  intend.  If 
Dr.  Solf  could  by  an  effort  of  the  imagination  place  himself  at 
the  standpoint  of  a  statesman  of  the  British  Commonwealth, 
would  it  appear  to  him  anything  unreasonable  that  we  should 
be  loth  to  see  Germany — Germany  as  she  still  is  to-day — 
acquire  a  position  in  which  she  would  have  the  connexions 
of  the  British  Commonwealth  at  her  mercy? 

We  cannot,  however,  do  justice  to  the  German  position 
unless  we  realize  that  for  Germans  the  fundamental  con- 
sideration is  that  unless  Germany  does  get  Mittel-Afrika, 
the  British  Commonwealth  will  have  Germany  at  its  mercy; 
we  could  at  any  moment,  they  say,  ruin  Germany  by  cutting 
her  off  from  the  raw  materials  of  Africa. 

Are  we,  then,  to  conclude  that  the  state  of  the  case  is 
this :  Either  Germany  at  the  mercy  of  the  British  Common- 
wealth or  the  British  Commonwealth  at  the  mercy  of  Ger- 
many: one  of  the  two?  It  must  be  ill  for  the  peace  of 
mankind  if  this  is  so. 

One  may  observe  that  the  presupposition  in  all  such  argu- 
ments is  that  the  old  state  of  the  world  in  which  every  nation 
depends  for  its  safety  simply  upon  its  own  strength  and  the 
alliances  it  may  form  at  discretion — the  state  which  has  been 
described  as  that  of  ''international  anarchy" — goes  on  after 


Introduction 


Ivii 


the  war  as  before.  Supposing  in  its  place  something  of  the 
nature  of  a  League  of  Nations  arises,  there  will  no  longer 
be  a  question  of  any  nation  being  at  the  mercy  of  any  other 
nation.  The  international  authority  will  be  able  to  bring  to 
bear  against  any  Power  which  acts  towards  another  in  a  way 
regarded  by  the  general  conscience  of  the  world  as  unjust 
the  strength,  exercised  either  by  military  or  by  economic 
pressure,  of  all  the  rest.  If  confidence  in  such  an  organization 
of  the  world  were  once  established,  a  nation  would  be  able 
to  forgo  many  safeguards  which  it  dare  not  forgo  in  the  state 
of  international  anarchy. 

So  long  as  such  a  state  goes  on,  no  British  statesman 
could,  without  betraying  his  trust,  put  the  Commonwealth  in 
a  position  in  which  it  was  always  exposed  to  paralyzing  blows 
from  Germany.  One  can  imagine  what  the  feelings  of  the 
future  citizens  of  the  Commonwealth,  British  or  South 
African,  would  be  towards  the  men  of  this  generation,  if  they 
had  always  upon  them  the  incubus  of  a  great  military  German- 
African  Power,  and  remembered  that  there  had  been  a 
moment  when  the  German  rule  had  been  cleared  out  of  Africa, 
and  a  little  firmness  on  our  part  (so  it  would  seem  to  them) 
would  have  saved  Africa  and  the  Commonwealth  and  the 
world  for  good  from  this  frightful  complication,  which  made 
it  possible  for  the  British  Commonwealth  to  live  only  at  the 
price  of  an  unremitted  agonizing  efifort. 

If  this  is  not  to  be,  the  only  alternative  courses  would 
seem  to  be  either  to  keep  the  Germans,  as  a  political  and 
military  Power,  wholly  out  of  Africa,  and  guarantee  to  them 
by  securities  of  another  kind,  by  definite  treaties  and  by  fair 
practice,  their  supply  of  raw  materials  on  equal  terms,  or  to 
strive  for  an  effectual  League  of  Nations. 

If  such  a  League  could  be  established  as  the  result  of 
this  war  it  would  indeed  be  an  end  which  might  seem  to  repay 
the  agonies  and  efforts  of  four  years.    So  long  as  there  is  a 


Iviii 


Introduction 


chance  of  it,  to  continue  in  the  old  state  of  international 
anarchy,  however  strong  the  securities  may  be  which  we,  as 
a  single  Power,  obtain,  would  be  a  poor  satisfaction  in 
comparison. 

There  is  further  the  humanitarian  consideration  as  to  how 
the  black  peoples  would  be  affected  by  being  put  back,  or 
put  for  the  first  time,  under  German  rule.  On  this  topic  Dr. 
Solf  has  a  great  deal  to  say.  He  implies  that  the  English  are 
dishonest  in  instituting  an  atrocity  campaign  against  the 
Germans.  It  is  fair  to  remember  that  Dr.  Solf's  own  record 
as  a  colonial  administrator  is  a  high  one  in  the  matter  of 
justice  and  solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  the  native  peoples. 
He  seems  ready  to  admit  that  German  colonial  history  has 
been  disfigured  by  some  great  atrocities,  but  he  maintains, 
on  the  one  hand,  that  serious  efforts  have  been  made  in 
recent  years,  since  Dernburg's  reforms,  to  correct  abuses, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  no  Europeans  have  an 
absolutely  clean  record,  and  the  British  a  worse  record 
than  the  Germans.  Here  again,  it  is  fair  to  do  justice 
to  the  movement  for  considerate  treatment  of  the 
native  i>eoples,  which  had  no  doubt  made  some  way  in 
Germany  before  the  war  and  had  found  support  in  missionary, 
as  well  as  in  Social  Democrat,  circles.  Yet  this  would  not 
dispense  the  British  from  the  duty  of  examining  very  carefully 
what  in  actual  practice  German  rule  in  Africa  had  been  before 
consigning  to  it  multitudes  of  the  primitive  races.  We  may 
grant  Dr.  Solf  that  a  catalogue  of  particular  atrocities  is  not  a 
conclusive  argument.  Neither,  may  we  say,  is  his  argument 
conclusive,  when  he  appeals  to  the  fidelity  of  the  black  troops 
in  East  Africa.  For,  as  has  since  then  been  publicly  pointed 
out,  the  Germans  seem  to  have  given  their  black  soldiers 
considerable  privileges,  which  enabled  them  to  hector  it  over 
the  rest  of  the  population,  and  their  fidelity  would  not  there- 
fore in  itself  prove  the  humane  character  of  German  rule 


Introduction 


lix 


as  a  whole.  For  a  really  objective  valuation  of  the  records 
of  the  different  European  Pov^ers  in  Africa  no  doubt  a  mass 
of  detailed  local  knov^ledge  is  required  which  very  few  men 
in  any  European  country  can  possess.  But  in  this  connexion 
the  ordinary  Englishman  may  reasonably  be  moved  by  the 
streams  of  tendency  which  he  finds  prevalent  in  Germany 
itself.  We  may  recognize  the  liberal  and  philanthropic  cur- 
rents, yet  we  cannot  but  also  see  that  the  Zabern  spirit  and 
the  worship  of  strength  as  such  has  still  great  hold  in  those 
circles  from  which  the  men  sent  to  bear  command  in  the 
tropics  would  largely  be  drawn.  Supposing  the  political 
developments  of  the  future  should  bring,  let  us  say,  the  Social 
Democrat  Party  to  power  in  Germany,  the  question  of 
German  rule  over  black  people  would  at  once  become  a  very 
different  one.  Leaving  particular  acts  of  atrocity  aside,  it 
can  hardly  be  questioned  that  German  rule,  as  a  whole,  has  a 
harsh  character  as  compared  with  British.  This  is  admitted, 
for  instance,  by  Rohrbach  in  the  passage  quoted  above  where 
he  describes  the  British  methods,  in  comparison  with  the 
German,  as  "V erhdtschelung,"  ''spoiling."  The  same  thing 
seems  to  be  indicated  by  Dr.  Solf,  when  he  speaks  of  a 
"native  policy  based  on  false  humanitarianism"  (Speech  at 
Leipzig,  reported  in  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  for 
June  8,  1917). 

Dr.  Solf  has  dealt  at  some  length  with  the  use  of  black 
man-power  for  military  purposes.  He  declares  himself  to  be 
on  principle  emphatically  against  the  "militarizing  of  the 
natives."  What  he  says  runs  counter  to  some  of  the  hopes 
expressed  by  unofficial  propagators  of  the  Mittel-Afrika 
idea,  as  may  be  seen  by  previous  quotations. 


There  can  be  no  question  that  the  possibility  of  falling 
back  upon  vast  reserves  of  black  man-power  for  the  armies 
of  the  future  will  constitute  a  new  and  menacing  danger 
for  the  peace  of  Europe.    The  European  Powers  have  there- 


Ix  Introduction 

fore  a  common  interest  in  obviating  the  new  peril  which  has 
suddenly  risen  above  the  horizon.  The  peril  is  recognized  by 
our  enemies  as  well  as  by  ourselves. —  (Speech  of  December 
21,  1917.) 

And  here  Dr.  Solf  takes  occasion  to  tax  the  enemy  with 
distorting  facts  by  attributing  to  the  Germans  the  design  of 
creating  big  black  armies  in  Africa.  He  especially  censures 
Sir  Harry  Johnston  for  som-Q  statements  of  his  which 
appeared  in  the  Manchester  Guardian  of  July  4,  191 7.  Sir 
Harry  had  stated  that  German  Ministers  in  office  had 
"indirectly  but  plainly  enough"  indicated  that  they  cherished 
those  plans.    Dr.  Solf  replies : — 

I  am  the  only  German  Minister  in  office  who  has  spoken 
about  the  militarization  of  Africa — in  Leipzig  recently — and 
what  I  said  was  exactly  the  opposite,  namely,  that  we  do  rot 
desire  the  militarization  of  the  black  races  of  Africa !  The 
best  way  of  preventing  such  militarization  is  to  agree  to  the 
new  partitioning  of  the  Continent  which  we  ask  for.  If  an 
equipoise  of  power  all  round  is  substituted  for  the  unequal 
distribution  which  has  prevailed  hitherto,  it  ceases  to  be 
possible  for  any  one  colonial  Power  to  transport  black  forces 
to  Europe  without  exposing  the  colony  to  the  danger  of  an  at- 
tack by  the  equally  strong  neighbour  Power.  But  the  in- 
terest which  any  Power  may  have  in  organizing  native  armies 
will  be  very  much  diminished,  when  there  can  no  longer  be 
any  question  of  employing  them  in  Europe  or  anywhere  out- 
side the  country.  Since,  however,  our  attitude  to  the  whole 
question  is  one  of  principle,  we  shall  be  ready  to  go  farther 
and  promote  any  limitation  by  agreement  of  armaments  in 
Africa. — (Speech  of  December  21,  1917.) 

One  may  believe  that  Dr.  Solf  is  quite  sincere  in  desiring 
to  save  the  world  from  the  evils  which  he  rightly  discerns  to 
follow  from  the  extensive  use  of  black  armies  in  the  quarrels 
of  European  Powers.  Yet  his  argument  is  a  curious  one. 
The  army,  black  and  white,  of  the  German  African  Empire 
is  in  the  first  instance  to  be  increased  (see  quotation  on 
page  i)  till  it  is  so  formidable  to  the  neighbouring  Powers 
that  they  do  not  dare  to  send  their  black  armies  to  Europe. 


Introduction 


Ixi 


They  will  then  lose  interest  in  their  black  armies  and  reduce 
their  number!  Then  Germany  will  be  willing  to  agree  to 
reduce  hers! 

We  should  not  overlook  one  special  factor  of  danger  to 
the  native  peoples  in  the  return  of  German  rule.  As  Dr. 
Oskar  Karstedt  showed  above  (page  xii),  the  Germans  are 
very  sensible  of  the  blow  given  to  their  prestige  by  the  con- 
quest of  the  German  colonies.  We  need  not  accept  as  true  the 
stories  propagated  in  Germany  of  gratuitous  humiliations  in- 
flicted upon  Germans  by  the  conquerors.  When  the  time  comes 
for  impartial  investigators  to  examine  such  charges,  they  will 
also  have  to  take  account  of  the  circumstantial  charges  made 
against  the  Germans  of  atrocious  conduct  towards  English 
men  and  women  and  the  native  Christians  attached  to  British 
missions.  The  experiences  of  the  Universities'  Mission  to 
Central  Africa  have  already  been  given  publicity  in  England. 
We  have  nothing  here  to  do  with  such  stories  told  on  either 
side.  Apart  from  anything  done,  or  not  done,  by  individual 
Englishmen  to  individual  Germans,  the  expulsion  of  the 
Germans  from  their  colonies  has  in  itself  inflicted  a  grave  blow 
upon  German  prestige.  And,  as  Dr.  Karstedt  pointed  out, 
Europeans  believe  that  their  government  of  black  peoples 
largely  rests  upon  prestige.  If  the  Germans  returned  to  their 
colonies,  it  is  not  likely  that  they  would  be  able  to  restore 
their  prestige,  as  Dr.  Karstedt  desires,  by  compelling  the 
British  to  do  public  penance,  and  failing  that,  they  would 
certainly  be  under  strong  temptation  to  remedy  the  disad- 
vantage by  revenging  themselves  ruthlessly  upon  all  who  had 
shown  friendliness  to  the  British  and  make  the  native  peoples 
generally  feel  the  weight  of  their  hand. 

The  whole  question  of  a  German  oversea  empire  would, 
of  course,  take  on  a  very  different  complexion,  if  the  German 
state  came  to  be  directed  by  a  new  spirit.    It  would  probably 


Ixii 


Introduction 


not  be  safe  to  count  on  such  a  new  spirit  as  durable,  until  a 
certain  period  of  time  had  elapsed  after  the  end  of  the  war. 
And  here  one  may  remark  that  the  problem  of  the  conquered 
German  colonies  is  usually  discussed  as  if  the  only  alterna- 
tives were  the  definitive  retention  of  the  colonies  by  Great 
Britain  and  France  at  the  peace,  or  their  immediate  return  to 
Germany.  Another  possibk  line  of  procedure  would  surely 
be  their  provisional  retention  by  Great  Britain  or  France,  or 
by  some  international  authority,  till  it  was  possible  to  know 
for  certain  that  new  elements  had  come  to  the  top  in  Germany 
and  that  th-e  spirit  of  force-worship  and  ambition  had  been 
clean  cast  out. 

Edwyn  Bevan. 

February,  ipi8. 

[Some  parts  of  the  above  Introduction  were  embodied  in 
three  articles  I  contributed  during  February,  1918,  to  the 
Westminster  Gazette.  My  thanks  are  due  to  the  Editor 
for  permission  to  reproduce  them  in  this  book. — E.B.] 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  OF 
CENTRAL  AFRICA* 


L— POSITION  AS  A  WORLD-POWER 

IN  the  thirty  years  before  the  war  it  was  given  to  us  to  rise 
to  the  admitted  rank  of  an  economic  world-power.  Our 
success  was  great ;  we  used  to  ascribe  it  to  our  policy  of  Pro- 
tection. The  essential  character  of  our  Protective  system  can 
be  described  shortly  as  consisting  in  the  systematic  trans- 
ference of  the  work  of  producing  raw  materials  for  our  indus- 
tries to  cheap  soils  overseas.  Let  us  give  an  instance.  The 
area  under  cultivation  in  the  case  of  rape  seed  diminished 
from  179,000  hectars  in  1878  to  31,000  hectars  in  1913,  and 
in  the  case  of  flax  in  the  same  period  from  134,000  hectars 
to  barely  15,000.  Our  oil  and  fibre  industries  drew  their  raw 
material  from  lands  more  favourable,  climatically,  where 
production  was  ch-eaper.  It  became  the  basis  of  our  economic 
policy  to  acquire  the  raw  material  necessary  for  our  industries 
as  cheaply  as  possible ;  on  the  other  hand,  our  frontiers  were 
barred  as  far  as  possible  by  high  tariffs  against  the  importa- 
tion of  any  article  of  human  food.  The  supplying  of  food 
to  the  growing  population  at  high  pric-es  was  reserved  for 
German  agriculture. 

By  1907,  roughly  2,400,000  people  were  employed  in 
our  textile  and  clothing  industries;  our  exports  of  cotton  and 
woollen  goods,  clothes  and  millinery,  worsted,  cotton-yarn  and 
thread  were  to  the  value  of,  roughly,  1,000,000,000  marks  in 
1913.  If  our  own  agricultural  efforts  had  had  to  produce 
wool  and  fibre,  the  rise  of  our  textile  and  clothing  trades 

*  Das  deutsche  Kaiserreich  Mittelafrika  als  Grundlage  einer  neuen 
deutschen  Weltpolitik.  Von  Emil  Zimmermann.  Verlag  der  Euro- 
pdischen  Staats-  und  Wirtschafts-Zeitung  G.m.b.H.    Berlin,  1917. 

I 


2       The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

would  have  been  impossible.  We  should  have  had  changes 
in  population,  more  peopk  engaged  in  agriculture,  iewer  in 
industry,  fewer  customers  for  foodstuffs,  and  cheap  food 
with  low  industrial  wages.  But  the  Anglo-Saxons  have  been 
supplying  us  with  cotton  and  wool  in  growing  measure.  In 
1 91 3  they  sent  us  223  million  marks'  worth  of  sheep's  wool 
(53  per  cent,  of  our  total  imports),  and  mor-e  than  600  million 
marks'  worth  of  cotton  (97  per  cent,  of  our  total  imports). 
The  development  of  our  textile  and  clothing  industries,  and  in 
close  connection  with  that  the  prosperity  of  our  agriculture, 
was  dependent  on  th-e  Anglo-Saxon  supply  of  wool  and 
cotton.  The  case  was  exactly  the  same  with  the  supply  of 
copper  for  our  electric  industries.  Of  our  total  imports  to 
the  value  of  335/4  million  marks,  we  drew  316  million  marks' 
worth  from  the  Anglo-Saxons  (294  million  marks'  worth  from 
the  United  States  alone).  In  other  products  our  dependence 
on  the  Anglo-Saxons  was  less,  but  yet  so  great  that  it  is  no 
exaggeration  to  say  that  our  system  of  Protection  was  only 
possible  because  the  Anglo-Saxons  put  at  our  disposal  their 
fields  of  cheap  production  across  the  sea. 

But  they  did  more.  They  gave  admission  to  our  mer- 
chants, trade-agents,  commercial  establishments  everywhere 
in  their  broad  domains,  looked  kindly  on  them,  as  long  as 
they  were  modest,  and  thereby  they  assisted  materially  to 
open  markets  for  our  industrial  products. 

Suppose  we  had  not  had  the  rich  fields  of  South  and  West 
Africa,  Australia,  India,  the  Far  East,  Canada,  where  the 
Anglo-Saxons  had  done  the  preliminary  work,  but  had  had 
to  begin  at  the  very  beginning  in  the  acquisition  of  our  raw 
materials — should  we  have  climbed  so  quickly  to  the  position 
of  a  great  industrial  and  commercial  Power?  Our  rise 
depended  essentially  on  the  English  policy  of  the  Open  Door. 
We  were  sojourners  in  England's  house,  paying  guests  of  the 
Anglo-Saxons.  The  secret  of  our  success  lies,  apart  from  our 
organization  and  the  training  of  our  working  classes,  in  the 
fact  that  England  and  the  countries  which  are  the  great 
producers  of  raw  materials  granted  us  an  Open  Door,  allowed 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  3 

us  to  draw  on  their  vast  reservoirs  of  raw  materials.  If  this 
permission  is  withdrawn,  we  shall  be  at  one  stroke  once  more 
the  Germany  of  1880. 

Now  England  will  not  kt  us  draw  on  her  stores  again. 
Since  we  have  grown  great,  she  feels  us  as  a  troublesome 
intruder  and  means  to  be  rid  of  us.  That  is  the  meaning  of 
the  war. 

That  a  keen  recognition  of  the  situation  has  not  been 
lacking  in  Germany  is  shown  by  the  following  letter  which 
the  Secretary  of  State,  Dr.  Solf,  addressed  as  far  back  as 
the  7th  September,  1914,  to  Herr  O.  Riedel,  in  Hamburg, 
President  of  the  German  Trade  and  Plantation  Company  in 
the  South  Sea  Islands : — 

Fortunately,  the  fate  of  our  colonies  will  not  be  decided 
in  Africa  and  in  the  South  Seas,  but  on  the  battlefields  of 
Europe,  and  in  view  of  the  successes  of  our  arms  up  till  now 
I  am  completely  confident  that  we  shall  succeed  in  finally 
bringing  to  the  ground  our  worst  foe,  England.  But  it  is 
a  hard  task,  far  harder  than  most  of  our  countrymen  realize, 
who  only  know  the  British  Empire  by  hearsay  and  who  look 
at  it  through  spectacles  tinted  by  righteous  anger  at  Eng- 
land's present  attitude.  We  need  not  fear  England's  military 
power  on  land.  Our  commanders  will  deal  with  the  arts  of 
Kitchener  and  French.  At  sea  our  young,  numerically  in- 
ferior, navy  stands  face  to  face  with  the  greatest  sea-power 
of  all  time,  which  yet  found  it  necessary  to  call  in  Japan 
as  well  as  the  allied  French  fleet.  It  may  sound  presumptuous 
to  expect  more  in  this  unequal  struggle  than  a  heavy  blow 
to  our  English  enemy.  But  did  not  Nelson  at  Trafalgar  de- 
feat a  superior  force?  The  example  of  our  enemy  justifies  us 
in  the  boldest  hopes.  And  Great  Britain's  prestige,  which  is 
already  shaken  by  our  victories  over  her  army,  will  hardly 
survive  any  reverse  at  sea,  for  England's  power  over  her 
dependent  native  populations  rests  on  their  belief  in  the  in- 
vincibility of  the  mother-country.  In  spite  of  all,  it  is  a  case 
of  keeping  cool  and  on  our  guard ;  for  even  if  England  is 
weakened  we  must  not  under-estimate  the  means  she  always 
uses  in  war  to  make  up  for  her  lack  of  military  preparation. 
However  repellent  and  treacherous  the  weapons  are,  with 
which  England  fights  against  our  trade  and  our  industries, 
they  are  weapons  which  in  effectiveness  equal  our  dreaded 
howitzers.  .  .  .  But  complaining  is  no  use.  We  must  fi^ht 
and  hold  out  against  these  weapons  too,  hold  out  on  both 
fronts,  the  military  and  the  economic,  until  we  have  fought 


4      The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 


our  way  to  peace  and  security  for  at  least  a  hundred  years. 
While  we  are  fighting  our  continental  foes  for  victory,  the 
struggle  with  England  is  for  the  spoils  of  victory.  And 
they  must  be  no  small  ones  to  reward  the  heroism  and  cheer- 
ful self-sacrifice  of  our  people. 

There  is  as  little  friendship  for  England  in  this  document 
as  in  Bethmann's  negotiations  before  the  wa.T  with  England 
about  Central  Africa.  It  was  coming  to  be  realized  that 
England  was  trying  to  prevent  us  using  her  Open  Door,  and 
that  it  was  advisable  to  undertake  with  all  energy  the 
production  of  raw  materials  on  tropical  territories  of  our  own. 

The  long  hesitation  of  the  Imperial  Government  on  the 
submarine  question  arose,  too,  from  the  perception  of  our 
real  economic  position.  It  was  not  desired  that  the  struggle 
should  take  on  a  form  which  would  place  our  whole  future 
existence  as  an  economic  Power  at  stake.  An  attempt,  there- 
fore, was  made  to  avoid  a  breach  with  the  United  States. 
The  breach  has  taken  place,  and  it  is  Wilson  who  gave  the 
signal  for  the  attack  on  our  economic  position  in  the  world. 
When  he  forced  Central  and  South  America  to  declare  the 
breaking-ofif  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany,  that  was 
no  child's  play  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  but  a  very  serious 
matter.  So  long  as  the  United  States  did  not  go  in  with 
England,  we  could  count  as  our  war-aim  the  restoration  of  our 
old  economic  system,  the  development  of  a  colonial  Empire 
of  our  own  in  order  that  we  should  not  be  entirely  dependent 
on  others  for  our  raw  materials;  to-day,  however,  the  situa- 
tion is  essentially  different.  To-day  it  must  be  clear  to  us 
that  the  Anglo-Saxons  have  set  before  themselves  the  great 
aim  of  founding  a  World-Syndicate  in  raw  materials  directed 
against  Germany,  and  that  they  will  stick  stubbornly  to  their 
efforts  to  achieve  this  aim.  It  is  not,  of  course,  conceivable 
that  the  Syndicate  will  forbid  or  prevent  the  sale  of  raw 
materials  to  Germany;  that  could  not  be  carried  through. 
But  that  is  not  necessary;  it  is  quite  enough  that  the  British 
Empire  and  the  United  States  should  conclude  commercial 
treaties  with  their  associates  and  with  each  other,  laying  down 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  5 


that  raw  materials  destined  for  other  than  the  contracting 
States  should  be  subject  to  an  export  duty.  If  these  con- 
ditions remained  in  force  for  from  twelve  to  fifteen  years,  the 
rehabilitation  of  our  former  economic  and  trade  policy  would 
be  impossible.  Neither  Flanders  nor  the  Economic  League 
of  Mittel-Europa  is  any  safeguard  against  this  danger.  We 
cannot  support  70  million  people  in  Germany,  as  before  the 
war,  if  we  have  not  at  our  disposal  oversea  territories  where 
raw  materials  can  be  produced  very  cheaply. 

And  so  now  that  the  issue  of  the  war  is  narrowed  to  a 
decision  as  to  whether  we  are  to  hwue  real,  and  not  only 
imaginary,  oversea  dominion  or  are  to  sink  to  the  rank  of  a 
third-rate  Power,  we  must  summon  up  all  our  resolution  and 
energy  to  achieve  the  first  alternative. 

At  an  earlier  stage  of  the  war  we  could  still  cherish  the 
hope  that  we  should  succeed  in  continuing — though  with 
certain  modifications — our  former  policy  of  using  foreign 
territory  for  our  interests ;  it  must  be  clear  to  us  to-day  that  it 
is  a  question  of  standing  on  our  own  feet  as  a  World-Power. 
We  climbed  by  means  of  England's  policy  of  the  Open  Door; 
now  the  Anglo-Saxons  are  going  to  correct  that  mistake. 
They  will  no  longer  suffer  Germany  beside  them  as  a 
pretended  World-Power.  And  now  it  is  a  question  of  fight- 
ing our  way  to  a  position  as  a  World-Power  or  sinking  to  be  a 
third-rate  Power.  The  struggle  to  assert  our  standing  as  a 
World-Power  is  now  the  object  of  the  war. 

II.— THE  WAY  TO  BECOME  A  WORLD-POWER 

The  Flanders  politicians  say:  "World-power  can  only  be 
won  by  the  possession  of  the  coast  of  Flanders ;  that  is  the 
preliminary  condition  of  every  prosperous  colonial  and  oversea 
policy,  every  policy  independent  of  the  decisions  which  Eng- 
land and  North  America  may  take."  That  may  carry  convic- 
tion to  a  way  of  thought  directed  towards  the  Continent,  but 
proves  itself  a  wrong  conclusion,  if  one  considers  more  deeply. 
We  are  not  here  going  to  deal  with  the  fear  that  the  incorpora- 


6       The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

tion  of  countries  with  populations  of  a  different  stock  might 
lead  to  a  weakening  of  Germany,  although  it  naturally  sug- 
gests itself.  But  this  fear — in  spite  of  all  experience  in  the 
old  frontier  provinces — is  not  shared  by  large  numbers  of 
people  in  Germany,  and  so  it  shall  be  left  out  of  account. 

But  I  suppose  everyone  will  agree  (i)  that  real  world- 
power  can  only  be  maintained  if  a  strong  foundation  is  laid 
in  the  mother-country;  (2)  that  it  can  only  be  maintained  if 
strong  branches  of  the  home  economic  system  are  established 
overs-eas;  and  (3)  that  the  strength  of  the  mother-country  is 
in  the  long  run  only  assured  by  means  of  a  sound  economic 
foundation. 

It  may  be  admitted  at  once  that  territorial  gains  in 
Lithuania  and  Courland  will  not  only  satisfy  the  desire  for 
land  which  will  arise  after  the  war,  but  will  place  the 
food-supply  of  the  whole  population  on  a  broader  basis. 
The  same  advantage  could  not  be  expected  from  over- 
populated  Belgium ;  that,  at  any  rate,  means  no  further 
alleviation  in  the  food  question.  It  will,  perhaps,  neverthe- 
less be  suggested  that  we  might  find  employment  for  workers 
and  foremen  in  Belgian  industries.  But  does  this  and  the 
possible  increase  of  the  food-supply  really  mean  any 
strengthening  of  the  home  foundation?  It  only  seems  so  to 
a  superficial  survey,  because  we  think  to-day,  under  the  stress 
of  the  food  shortage,  that  we  should  be  more  secure  in  a  future 
war  if  only  we  had  Courland  and  Lithuania.  But  we  quite 
forget  that  our  shortage  of  food  is  caused  more  by  the  war 
itself  than  by  England's  blockade.  The  decisive  element  is 
the  lack  of  men  in  town  and  country,  the  deterioration  in 
the  cultivation  of  the  land,  and  consequently  in  the  crops,  the 
establishment  of  vast  camps  by  the  military  authorities,  and 
the  unreasonable  panic  of  large  sections  of  the  population. 
And  in  a  future  war  of  €qual  magnitude  Lithuania  and  Cour- 
land would  afford  us  no  greater  possibilities  of  holding  out; 
indeed,  we  already  had  both  of  them  at  our  disposal  in  the 
second  autumn  of  the  war.  We  still  have  enough  to  eat,  even 
if  sometimes  it  is  rather  a  tight  pinch;  that  is  the  best  proof 


The  Gennan  Empire  of  Central  Africa  7 


that  the  basis  of  our  food-supply  is  strong  enough.  But 
flourishing  industries  and  strong  finance  are  also  integral 
parts  of  the  home  foundation ;  they  are  just  as  important  as 
the  food-supply.  Now  it  is  against  these  elements  that  the 
enemy's  attack  is  at  present  directed.  And  it  is  these,  and  not 
the  food-supply,  that  need  assuring  permanently  for  the  future. 

The  enemy  is  certainly  trying  to  cut  off  our  imports  of 
foodstuffs  in  order  to  weaken  us;  but  the  main  thing  in  his 
eyes  is  to  stop  the  import  of  raw  materials.  And  he  had 
made  preparations  far  in  advance.  Wilson's  demand  to  the 
neutrals,  to  support  his  action  against  Germany,  was  issued  a 
few  days  after  the  ist  February,  191 7.  So  important  a  step — 
which  had  a  speedy  success  too  in  China,  Brazil  and  a  number 
of  smaller  states — is  not  the  result  of  one  night's  deliberation. 
Wilson  thought  it  over  for  months,  and  discussed  the  question 
in  every  detail  with  England.  The  entry  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war  and  the  way  in  which  it  was  achieved 
furnish  the  best  proof  that  England  has  given  up  the  idea  of 
crushing  Germany  on  the  field  of  battle  in  this  war.  The 
bloodless  war  which  bars  Germany  from  raw  materials  by 
means  of  raised  prices  is  the  next  move.  The  Anglo- 
Saxons  want  to  tie  down  China,  Japan  and  all  Central  and 
South  America  to  this  programme.  Our  great  industries, 
which  are  dependent  on  a  supply  of  raw  materials  from  abroad, 
would  then  not  be  able  to  maintain  themselves.  For  the 
employment  of  the  workmen  who  would  so  be  set  free  we 
should  have  to  develop  our  iron  and  steel  industry  and  our 
coal-mining  to  the  uttermost,  and  these  industries  would  not 
be  in  a  position  to  employ  all  the  hands  who  would  be  thrown 
out  of  work;  many  thousands  would  pour  into  agriculture. 
Whole  hosts  of  them,  however,  would  leave  their  native  land; 
and  the  consequence  would  finally  be  the  retrogression  of 
German  agriculture.  For  a  necessary  condition  of  sound 
agricultural  development  is  industrial  prosperity  and  sound 
proportionate  commercial  returns  (not  cut-throat  methods  as 
at  present  during  the  war),  and  the  basis  of  these  is  cheap  raw 


8       The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 


material  for  industries.  Supposing  the  consequences  of  the 
blockade  of  raw  materials  have  shown  themselves  to  the  full  in 
15  or  20  years,  England  and  her  satellites  will  then  declare 
war  afresh  on  a  German  Empire  which  will  be  rotten  to  the 
core,  and  then  our  strong  home  foundation  will  b6  lacking. 

The  Flanders  politicians  recognize  this  danger  so  clearly 
that  they  actually  base  their  claims  on  the  necessity  of 
assuring  permanently  the  supply  of  industrial  raw  materials. 
Only  they  fail  to  show  that  the  possession  of  Antwerp  and 
the  coast  of  Flanders  actually  produces  this  result.  Admiral 
von  Thomsen  is  not  of  this  opinion.  In  the  Unabhdngige 
Nationalkorrespondenz  of  the  i8th  June,  1917,  he  writes:-^ 

If  a  great  deal  is  being  said  nowadays  about  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  coast  of  Flanders  "in  order  to  win  freedom  for 
Germany's  traffic  on  the  seas,"  it  must,  on  the  other  hand, 
perpetually  be  emphasized  that  the  possession  of  the  coast 
of  the  Channel,  as  far  as  and  including  Boulogne,  is  indis- 
pensable for  Germany's  security  in  face  of  the  British  fleet. 
The  possession  of  this  coast  would,  however,  never  be  secure 
unless  Germany  had  complete  control  of  the  corresponding 
hinterland. 


After  three  years  of  war  we  do  not  even  hold  Dunkirk; 
and  Admiral  von  Thomsen  demands  Calais  and  Boulogne 
with  their  hinterland  as  a  preliminary  condition  of  the  free- 
dom of  sea-borne  commerce !  The  supporters  of  the  Flanders 
policy,  then,  are  not  even  agreed  as  to  the  limits  of  the  claims 
to  be  put  forward.  But  they  are  not  really  right  in  their  view 
that  freedom  of  the  seas  is  all  that  is  necessary.  Suppose 
the  Anglo-Saxon  Syndicate  refuses  to  sell  us  raw  materials 
cheaply  in  spite  of  our  possession  of  Flanders?  Then  we 
should  have  a  lack  of  raw  materials  in  the  country  in  spite  of 
freedom  of  the  seas,  and  that  would  be  the  beginning  of  the 
undermining  of  our  economic  position — which  is  our  home 
foundation. 

In  the  form  which  the  international  situation  has  taken 
owing  to  the  embitterment  of  the  relations  between  the 
Anglo-Saxons  and  ourselves,  we  cannot  assure  our  industries, 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  9 


our  finances,  or  in  the  end  even  the  prosperity  of  our  agricul- 
ture, by  any  steps  taken  on  the  Continent;  cheap  fields  of 
supply  overseas  are  essential  to  a  strong  home  policy;  and  we 
cannot  attain  them  through  Flanders.  In  order  to  secure  our 
position  we  must  go  a  different  way  about  it,  and  this  way  is 
indicated  to  us  by  what  has  happened  in  Russia  and  the  great 
points  of  opposition  between  North  and  South  America. 

Great  as  the  Mittel-Europa  Idea  is,  what  does  it  mean 
economically?  There  are  certainly  many  possibilities  in  the 
Balkans  and  the  Near  East,  but  they  need  developing,  and 
for  that  men  are  necessary.  Mittel-Europa  comes  to  life 
if  we  imagine  Russia  with  its  wide  spaces  and  its  great 
economic  future  added  to  it.  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  the 
Balkans,  Turkey  can  set  us  free  from  the  Anglo-Saxons  in 
the  matter  of  wheat,  maize,  legumens,  oleaginous  vegetable 
products,  tobacco,  vegetable  fibre,  fruit,  wood,  meat,  poultry. 
The  further  foodstuffs  that  we  need,  such  as  coffee,  cocoa, 
tobacco,  as  well  as  raw  materials,  such  as  oleaginous  products, 
wool  and  skins,  we  can  draw  from  South  America,  and  it  is 
not  too  difficult  to  make  Central  and  South  America  break 
away  from  the  hostile  coalition. 

South  America's  natural  complement  is  not  the  United 
States  nor  the  British  Empire,  which  are  both  producers  of 
raw  material,  but  the  industrial  German  Empire.  Further, 
both  North  and  South  America  hunger  equally  for  population, 
and  they  will  be  eager  rivals  after  the  war.  Emigration  has 
stopped  during  the  war.  After  the  war  North  America  will 
want  to  lay  out  its  vast  gains,  and  will  be  in  urgent  need  of 
hands.  The  United  States  will  do  anything  to  entice  the 
stream  of  immigration  to  their  own  harbours.  They  will 
assimilate  without  hesitation  all  that  Belgium,  Serbia,  Russia 
and  Italy  can  send  them.  Now  we  and  our  allies  should  do 
very  vital  service  to  South  America  and  Mexico  by  a 
systematic  propaganda  of  re-emigration  among  Germans, 
Austrians,  Hungarians  and  German  Russians  in  the  United 
States  and  Canada,  and  the  diversion  of  a  great  part  of  this 
stream  to  Mexico  and  South  America.    These  countries,  too, 


10     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

will  have  urgent  need  of  population  after  the  war;  if  we  give 
it  to  them,  we  shall  cause  them  to  join  us.  But  it  must  not  be 
supposed  that  the  matter  can  be  put  off  till  the  end  of  the 
war.  All  that  South  Americans  know  about  us  so  far  is  that 
we  tried  feverishly  to  avoid  the  breach  with  the  United  States, 
as  a  section  of  the  Anglo-Saxons.  They  have  seen  in  that 
the  effort  to  keep  the  road  open  back  to  our  relations  of 
dependence.  They  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  we  are 
going  to  change  our  policy.  They  must  therefore  be  shown 
and  told  clearly  and  unmistakably  that  we  mean  to  take  the 
road  to  world-power  on  our  own  feet,  and  not  on  Anglo-Saxon 
crutches.  This  will  not  be  done  by  pointing  to  Flanders; 
that  will  be  no  use  to  the  South  Americans.  Just  as  we 
cannot  alter  our  attitude  to  Japan  without  being  in  a  position 
to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  Australia,  India  and  Western 
America,  so,  if  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  North  Sea,  we 
cannot  free  the  South  Americans  from  the  pressure  which  the 
Anglo-Saxons  would  bring  to  bear  on  them,  if  England  still 
dominated  Central  Africa,  which  lies  over  against  South 
America.  But  our  relations  with  South  America  at  once 
assume  a  quite  different  aspect,  if  we  possess  a  compact 
Central-African  Empire.  South  America  would  have  as 
great  an  interest  as  ourselves  in  the  strengthening  of  this 
Empire,  because  it  would  gain  thereby  a  trustworthy  ally 
against  the  Anglo-Saxon.  And  it  would  make  an  end  of  the 
fear  which  is  aroused  by  German  immigration  into  South 
America,  the  fear  lest  some  day  Germany  might  attempt  to 
bring  South  America  under  her  domination.  Mitiel-Afrika  is 
so  essential  a  preliminary  condition,  if  we  are  to  complete  our 
economic  system,  which  cannot  dispense  with  the  tropical 
fields  of  cheap  supply  already  opened  up,  by  bringing  in 
South  America,  that  for  that  reason  alone  it  would  have  to 
stand  in  the  forefront  of  all  our  war-aims. 

Again,  a  German  Mittel-Afrika  would  exercise  strong 
influence  towards  the  Indian  Ocean,  the  South  Seas  and  the 
Far  East.  In  order  to  make  this  clear  we  must  make  a  slight 
digression. 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  11 

We  must  reconcile  ourselves  to  the  fact  that  England  will 
keep  her  strong  position  on  the  Suez  Canal  and  the  Red  Sea ; 
that  is  almost  essential  to  her  for  her  domination  of  India. 
But  it  is  almost  as  important  for  us  as  for  her  that  she  should 
stay  there.  We  cannot  take  India,  and  either  Russia  or 
Japan  would  become  a  danger  to  the  world,  if  either  of  them 
possessed  the  country.  The  future  development  of  the  world 
must  be  envisaged  by  reference  to  the  great  tropical  terri- 
tories which  provide  the  food-supply  for  great  masses  of 
people.  The  two  most  important  are  China  and  India,  w^ith 
their  400  and  320  million  inhabitants ;  they  comprise  together 
over  two-fifths  of  the  whole  population  of  the  world.  Can 
both  countries  ever  be  allowed  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese,  who  are  already  hankering  after  China?  Or 
can  we  ever  quietly  see  Russia  in  possession  of  India,  when 
she  already  has  broad  and  very  rich  territories  in  Central 
Asia  and  when  her  vast  population  threatens  to  become  a 
danger  for  Mittel-Europa  in  the  near  future.  England  will 
not  be  irreparably  incapacitated  for  holding  India  by  this 
war.  She  has  shown  herself  capable  of  a  huge  expenditure 
of  strength,  even  in  the  conduct  of  land  warfare,  such  as  the 
world  till  recently  would  have  thought  impossible.  England 
will  show  a  new  upward  impetus  in  industry  and  trade,  and 
she  will  need  her  complement  in  tropical  territory.  To  take 
India  from  England  would  mean  throwing  her  back  on  West 
and  Central  Africa — apart  from  Brazil,  the  last  remaining 
tropical  areas  of  economic  value — and  making  these  two  still 
undeveloped  territories  of  the  future,  which  contain  30  to 
40  million  negroes  apiece,  the  object  of  strife  between  the 
industrial  nations  of  Europe.  That  would  put  Central  and 
Western  Europe  at  a  heavy  disadvantage  as  against  Russia, 
Japan  and  the  United  States.  A  sensible  world-policy  must 
avoid  this  mistake  and  preserve  England's  dominion  in  India 
while  confining  her  in  Africa  to  the  south.  Tropical  Africa 
should  be  as  far  as  possible  wholly  reserved  as  the 
complementary  economic  domain  of  Mittel-Europa. 

The  centre  of  gravity  of  the  British  Empire  still  lies  to-day 


12     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

apparently  immovable  in  the  North  Atlantic,  although  not 
less  than  350-355  of  its  440-450  million  inhabitants  live  in 
South  and  East  Africa,  India  and  Australia — that  is  to  say, 
round  the  Indian  Ocean.  But  economically  and  politically 
the  great  Empire  round  the  Indian  Ocean  has  been  growing 
more  important  every  year.  The  export  trade  of  this  part  of 
the  British  Empire  already  reaches  the  value  of  14,000,000,000 
marks  as  against  about  the  30,000,000,000  of  England, 
Canada,  the  West  Indies  and  West  Africa.  From  a  military 
point  of  view,  too,  this  part  of  the  Empire  has  played  a 
notable  part  in  this  war — a  commendable  achi-evement,  when 
one  reflects  that  the  Sudan  and  the  greater  part  of  South  and 
East  Africa  have  been  conquered  only  since  1898.  Australia, 
India  and  South  Africa  will  grow  in  economic  and  military 
importance  after  this  war.  Thus  the  great  lines  of  communi- 
cation between  England  and  these  colonies  will  become  vital 
arteries  for  the  British  Empire,  which  we  can  threaten  most 
seriously  from  East  and  West  Africa.  Mittel-Afrika  would 
lie  more  or  less  in  the  centre  of  the  British  Empire,  and 
Australia  and  India  would  have  to  reckon  with  this  German 
colony  in  their  big  trade-enterprises.  The  policy  of 
Mittel-Afrika  would  have  a  strong  influence  on  that  of 
Australia  and  India,  and  therefore  on  that  of  Japan,  too. 
Through  Mittel-Afrika  we  should  really  take  our  place  as  a 
World-Power — with  great  effect  on  South  America,  the  Indian 
Ocean  and  the  Arab  nations  of  North  Africa;  and  Mittel- 
Afrika  gives  us  a  far  more  secure  position,  as  against  the 
Anglo-Saxon,  than  does  the  Flanders  coast,  which,  on  the 
showing  of  Admiral  von  Thomsen,  has  no  value  without 
Boulogne.  If  by  the  energetic  execution  of  our  work  in 
Central  Africa  we  proclaim  to  the  world  our  firm  resolve  to 
stand  as  far  as  possibl-e  on  our  own  feet,  as  in  other  things 
so  in  the  production  of  raw  materials  for  our  industries,  then 
we  shall  have  broken  the  will  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  to  form  a 
World-Syndicate  against  us,  because  we  should  then  be  in  a 
position  to  count  on  South  America.  And  our  economic 
system,  characterized  by  ch-eap  raw  material  for  our  industries 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  13 


and  raised  home  prices  for  foodstuffs  as  the  basis  of  our  agri- 
cuhural  prosperity,  would  be  assured,  and  thus  the  strength 
of  our  home  base  would  be  assured  also.  Further,  we 
shall  not  thus  in  future  be  mere  sojourners  on  the  soil  of 
more  favoured  nations ;  w^e  shall  raise  by  our  own  strength 
a  great  tract  of  the  earth  and  have,  after  a  generation,  a 
Brazil  or  an  India  of  our  own.  That  cannot  be  valued  too 
highly. 

The  champions  of  the  Flanders  policy  are  always  asking 
how  w€  are  to  get  raw  materials  into  Germany,  if  we  have  not 
got  a  secure  outlet  to  the  open  sea.  This  question  is  an 
expression  of  the  f-ear  that  England — of  whom  certainly  we 
can  believe  anything — might  one  day  in  the  middle  of  peace 
bar  the  road  to  us  through  the  Channel  and  carry  off  our 
ships  and  goods.  That  is  indeed  a  very  serious  and,  as  the 
course  of  events  in  Greece  shows,  by  no  means  imaginary 
danger,  in  face  of  w^hich  all  international  agreements  are 
inadequate.  But  it  is  open  to  question  whether  the  posses- 
sion of  Antwerp  and  the  Flanders  coast  would  effectively 
obviate  it,  especially  as  there  are  very  many  strong 
grounds  for  believing  that  it  will  be  very  difficult  to  get 
England  out  of  Calais  and  Boulogne,  and  that  she  will  in  any 
case  remain  there,  if  we  keep  Belgium.  We  should  have  to 
drive  England  out  of  Calais  and  Boulogne  by  a  fresh  and 
bitter  struggle,  and  that  in  such  a  war  we  should  have  France 
on  our  side  appears,  after  all  our  experience  of  th-e  French,  an 
extremely  bold  assumption. 

In  order  to  estimate  the  question  of  Flanders  rightly  we 
must  go  back  to  its  true  essentials  and  realize  it  for  what  it 
really  is — a  question  of  security  against  English  attacks. 
Besides  that,  the  value  of  Belgium — estimated  at 
50,000,000,000  marks — plays,  of  course,  a  great  part  if  we 
take  Belgium's  coal-mines  into  account;  but  all  that  loses 
value  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Belgium  does  not  assure  the 
prosperity  of  our  industries  any  more  than  Courland  and 
Lithuania  do,  and  that  for  our  industries  we  must  have  cheap 
and,  for  the  most  part,  tropical  fields  of  supply.    These  are 


14     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

necessary  to  our  existence;  but  the  coast  of  Flanders  only 
means  a  security  for  the  undisturbed  growth  of  our  national 
life.  If  that  is  the  case,  we  must  decide,  first  of  all,  for  the 
essentials  of  life,  and  then  we  must  enquire  whether  the  coast 
of  Flanders  is  the  only  possible  security.  And  that  is  not 
the  case. 

We  have  seen  how  a  German  Mittel-Afrika  would  have 
great  influence  on  India  and  Australia  and,  through  the 
North  African  Arabs,  on  Egypt  and  the  Sudan,  how  it 
would  produce  a  new  position  in  world-politics.  And  the 
expectation  is  not  unjustified  that  a  strongly  developed 
German  Mittel-Afrika  would  force  England  to  keep  the  gate 
of  the  Channel  permanently  open  to  us. 

Even  in  the  present  war  the  military  strength  of  the 
German  Central  African  colonies  has  shown  itself  too  unmis- 
takably to  leave  any  room  for  further  question.  The 
memorandum  of  the  Navy  League,  which  the  Committee 
submitted  to  the  Chancellor  and  the  Bundesrat,  referred~to 
this  in  the  following  terms  : — 

It  appears,  on  the  other  hand,  to  be  a  fair  deduction  from 
the  experiences  of  the  war  that  the  West  and  East  African 
colonies  will  be  the  most  important  of  all  our  colonies  and 
the  easiest  to  defend.  In  order  to  protect  them  and  German 
world-trade  effectively,  there  will  be  need  of  a  cruiser  squad- 
ron able  to  rely  on  a  few  strong  bases  on  land  and  on  float- 
ing bases  in  the  form  of  depot  ships,  whose  speed  and  sea- 
going capacity  correspond  with  their  own. 

It  is  a  fact  of  the  greatest  importance  that  the  German 
East-African  troops,  in  spite  of  their  small  numbers,  were 
twice  within  measurable  distance  of  wresting  the  Uganda 
Railway  from  the  English.  On  the  19th  September, 
1 914,  the  cruiser  Konigsberg  had  destroyed  the  English 
cruiser  Pegasus  oflF  Zanzibar;  on  the  20th  September 
a  German  column  advanced  from  Tanga  against 
Mombasa.  It  stormed  the  English  camp  at  Majorini 
on  the  24th ;  at  the  beginning  of  October  the  English 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  15 

force  covering  Mombasa  was  defeated  at  Gaza,  40 
miles  south  of  the  port.  Mombasa  was  in  danger  of 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans.  At  the  same  time 
German  columns  kept  advancing  from  Kilima-njaro  against 
the  Uganda  Railway,  and  another  German  column  marched 
simultaneously  along  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Victoria  Nyanza 
on  Port  Florence,  the  terminus  of  the  Uganda  Railway.  The 
situation  was  more  than  critical  for  the  English  defence;  it 
was  saved  by  the  arrival  of  strong  Indian  reinforcements. 

In  spite  of  the  introduction  of  great  masses  of  Indians  on 
the  English  side,  the  German  forces  had  again  the  upper 
hand  in  the  north  at  the  end  of  191 5;  they  occupied  the 
Uganda  Railway  for  a  distance  of  30  to  40  kilometres  to  the 
east  of  Kilima-njaro.  Then  the  arrival  of  a  large  Boer  army 
brought  about  a  sudden  turn  of  events. 

The  capture  of  the  Uganda  Railway  would  have  made  it 
impossible  for  England  to  hold  her  East-African  colony,  and 
would  have  had  disastrous  effects  far  away  in  the  Sudan  and 
the  whole  African  theatre  of  war.  England  and  France 
found  it  very  difficult  to  keep  the  Sudan  quiet,  as  is  proved 
by  the  rising  of  the  Imam  of  Darfur  and  the  struggle  with  the 
Senussi ;  French  Central  Africa  and  great  parts  of  the  French 
Sudan  were  in  revolt  even  at  the  beginning  of  1917,  as  we 
learn  from  reports  in  the  French  press.  What  effect  would 
have  been  produced  by  the  news  that  the  Germans  had  cap- 
tured the  Uganda  Railway,  occupi-ed  Mombasa  and  Nairobi, 
and  got  into  touch  with  Abyssinia !  All  this,  as  well  as  the 
loss  of  the  railway-line,  was  only  prevented  by  England's 
power  to  move  troop  transports  freely  across  the  Indian 
Ocean. 

By  means  of  this  concentration  of  troops  England  has 
succeeded  at  last  in  capturing  the  greater  part  of  the  colony. 
But  a  great  German  Mittel-Afrika  on  a  war  footing  will  not 
only  be  able  to  maintain  itself  against  attack  from  South 
Africa,  India  and  Australia,  but,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Arabs  of  North  Africa,  will  represent  a  Power  with  which 
England  will  be  in  no  hurry  to  pick  a  quarrel. 


16     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 


III.— THE  BUILDING  UP  OF  GERMAN  WORLD-POWER 

We  Germans  of  the  Empire  do  not  realize  clearly  enough 
that  the  war  is  a  struggle  against  Germanism  all  over  the 
world,  and  that  it  has  therefore  given  us  something  very 
great  and  unique  as  the  first  prize  of  victory.  The  clever 
historian,  Albrecht  Wirth,  writes  in  the  conclusion  to  his 
Short  History  of  the  World  (published  by  Alfred  Janssen, 
Hamburg)  : — 

The  war  has  given  us  Germans  a  forward  move  which 
tannot  be  too  highly  prized;  for  the  first  time  in  history  all 
Germans  in  the  world,  including  the  American  Germans, 
know  themselves  to  be  united  in  their  desires  and  convic- 
tions. That  has  never  happened  before.  Quot  homines,  tot 
sententicc!  We  were  scattered  far  and  wide  over  the  face  of 
the  earth,  and  our  views  and  thoughts  were  widely  sundered. 
Now,  however,  this  disunion  is  gone  for  ever. 

Thanks  to  the  war  and  to  the  way  in  which  England  has 
conducted  it  more  and  more  keenly  as  an  economic  war,  there 
is  now  a  German  will  in  the  world  which  revolts  against  the 
Anglo-Saxon  will ;  every  German  in  the  world  outside  the 
frontiers  of  the  Empire  is  watching  the  mighty  struggle  in 
tense  anxiety^  and  keeps  asking  himself  whether  the  German 
Empire  will  succeed  in  substantiating  its  claim  to  a  position 
that  tells  in  the  world,  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Germans 
in  foreign  countries  are  expecting  for  themselves  a  mighty 
uplift. 

This  fact  of  a  general  awakening  of  the  German  Idea  in 
the  world  is  not,  unfortunately,  sufficiently  appreciated  at 
home,  and  we  do  not  realize  clearly  enough  the  great  advan- 
tage which  this  awakening  secures  for  us.  And  so  we  still 
think  too  much  of  incorporating  some  millions  of  foreign 
population  within  our  frontiers,  because  we  overlook  the  fact 
that  ten  million  and  more  Germans  abroad  are  ready  to-day  to 
link  their  fortunes  permanently  with  ours.  We  must  not,  of 
course,  imagine  this  readiness  to  mean  that  they  are  waiting 
for  the  chance  of  returning  to  Germany  or  to  annexed  terri- 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  17 


tories,  and  those  people  are  making  a  great  mistake,  who  look 
at  the  future  development  of  Germany  and  the  world  exclu- 
sively from  the  point  of  view  of  their  own  petty  interests.  It 
is  only  too  intelligible  that  the  thousands,  and  perhaps  tens  of 
thousands,  who  have  found  good  situations  in  Courland, 
Lithuania  or  Belgium,  far  better  in  many  cases  than  their 
former  civil  positions,  wish  to-day  for  the  continuance  of  the 
German  occupation.  Men  in  field-grey,  second  and  third 
sons  of  farmers,  have  looked  at  the  soil  of  Lithuania  and 
Courland  with  hopes  for  their  own  future.  Merchants  and 
manufacturers  dream  of  new  possibilities  in  the  conquered 
territories.  Disabled  men  hope  to  find  a  place  in  the  future 
German  administration.  And  from  their  own  small  stand- 
point they  are  all  making  an  accurate  enough  estimate  and 
are  awaiting  the  complete  Germanisation  of  their  new 
narrower  home  through  the  influx  of  Germans  from  abroad 
into  the  conquered  territories. 

But  all  these  estimates  are  false  because  they  do  not  take 
into  account  the  needs  of  our  national  economic  system  as  a 
whole,  such  as  the  process  of  history  has  made  them.  In  the 
peace  of  1870  it  was  a  question  of  uniting  the  Empire  into  a 
single  national  and  economic  organization  under  one  manage- 
ment. To-day  the  firm  ^'German  Empire"  is  to  be  securely 
established  as  a  world-firm.  Its  right  to  exist  is  being 
attacked  because  it  won  its  prosperity  through  England's 
laisser-faire.  Its  credit — that  is  to  say  raw  material — is  to 
be  cut  off.  And  the  firm  "German  Empire"  has  now  to 
prove  that  it  can  stand  on  its  own  feet  without  England  and 
the  United  States.  That  is  the  question  at  issue.  That  is 
the  great  idea  to  which  everything  must  be  subordinated. 
The  Germans  abroad  have  grasped  this  idea  far  more  clearly 
than  the  Germans  at  home,  and  the  former  will  be  in  their 
places  when  they  are  called  upon  to  co-operate  in  making 
the  world-firm  "German  Empire"  self-supporting.  But  they 
refuse  and  hang  their  heads  when  they  are  asked  to  work  for 
Continental  aims,  to  come  to  Belgium  or  Courland. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  a  spirit  of  unrest  will  seize  large 


18     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

sections  of  the  Germans  abroad  directly  after  the  war  and  will 
last  for  years.  We  must  take  account  of  the  fact  that  tens 
of  thousands  of  Germans  in  the  United  States  and  Canada, 
South  Africa,  Australia  :m6.  Russia  will  leave  their  old  homes 
to  seek  the  protection  of  the  German  Empire.  Side  by  side 
with  this  will  go  an  equally  great  spirit  of  unrest  among  the 
population  of  Germany.  Such  a  war  as  the  present  one  must 
leave  its  mark  on  the  peoples  of  Europe;  it  will  be  quite  as 
far-reaching  in  its  effects  as  the  Napoleonic  wars.  We  all 
know  the  consequences  of  that  epoch  to  our  country.  First 
came  the  lean  years  1816,  1817;  hundreds  of  thousands 
crossed  the  sea  then.  Then  political  persecution  and  social 
inequalities  drove  tens  of  thousands  every  year  to  America. 
That  Continent,  with  its  great  resources  and  the  alluring 
prospects  of  gain,  with  its  political  and  religious  freedom, 
seemed  the  very  Promised  Land  to  the  masses  who  felt  them- 
selves down-trodden  in  Europe.  Between  1820  and  1885 
Germany  lost  5  million  souls  to  America,  irrespective  of  the 
Germans  who  flocked  to  the  United  States  from  Switzerland, 
Austria-Hungary,  Luxemburg  and  the  German  settlements 
in  Russia. 

The  Chancellor,  von  Bethmann  HoUweg,  tried  to  avoid  a 
return  of  the  period  of  emigration  by  his  cry  of  "an  open 
road  for  ability"  and  by  promising  political  reforms  after  the 
war.  But  first  of  all  we  shall  have  to  find  subsistence  for 
the  hundreds  of  thousands,  perhaps  millions  of  the  disabled; 
and  that  will  undoubtedly  bar  the  upward  road  to  the  rising 
generation.  We  shall  not  be  able  to  find  within  our  borders 
proper  room  for  our  youthful  talent,  even  without  the  further 
influx  of  Germans  from  abroad.  They  see  far  more  clearly 
than  we  do  that  a  German  Empire  restricted  to  the  Con- 
tinent of  Europe  blights  all  their  hopes,  and  if  Germany 
concludes  a  peace  which  renounces  a  colonial  policy  of  her 
own;  she  will  have  lost  finally  and  for  ever  her  sons  in 
foreign  lands. 

The  position  is  quite  different  as  soon  as  we  proclaim  our 
will  to  stand  from  henceforth  on  our  own  feet  abroad  by 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa'  19 

demanding  a  great  colonial  Empire  of  our  own.  A  great  sigh 
of  relief  will  go  up  at  once  from  the  Germans  overseas.  And 
if  we  call  upon  the  American  Germans  to  concentrate  in 
Central  and  South  America,*  hundreds  of  thousands  in 
Canada  and  the  United  States  will  obey  our  call.  We  know 
at  the  moment,  naturally,  very  little  of  the  sharp  pressure 
which  is  being  brought  to  bear  on  the  North-American 
Germans;  but  the  occasional  short  reports  which  we  get  show 
us  that  it  is  exceedingly  heavy.  Hundreds  of  thousands, 
therefore,  will  welcome  as  a  deliverance  the  opportunity  of 
shaking  the  dust  of  the  United  States  from  their  feet  after 
the  war.  And  they  will  find  conditions  of  life  to  which  they 
are  accustomed  in  the  States  of  Central  and  South  America. 
The  immigration  of  Germans  from  North  to  Central  and 
South  America  will  be  furthered  by  treaties  between  the 
German'Empire  and  the  States  concerned. 

We  shall  also  be  able  to  attract  a  considerable  number  of 
the  Germans  abroad — including  people  with  capital — to  a 
great  German  African  Empire.  They  will  be  glad  to  come, 
if  this  new  great  colonial  Empire  is  given  large  liberties  and 
offers  the  immigrant  all  that  he  was  accustomed  to  find  in 
America. 

Further,  we  can  give  some  assistance,  so  far  as  the  German 
abroad,  who  is  still  a  German  subject,  is  concerned.  Germany 
at  the  conclusion  of  peace  must  take  their  case  in  hand,  and 
see  to  it  that  the  enemy  states  have  to  give  compensation  for 
the  illegal  wrongs  which  Germans  abroad  have  suffered  at  the 
hands  of  their  governments  and  subjects. 

The  will  to  stand  up  for  the  German  abroad  is  clearly 
present  in  the  Imperial  Government.  The  Foreign  Secretary 
gave  the  following  answer  to  a  question  on  this  point: — 

In  regard  to  damage  suffered  by  Germans  in  enemy 
countries  owing  to  measures  taken  by  our  enemies  in  viola- 
tion of  international  law,  the  Imperial  Government  regards 
as  one  of  their  most  urgent  duties  in  the  negotiations  for  peace 

*  [The  German  original  here  has  "Nordamerika,"  an  obvious  print- 
er's error. — Translator.] 


20    'The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

to  work  for  the  fullest  possible  indemnification  of  the  suf- 
ferers by  the  enemy  State.  Whether  the  establishment  or 
payment  of  such  damage  will  give  rise  to  the  introduction 
of  a  bill  in  the  German  Parliament  can  presumably  only  be 
considered  at  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  negotiations. 

It  is  clear  from  the  tenor  of  this  answer  that  the  Imperial 
Government  has  in  mind  to  demand,  on  the  conclusion  of 
peace,  a  lump  sum  as  compensation  for  all  the  damage  suffered 
by  Gei  lans  abroad,  and,  considering  the  great  number  of 
victims,  this  sum  is  bound  to  reach  a  total  of  several  thousands 
of  millions  of  marks.  These  milliards  will  have  been  won  by 
our  army  and  will,  of  course,  have  to  go  to  the  State,  and  it  is 
therefore  to  be  assumed  that  settlement  in  Germany  or  in  a 
German  colony  will  be  a  condition  of  getting  compensation. 
Possibly  settlement  in  the  territory  of  our  allies  will  be 
counted  as  equivalent. 

Obviously,  any  strict  compulsion  must  be  avoided.  But 
there  can  be  no  idea  of  compulsion,  if  territory  of  about  the 
size  of  Brazil  and  four  times  the  extent  of  Germany  is  put  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Germans  from  abroad  in  Central  Africa. 

Mittel-Afrika,  with  the  frontiers  which  we  would  give  it 
(we  should  constitute  it  by  uniting  the  Cameroons,  French 
Equatorial  Africa,  the  Belgian  Congo,  German  East  Africa, 
British  East  Africa,  Uganda,  and  great  parts  of  Angola,  with 
a  surface  of  about  7  to  7j4  million  square  kilometres),  con- 
tained at  the  outbreak  of  war  at  least  20^000  white  men.  In 
the  first  year  after  the  war,  if  a  sensible  policy  is  applied,  it 
might  immediately  receive  twice  the  number;  we  might  attract 
to  it  up  to  40,000  Germans  from  abroad,  with  an  average 
capital  of  25,000  marks,  and  a  further  10,000  to  20,000  Ger- 
mans as  workmen,  apprentices,  overseers,  merchants  and  bank 
officials.  For  if  capital  to  the  extent  of  1,000,000,000  marks 
comes  suddenly  into  the  country,  a  quite  different  life  would 
develop  from  that  which  would  arise  from  a  settlement  by 
driblets. 

We  could  also  make  a  good  beginning  with  small  settle- 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  21 


ments  in  Central  Africa,  for  instance  in  Angola,  in  certain 
districts  of  East  Africa,  and  the  Southern  Congo,  if  we  took 
as  our  pattern  the  South  Brazilian  provinces  of  Santa 
Catherina  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  There  Germans  work 
permanently  on  the  land  and  keep  healthy  at  from  25  to 
32  degrees  of  latitude  south.  In  the  coffee  province  of 
Brazil,  San  Paulo,  a  tropical  district,  Germans  have  to 
work  in  the  coffee  plantations  even  as  day  labourers.  Angola 
lies  much  nearer  the  equator,  it  is  true;  it  stretches  from 
6  to  17  degrees  southern  latitude.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that 
it  would  be  possible  to  develop  exclusive  settlements  of 
German  farmers  in  this  district,  as  in  Southern  Brazil,  if  we 
follow  the  example  of  the  Brazilian  States  of  Parana,  Santa 
Catherina  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  These  States  give  every 
immigrant  on  arrival  a  measured  plot  of  land  of  25  hectars, 
with  house  and  agricultural  implements  as  his  own  possession 
on  deferred  payment  of  a  low  purchase-price.  And  work 
can  begin  at  once. 

It  is  true  enough  that  there  are  many  arguments  against 
the  introduction  of  small-holders  into  Africa;  but  we  must 
make  the  attempt. 

A  further  essential  for  the  development  of  real  German 
world-power  is  a  genuine  policy  of  our  own  in  the  matter  of 
raw  materials,  based  on  the  principle  that  the  raw  materials 
produced  in  our  colonies  belong  in  the  first  instance  to 
German  industries.  Hitherto  our  colonial  economic  policy 
has  been  in  no  way  connected  with  our  home  policy.  The 
principle  did  not  hold  good,  either  that  the  German  colonies 
had  primarily  to  buy  in  the  German  market  or  that  colonial 
products  must  primarily  be  sent  to  Germany.  Only  as 
regards  foodstuffs  was  the  law  of  giving  preference  to  home- 
grown products  recognized ;  but  colonial  soil  counted 
economically  as  foreign.  That  tradition  must  be  broken 
with.  We  must  establish  it  as  the  basis  of  our  economic 
system  that  all  that  is  needed  for  our  industries  must  be  grown 
on  our  own  soil.  We  must  only  call  upon  the  territory  of 
friendly  States  so  far  as  our  own  is  inadequate.    It  is  only 


22     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 


such  a  law  as  that,  which  can  give  a  chance  of  peaceful 
development  to  our  economic  system  and  to  the  German 
element  in  the  world.  It  allows  the  emigration  of  surplus 
forces  to  the  cheap  fields  of  supply  overseas  and  attaches  them 
to  new  German  land,  giving  them  a  home  on  it.  They  are 
no  longer  compelled  to  wander  round  the  world  as  commercial 
travellers  and  agents  of  German  industries  in  search  of  a 
market.  It  should  no  longer  be  the  aim  of  German  economic 
policy  to  swell  the  figures  of  foreign  trade  by  all  sorts  of  petty 
artifices.  We  should  rather  arrive  at  establishing  what  are  the 
needs  of  the  population  in  the  matter  of  tropical  foodstuffs 
and  luxuries,  as  well  as  of  raw  material  for  our  industries,  and 
arranging  for  the  oversea  production  accordingly.  What  our 
own  colonies  cannot  achieve  ought  to  be  handed  over  to 
friendly  States  under  treaty.  And  we  ought  not  to  turn  out 
as  an  equivalent  much  over  the  strictly  necessary  quantity  of 
finished  industrial  products.  It  was  by  scraping  together  the 
tropical  and  subtropical  agricultural  products  of  all  the  world 
that  we  brought  unrest  into  our  economic  system;  nothing 
but  regulation  and  order  and  the  greatest  possible  production 
of  raw  material  by  our  own  tropical  agriculture  will  bring  us 
peace  in  our  labour,  will  free  us  from  the  fevered  scramble  of 
competition,  and  make  the  German  a  happy  man  again. 


IV.— THE  OVERSEA  FOUNDATIONS  OF  GERMAN  WORLD- 
POWER 

The  main  anxiety  of  those  who  find  it  hard  to  reconcile  them- 
selves to  the  idea  of  a  great  Central-African  colonial  Empire 
is  concerned  with  the  Congo  territories,  and  it  is  especially 
the  sleeping  sickness,  so  prevalent  there,  which  is  regarded 
as  a  heavy  mortgage  calculated  to  depreciate  very  materially 
the  value  of  the  colony. 

The  Rapports  sur  V Administration  du  Congo  helge  again 
and  again  deplore  the  wide  dissemination  of  sleeping  sickness 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  23 


in  many  districts.  In  the  report  for  1908  it  is  stated  that 
sleeping  sickness  was  raging  in  the  eastern  province  by  Lake 
Tanganyika,  that  it  was  wide-spread  in  Mongalla,  in  the  basin 
of  Lake  Leopold  IL,  on  the  Lukenye,  on  the  Lower  Congo, 
and  in  Eastern  Kwango ;  it  was  reported  to  have  broken  out 
seriously  on  the  banks  of  the  rivers  Congo,  Itimbiri,  Lulongo, 
Ubangi ;  in  Katanga,  on  the  rivers  Lualaba,  Lufira,  and  on 
Lak-e  Kissale.    But  there  was  none  in  Upper  Katanga. 

The  report  for  191 1  establishes  the  fact  that  sleeping 
sickness  was  on  the  decrease  in  Lower  and  Central  Congo,  in 
certain  districts  of  Kassai,  in  Manyema,  and  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Yakoma.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  raging  in  191 1, 
and  had  assumed  th-e  form  of  an  epidemic,  on  the  Semliki, 
Lake  Kivu,  the  Kwilu  and  the  Kwango. 

In  1912  settlements  were  removed  on  the  Luapula  and 
the  Lualaba  owing  to  sleeping  sickness;  the  pest  had  greatly 
diminished  in  Katanga,  and  the  Tanganyika,  the  Mweru  and 
the  Upper  Luapula  sections.  Yet  the  report  still  intimated 
that  sleeping  sickness  was  lying  heavy  on  the  colony. 

We  must,  on  the  other  hand,  not  overlook  and  suppress  the 
fact  that  the  vast  country  comprises  also  many  very  healthy 
and  populous  districts. 

We  have  one  source  of  information  in  the  reports  of  the 
British  Consuls  about  the  Belgian  Congo  contained  in 
Correspondence  Respecting  the  Affairs  of  the  Congo.  The 
Consul  Gerald  Campbell,  in  Boma,  writes  under  date 
October  25,  1910: — 


The  Uele  [Welle]  district  ...  is  not  only  comparatively 
well-populated  with  natives  of  a  greater  intelligence  than  is 
generally  found  in  the  Congo,  who,  long  accustomed  to 
trade  with  the  Arabs,  can  well  hold  their  own  against  all 
merchants,  but  it  is  rich  in  those  products  which  attract  trad- 
ers to  this  country.  Moreover,  more  caravan  routes  exist  in 
the  Uele  than  elsewhere. 


Campbell  put  the  total  population  of  the  Belgian  Congo 
at  734  millions. 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 


The  Consul  Armstrong  reported  in  1910: — 

The  Uele  [Welle]  is  a  densely  populated  country.  Sleep- 
ing sickness  is  practically  unknown,  and  the  few  cases  which 
exist  have  been  introduced  from  outside.  .  .  .  The  various 
tribes  in  this  district  are  remarkable  for  their  superior  in- 
telligence, and  of  these  the  Mangbattu,  with  its  sub-divisions 
of  Mangwele  and  Bangba,  is  the  most  noteworthy. 

The  Azande  is  a  warlike  tribe.  ...  In  numbers  they  rep- 
resent more  than  half  the  population  of  the  entire  district. 
.  .  .  Their  sultans,  or  chiefs,  known  as  the  Avungura — a 
name  given  to  the  ruling  tribe  as  distinct  from  the  ordinary 
Azande — are  incomparably  superior  in  every  way  to  the 
ordinary  native.  These  sultans  have  shown  remarkable  skill 
and  astuteness  in  dealing  with  the  European,  and  some  of 
them,  even  up  till  now,  have  maintained  a  sort  of  semi-inde- 
pendence. .  .  . 

Of  the  other  tribes  the  Ababuas  in  the  Rubi  zone  and 
the  Mamvu  in  the  Bomakandi  zone  are  perhaps  the  most 
primitive.  The  Government  has,  in  the  case  of  the  former 
tribe,  imposed  upon  them  as  their  chief  an  ex-sergeant  of  the 
public  force.  This  man,  being  of  another  tribe  (Amadis),  is 
maintained  in  his  authority  by  the  Government,  who  permits 
him  to  keep  a  small  body  of  armed  men  to  protect  his  per- 
son, and,  in  return  for  the  perquisities  of  chieftainship,  he 
forces  the  people  to  work  for  the  Government.  .  .  . 

The  Rubi  and  the  Bomakandi  are  the  richest  zones  in 
rubber.  The  whole  of  the  former  is  dense  equatorial  forest, 
while  the  latter  is  forest  intersected  with  grass  plains.  .  .  . 
The  Uele-Bili  is  chiefly  grass  plain,  but  strips  of  rubber- 
bearing  forests  are  to  be  found  along  the  numerous  water- 
courses which  intersect  the  country.  The  Gurba-Dungu  zone 
has  few  resources,  and  in  this  respect  resembles  the  Upper 
Nile  country. 

With  the  exception  of  the  Gurba-Dungu  zone,  the  soil 
in  the  Uele  district  is  exceptionally  rich,  and  rarely  in 
Africa  does  one  see  so  much  food  and  of  such  great  variety. 
Besides  the  ordinary  African  food,  such  as  bananas,  plantains, 
manioc,  palm  oil,  etc.,  maize,  rice,  pea-nuts,  millet,  sorghum, 
potatoes,  sesame  oil,  etc.,  grow  in  abundance.  The  quality  of 
the  maize,  where  the  seed  is  carefully  selected,  is  as  good  as 
the  best  that  America  can  produce.  Almost  every  kind  of 
European  vegetable  grows  with  luxuriance.  And  the  plains 
in  areas  where  there  is  no  tse-tse  fly  afford  good  grazing  lands 
for  cattle.  Nothing  has  yet  been  done  in  the  way  of  agri- 
cultural experiment,  with  the  exception  of  rubber,  but  there 
is  no  doubt  that  grain,  such  as  oats  and  wheat,  would  grow 
if  carefully  tended.  .  .  . 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  25 


In  the  Uele  district  slavery  is  rife.  .  .  .  Natives  are 
bought  and  sold,  and  officials  take  no  notice  whatever  of 
the  fact.  Indeed,  it  would  be  difficult  for  them  to  do  so,  be- 
cause they  have  actually  organized  a  thorough  system  of 
slavery  in  the  Mamvu  country.  These  people,  the  Mamvu, 
have  been  handed  over  entirely  to  a  few  Mangbettu  and 
Manguele  chiefs.  .  .  .  These  chiefs  told  me  that  the  Mamvu 
had  been  given  to  them  because  they  refused  to  work  the  rub- 
ber tax. 


As  Armstrong  further  reports,  most  of  the  merchants  in 
the  Welle  district  are  Greeks  and  Syrians  from  Khartum,  or 
Indians  from  Uganda  and  East  Africa.  There  are  great 
difficulties  about  porters;  few  merchants  can  get  more  than 
five  porters. 

A^ice-consul  Thurstan  sent  a  report  of  a  tour  which  he 
undertook  in  the  Kassai  district  in  August  and  September, 
1910. 

He  regards  the  Southern  part  of  the  Kassai  district  as 
suitable  for  European  settlement  in  the  future.  But  sleeping 
sickness  is  very  prevalent.  The  inhabitants  are  Bena  Lulua, 
Baluba  and  Kanyoka.  The  Bakette  and  Balolo  are  on 
their  western  borders,  half-naked  cannibals  whose  land  is 
unexplored. 

The  hereditary  main  chief  of  the  Bena  Lulua  is  Kalamba. 
Old  Kalamba  tw^ice  journeyed  with  Wissmann  as  far  as 
Nyangwe.  He  fled  before  the  Belgians  into  Portuguese 
territory;  his  son  came  back  in  1907,  and  established  himself 
at  Luluaburg. 

The  Baluba  and  Kanyoka  are  pastoral  peoples,  very  much 
spHt  up.  The  former  often  enter  European  service  as 
workers  or  domestic  slaves.  Little  is  done  for  the  country. 
There  are  no  roads  or  bridges  ;  the  paths  are  poor  native  tracks. 
The  district  was  formerly  the  scene  of  perpetual  fighting  and 
slave-raids.  Now  it  is  quiet.  Domestic  slavery  exists. 
Sleeping  sickness  was  very  rife;  the  great  native  village 
of  the  Bena  Lulua,  Mwamba  Kafula,  is  said  to  have  lost  a 
third  of  its  3,cxx)  inhabitants  in  five  years. 

The  Bakuba  are  forest-dwellers;  they  fish  and  hunt  and 


26     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

have  artistic  tendencies.  They  produce  woodwork  of  an  ex- 
cellence unapproached  by  any  other  race  of  the  Kassai.  The 
Bakuba  have  been  slave-owners  from  time  immemorial,  and 
are  only  accustomed  to  work  at  their  own  pleasure.  King 
Lukengo  (Frobenius  gives  graphic  descriptions  of  his  court 
— Ed.)  receives  a  commission  from  the  Kassai  Company  per 
ton  on  all  rubber  collected  in  his  country. 

Also  in  1910  the  Consul  Mackie  undertook  a  journey  in 
the  Congo  bend,  of  which  he  made  an  interesting  report. 

He  found  the  district  round  Lake  Tumba  thickly  popu- 
lated ;  th-e  villages  looked  prosperous  according  to  African 
standards.  He  reported  of  the  Bangala  district  that  sleep- 
ing sickness  had  caused  great  devastation  there.  For  a 
distance  of  500  kilometres  from  Lulanga  up  the  Congo  to 
Bumba  the  missionaries  only  found  49  villages  with  a  total 
population  of  4,068  people  in  1910  as  against  50,000  in  1890. 
New  Antwerp  *'is  believed"  formerly  to  have  had  15,000 
inhabitants ;  only  a  few  hundreds  remain.  Many  decamped 
owing  to  sleeping  sickness ;  others  died. 

Between  the  Congo  and  the  Lopori  River  Mackie  found 
the  population  very  much  exhausted  by  the  methods  of  the 
rubber-trade.  That  is  the  home  of  the  Bongandanga,  a  quar- 
relsome tribe  with  a  bad  reputation. 

The  land  watered  by  the  Maringa  River  is  inhabited  by 
the  tribe  of  the  Mongo ;  the  Boenda  (Baringa)  are  a  sub-divi- 
sion of  it.  They  have  large  villages,  are  numerous,  warlike  and 
hostile.  There  is  much  sleeping  sickness  round  Lingunda 
on  the  Lomako  River.  The  Esanga  (Ysenge)  district  on  the 
Upper  Maringa  is  thickly  populated.  Round  Basankusu,  at 
the  confluence  of  the  Maringa  and  the  Lopori,  the  inhabitants 
are  Mongos ;  they  file  their  teeth.  Mackie  found  these 
villages  surrounded  with  palisades  against  man-eating 
leopards.  Twenty  men  are  said  to  have  been  eaten  at  the 
mission-station  of  Ikau.  The  forest  tracks  in  this  district  are 
very  good — sometimes  15  feet  wide;  they  are  kept  free  of 
grass  by  women  and  children. 

Round  Ikau-Bokota,  on  the  Lulongo  River,  the  Mongos 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  27 

build  large  villages  and  make  streets ;  but  the  villages,  w^hich 
are  very  numerous,  are  badly  built  and  dirty.  They  often  are 
so  close  to  one  another  that  they  form  a  line  several  English 
miles  long. 

Mackie  also  undertook  a  journey  through  the  Aruwimi 
district.  He  reports  the  existence  of  many  large  villages 
close  to  Yambuya.  The  tribe  of  the  Baso  round  Basoko  is 
noted  for  its  prowess,  activity  and  industry ;  the  Bangalemas, 
on  the  two  banks  of  the  Aruwimi,  are  great  workers  in  iron. 
They  build  high,  conical  huts. 

In  the  forest  between  the  Congo  and  the  Aruwimi  the 
Turumbu  have  numerous  thickly  populated  villages.  There 
is  an  extensive  palm-oil  industry  among  the  natives ;  their 
pottery  is  famous. 

The  report  of  the  Consul  Lamont  dates  from  1912.  He 
was  able  to  communicate  the  fact  that  there  was  little  popula- 
tion on  the  banks  of  the  Congo  from  Stanley  Pool  upstream 
to  Coquilhatville.  Sleeping  sickness  is  very  rife ;  the  v/omen 
refuse  to  bear  children ;  abortion  is  a  common  practice. 
Infant  mortality  is  great.  In  Lulanga  the  population  is  said 
to  have  diminished  from  8,000  to  1,000.  Lamont  describes 
the  houses  as  poorer  and  more  miserable  than  any  he  had 
seen  in  Africa. 

Of  New  Antwerp  and  Lisala  he  reports  that  the  state 
labourers  there  had  good  houses,  and  were  well  fed,  strong 
and  contented.  The  physique  of  the  Ababuas  and  Azandes  in 
the  Aruwimi  and  Welle  districts  reminded  him  of  the  Ashantis. 
They  make  good  soldiers.  There  are  abundant  children  and 
abundant  food.  The  population  is  very  dense  everywhere 
along  the  main  routes,  except  on  the  Aruwimi.  Strawplaiting 
had  been  introduced  into  the  Ababua  country,  and  mats  and 
hats  were  being  produced.  The  weapons  of  the  Aruwimi  and 
Welle  tribes  are  spear,  knife,  bow  and  arrow.  Lamont  says 
he  saw  no  fire-arms  in  the  hands  of  the  natives.  In  Ibembo 
there  is  a  considerable  trade  in  native-grown  rice;  in  Likati 
a  large  palm-oil  market. 

Of  the  Lowa  district  (on  the  Lualaba)  Lamont  reports 


28     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

that  the  natives  there  cultivate  a  great  deal  of  rice.  The 
region  consists  of  swamps  and  marshes,  and  is  under  water 
for  nine  months  in  the  year.  Even  in  the  dry  season  march- 
ing is  difficult.  The  cultivation  of  rice  is  especially  active 
between  Kindu  and  Shuka;  Lamont  was  offered  i8o  kilo- 
grammes there  for  7  francs.  A  good  deal  of  cane  sugar  is 
grown,  too.  Sleeping  sickness  is  little  prevalent  in  the  Lowa 
district;  the  country  between  the  Lomami  and  Lualaba  seems 
to  be  free  from  mosquitoes. 

The  report  of  the  Vice-consul  Castens  also  dates  from 
1912.  He  made  a  tour  of  inspection  in  the  Kassai  and 
Sankuru  district.  Between  Pania-Mutombo  and  Lubefu  he 
found  quite  a  number  of  villages,  but  all  small  and  of  no 
particular  importance.  Between  Lubefu  and  Kabinda  (four 
days'  march)  the  country  was  beautiful,  mountainous  and 
well  wooded.  The  inhabitants  were  Basongi ;  their  powerful 
chief  was  old  Lupungu  in  Kabinda,  the  friend  of  Wissmann. 
He  ruled  over  50,000  souls;  his  capital,  Kabinda,  had  3,000 
inhabitants.  On  the  route  from  Lubefu  to  Kabinda  there 
were  a  number  of  villages  with  up  to  200  inhabitants  apiece; 
the  people  had  abundant  food  and  plenty  of  cattle.  Katambe, 
on  the  Lubefu  River  (north  of  Kabinda),  was  a  village  with 
12,000  inhabitants;  it  was  an  English  mile  long  and  half  a 
mile  wide — traversed  by  a  broad  park-like  street.  The  daily 
market  was  attended  by  goo  or  1,000  people,  the  weekly  one 
by  5,000  to  6,000.  Mutombo-Kachi  had  2,500  inhabitants 
(Balubas)  ;  there  were  rifles  to  be  seen;  the  Sultan  and  his 
brother  had  breech-loaders.  There  were  said  to  be  350  guns 
there  and  in  Katambe  respectively.  Kanda-Kanda  contained 
1,500  souls  (Kanyoka).  This  tribe  was  about  50,000  strong; 
the  people  made  good  porters. 

Kalamba  lived  at  Luluaburg,  as  Thursten  mentioned  above. 

Castens  found  the  Bakuba  country  thickly  populated ; 
according  to  his  account  there  are  164  villages  lying  within  a 
radius  of  from  20  to  30  English  miles  round  Mushengi  (in  the 
Bakuba  country). 

The  Basongo  Mino  live  between  the  Sankuru  and  the 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  29 

Lukenye  River.  Castens  describes  them  as  arrogant  and 
extremely  idle.  They  are  cannibals  and  hostile  to  the 
government.  In  April,  1912,  under  the  leadership  of  natives 
from  Ikela,  who  live  north  of  the  Lukenye,  they  brutally 
murdered  Lieutenant  Moreti,  head  of  the  post  at  Kole,  when 
he  was  on  his  way  to  arrest  some  people  who  had  harboured 
murderers. 

The  Batelele,  who  live  from  th-e  Sankuru  to  the  Lomami, 
were  formerly  warlike  and  very  aggressive ;  now  they  are 
peaceable  and  friendly  to  white  men.  They  learnt  a  great 
deal  from  the  Arabs,  are  good  workmen  and  excellent 
agriculturists;  they  are,  in  fact,  one  of  the  most  progressive 
and  most  useful  tribes.  Round  Lodja  and  south  of  Katako- 
Kombe  there  is  much  sleeping  sickness.  There  is  a  doctor 
stationed  in  Lodja. 

Castens  estimated  the  population  of  the  Kassai  district 
at  millions. 

These  very  instructive  reports  of  the  British  Consuls  are 
to  some  extent  supplemented  by  the  Belgian  official  reports. 

The  white  population  of  the  Belgian  Congo  rose  from  3,399 
persons  on  th-e  ist  January,  1910,  to  5,465  (including  about 
600  women)  on  the  ist  January,  1912,  and  to  over  6,(X)0  on 
the  1st  January,  1914.  On  the  ist  January,  191 1,  the  whites 
were  distributed  as  follows: — Boma  390,  Buta  (in  Welle)  35, 
Coquilhatville  32,  Banana  36,  Basoko  21,  Dima  (on  the 
Kassai)  39,  Elisabethville  (in  Katanga)  360,  fitoile  du  Congo 
116,  Kasongo  (on  the  Lualaba)  21,  Kilo  38,  Kindu  29, 
Kinshassa  69,  Leopoldvilk  221,  Lisala  21,  Luebo  20, 
Luluaburg  35,  Lusambo  50,  Matadi  143,  New  Antwerp  37, 
Ponthierville  42,  Sakania  48,  Stanleyville  106,  Thysville  (on 
the  railway  from  Matadi  to  Leopoldville)  56. 

As  for  the  products  of  the  colony  the  collection  of  self- 
grown  products  (rubber,  copal,  ivory)  played  the  chief  part 
until  quite  recently;  during  the  last  few  years  mining  came  to 
the  fore.  Cultivation  for  export  still  plays  a  very  small  role ; 
a  beginning  has  at  last  been  made  with  the  exploitation  of  the 
vast  stock  of  oil-palms. 


30     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

The  gold  fields  of  Kilo  produced  in  1910  876  kilogrammes 
of  gold,  in  1912  740  kilogrammes;  the  output  at  Moto  in  the 
same  district  amounted  in  1912  to  244  kilogrammes.  Further, 
the  yield  of  the  mines  at  Haut  Sele  in  the  same  year  was 
63  kilogrammes  of  gold,  and  some  gold  mines  were  brought 
into  working  in  the  basin  of  the  Gayu.  Coal  had  been  found 
on  the  Lukuga;  in  the  zone  of  Mandoko,  in  the  extreme 
south-east,  the  presence  of  valuable  diamonds  and  of  tin  was 
discovered. 

The  "Societe  Internationale  Forestiere  et  Miniere  du 
Congo"  had  mining  rights — 

1.  In  the  Aruwimi  basin  over  100,000  hectars  for  gold, 
silver  and  iron;  diamond  mines  were  discovered; 

2.  In  Mayumbe,  where  deposits  of  bitumen,  and  petro- 
leum, gold,  copper  and  iron  mines  were  discovered,  the  con- 
cession amounted  to  400,000  hectars; 

3.  In  Mayumbe  in  a  different  district  where  gold,  silver, 
platinum,  copper  and  iron  were  present; 

4.  In  the  Kassai  district  where  the  presence  of  gold, 
diamonds,  silver,  sulphur,  manganese  and  iron  was  estab- 
lished. 

The  ''Compagnie  du  Chemin  de  Fer  du  Congo  Superieur 
aux  Grand  Lacs''  discovered  great  masses  of  hematite,  and  in 
some  places  the  presence  of  gold,  in  the  east  of  the  Kivu 
district.  The  bituminous  deposits  discovered  on  the  Stanley- 
ville-Ponthierville  Railway  were  estimated  at  ij/^  million 
tons  with  a  proportion  of  60-100  litres  of  heavy  oil  per  ton. 

In  Upper  Katanga  the  diamond  fields  in  the  Kundulunga 
Mountains  produced  their  first  yield  in  1913.  There  were,  as 
a  rule,  only  small  stones,  found  in  the  ''yellow  ground"  near 
the  surface ;  many  of  them  were  very  fine.  The  blue  ground 
has  not  yet  been  exploited.  The  Thys-Jadit  group  had  found 
copper  to  the  east  and  north-east  of  Lake  Mweru  and  tin 
near  Kiambi  on  the  Luvwa;  near  the  Lukulu  gold  and  tin 
had  been  found. 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  31 

The  beginnings  of  an  industry  are  there,  but  it  suffers,  as 
does  th-e  whole  economic  development  of  the  colony,  from  the 
difficulties  of  getting  labour.  It  is  not  so  much  the  lack  of 
labourers ;  the  Belgian  Congo  is  in  proportion  as  thickly 
populated  as  the  Cameroons.  And  the  calls  for  labour  were 
in  general  less  than  in  the  Cameroons.  The  great  evil  in  the 
Belgian  Congo  was  a  wrong  labour  legislation,  which  was 
quite  unsuitable  for  Africa.  According  to  the  official  Belgian 
report  there  occurred  in  Elisabethville  (in  Katanga),  between 
the  1st  December,  1912,  and  the  ist  May,  1913,  no  less  than 
595  breaches  of  contract  on  the  part  of  native  labourers.  In 
Mayumbe  there  were  from  13  to  20  per  cent,  of  desertions 
among  the  native  labourers,  in  Matadi  15  per  cent.,  and  at 
Stanley  Pool  some  firms  had  to  reckon  on  25  to  50  per  cent. 

In  spite  of  these  difficulties  the  industry  made  progress. 
Lever  Brothers  (the  great  English  soap  firm)  had  50  white 
men  in  Leverville,  at  the  confluence  of  the  Kwilu  and  the 
Kwango.  The  oil  mills  there  can  deal  with  12,000  tons  of 
fruit  a  year,  the  mills  in  Alberta,  near  Bumba,  with  10,000 
tons  of  fruit.  There  are  also  oil-works  at  Elisabetha,  near 
Barumbi  (Aruwimi).  The  ''Societe  des  Huileries  du  Congo 
Beige"  (Lever  Brothers)  had  as  white  personnel  in  1912  139 
agents  in  the  Belgian  Congo,  69  Englishmen,  65  Belgians, 
I  Swiss,  I  Frenchman,  i  Dutchman,  2  Norwegians.  The 
number  of  black  hands  varied  between  1,500  and  3,000. 

The  ''American  Congo  Company"  set  up  factories  for  the 
mechanical  treatment  of  rubber  in  191 2  in  Kimpoko  and  Black 
River.  In  the  same  year  the  dockyard  of  the  ''Societe  Citas" 
at  Stanley  Pool  launched  17  ships  and  60  lighters  with  a 
tonnage  of  1,900  tons. 

In  19 13  there  were  two  furnaces  in  work  in  Katanga  and 
a  third  in  process  of  building.  No  i,  in  Lubumbashi,  pro- 
duced between  the  8th  January  and  the  27th  March,  989  tons 
of  copper  at  95  per  cent. ;  No.  2,  1,051  tons  from  the  7th  April 
to  the  9th  June.  The  two  furnaces  had  produced  together 
from  the  ist  January  to  the  30th  September,  1913,  5,000  tons 


32     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

of  lingots.  A  ton  of  copper  yielding  95  per  cent,  cost  in  1912 
about  800  francs  at  the  works. 

In  1912  the  various  administrative  districts  reported  as 
follovv^s  about  the  economic  situation : — 

Bas  Congo. — The  crops  were  844  tons  of  cocoa,  5,800  tons 
of  palm-kernels,  and  1,900  tons  of  palm-oil.  Th-e  trade  of 
Bomba  had  remained  stationary.  Matadi  had  a  turnover  of 
70,000  tons.  The  arrangements  in  the  harbour  were  in- 
adequate. There  were  169  trading-posts  in  the  district  with 
6,000  native  hands. 

Moyen  Congo  had  92  industrial  and  trading-posts  (th-e 
most  important  in  Kinshassa)  and  two  shipping-yards.  The 
number  of  black  labourers  (2,700  in  Leopoldville  and  1,700 
in  Kinshassa)  was  7,450;  it  was  insufficient.  The  district 
Haut  Sele  yielded  52  tons  of  rubber  as  against  77  in  191 1. 

Kwang'o. — There  were  85  factories  on  the  ist  January, 
1913.  700  tons  of  rubber  and  150  tons  of  rubber  bark  were 
collected.  A  great  number  of  factories  were  closed  owing  to 
the  rubber  crisis.  Leverville,  the  establishment  of  Lever 
Brothers,  lies  in  this  district. 

Kassai. — The  district  suffered  from  the  rubber  crisis.  It 
contained  over  80  trade  settlements. 

Lac  Leopold  IL — This  district  was  only  opened  to  Free 
Trade  on  the  ist  July,  191 1.  Five  companies  were  at  work 
in  1912;  in  the  second  half-year  they  imported  200  tons  of 
European  goods  and  exported  152  tons  of  rubber,  ivory  and 
copal. 

Equateur. — In  this  district  21  companies  had  107  factories; 
their  profits  amounted  to  over  a  million  francs.  Little  rubber 
was  collected,  only  90  tons  in  the  second  half  of  1912,  but  a 
great  deal  of  copal  was  exported.  The  Busira  Syndicate 
exported  more  than  800  tons,  but  only  8  tons  of  rubber. 

Bangala. — The  district  had  34  factories.  Not  much  was 
exported,  apart  from  120  tons  of  rice  from  Itimbiri.  There 
were  a  number  of  journeymen  traders  who  took  their  wares 
from  place  to  place  in  boats. 

Ubangi  had  36  factories.    The  rubber  and  ivory  trades 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  33 

made  little  progress;  the  Ekuta  section  delivered  15  tons  of 
copal  a  month. 

Stanleyville. — This  district  had  51  factories.  Its  export 
in  1912  amounted  to  105  tons  of  rubber,  18  tons  of  ivory, 
773/2  tons  of  rice.  The  Ituri  zone  wa-s  only  opened  to  Free 
Trade  on  the  ist  July,  1912;  its  trade  increased  quickly. 
Twenty-nine  factories  were  quickly  opened,  which  in  the 
second  half-year  exported  61  tons  of  rubber  and  14^  tons  of 
ivory. 

In  the  Welle  district  there  were  34  factories.  In  Welle 
Bili  the  number  rose  from  8  to  23  in  six  months,  and  in  Bomo- 
kandi  from  o  to  9.  The  increase  diminished  in  1913  owing 
to  the  fall  in  the  price  of  rubber. 

Aruwimi. — This  district  had  29  factories  and  a  number  of 
travelling  traders.  The  Lomami  Company  was  working  in 
the  district.    Developments  progressed  slowly. 

Katanga  had  229  companies  on  the  ist  January,  19 13,  and 
262  trading  posts. 

These  Belgian  official  reports,  taken  in  conjunction  with 
the  communications  of  the  British  Consuls,  give  an  essen- 
tially different  picture  of  the  Belgian  Congo  from  that  which 
still  pervades  the  German  press.  The  vast  territory  in  its 
north-eastern  part  resembles  the  neighbouring  populous 
British  province  of  Uganda  and  the  German  district  round 
Lake  Kivu;  the  southern  part  on  the  Kassai,  Sankuru  and 
Lualaba  Rivers  was  even  the  home  of  an  ancient  and  very 
remarkable  negro  civilization.  The  great  Lunda  Empire, 
between  Kwango  and  Lualaba,  the  tributary  states  of  which 
used  to  reach  as  far  as  Lake  Mweru  and  Bangweolo,  existed 
certainly  already  in  the  i6th  century,  as  can  be  seen  in 
Portuguese  reports;  it  was  still  flourishing  in  the  middle  of 
the  19th  century.  The  empire  was  maintained,  that  is  to  say, 
for  three  centuries — a  rare  phenomenon  in  Central  and  South 
Africa.  When  the  German  traveller  Paul  Pogge  visited  the 
Lunda  empire  in  1874  its  decay  had  already  begun  owing  to 
the  effect  of  European  influences. 


34     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

The  Baluba  peoples,  between  the  Kassai  and  the  Sankuru, 
the  Kioko,  who  live  to  the  south  of  them,  a  hard-working 
tribe,  who  are  regarded  as  the  descendants  of  the  Jagga, 
who  laid  the  ancient  Congo  Empire  waste  in  the  i6th  century, 
are  known  to  us  from  Wissmann's  descriptions;  Frobenius 
visited  these  same  tribes  in  1907  as  well  as  the  Bakuba  to 
the  north  of  them.  All  these  tribes  used  to  rank  very  high; 
from  the  point  of  view  of  civilization  the  Basongo,  between 
the  Sankuru  and  the  Lomami,  were  especially  highly  de- 
veloped; Wissmann  was  amazed  at  their  large,  populous  and 
clean  settlements  on  his  first  journey  across  Africa. 

All  these  territories,  and  especially  those  between  Lake 
Tanganyika  and  the  Lualaba,  suffered  very  severely  from 
Arab  slave-raids.  Their  inhabitants  were  powerless  without 
fire-arms  against  the  invaders,  and  could  not  defend  their 
civilization.  Many  of  them  were  killed  or  carried  off ;  again 
and  again  their  plantations  were  destroyed  and  their  villages 
burnt.  The  remnants  fled  before  the  man-hunters  into  the 
desert;  those  whom  the  enemy  had  not  carried  off  and  mur- 
dered were  ravaged  by  smallpox.  And  then  sleeping  sickness 
came  to  fill  the  cup  of  misfortune. 

Between  the  Kassai  and  Sankuru  and  the  bend  of  the 
Congo  there  live  also  some  first-rate  tribes,  although  naturally 
they  could  not  develop  so  high  and  lasting  a  political  civiliza- 
tion in  this  district  of  really  primeval  forest  as  on  the  southern 
and  northern  savannahs.  The  dark,  over-grown,  impenetrable 
forest  favours  dispersal.  But  in  the  actual  Congo  basin  the 
many  navigable  rivers  offer  again  sure  means  of  communica- 
tion, and  the  best  proof  of  traffic  between  the  Congo  hinter- 
land and  the  West  Coast,  reaching  back  into  pre-European 
times,  is  the  naturalization  of  American  cultivated  plants  in 
the  Congo  basin.  So  careful  a  judge,  therefore,  as  Dr.  Hugo 
Marquardsen  is  justified  in  saying  in  his  Belgian  Congo :  A 
Geographical  Survey,  in  the  third  volume  for  the  year  19 16  of 
Mitteilungen  aus  den  deutschen  Schutzgehieten  (Reports  from 
the  German  Protectorates)  : 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  35 


The  human  material  of  the  Belgian  Congo,  both  in  the 
plains  and  in  the  forests,  is  therefore  to  be  regarded  as, 
on  the  average,  very  valuable,  even  though  particular  sec- 
tions of  it  may  still  be  very  far  removed  from  civilization. 
The  civilizing  work  of  Europeans  among  these  people  must 
be  reckoned  as  fruitful  and  promising. 

As  for  the  French  Congo — more  properly  called  French 
Equatorial  Africa — Gabun  is  more  or  less  like  the  Southern 
Cameroons  and  the  parts  of  the  Belgian  territories  which  lie 
next  to  it,  only  with  this  difference,  that  the  population  of  the 
Gabun  coast  stands  at  an  equally  high  stage  of  development 
with  that  of  the  Niger.  Just  as  the  mouth  of  the  Congo  itself, 
so  the  coast  districts  north  and  south  of  it  were  the  goal  of 
European  commercial  and  missionary  enterprise  from  the 
beginning  of  the  i6th  century;  thus,  for  example,  according 
to  Heinrich  Schurtz  (see  Helmolt's  History  of  the  World) 
Loango  in  Gabun  is  said  to  have  had  15^000  inhabitants  in 
1650.  At  any  rate,  the  population  of  the  Gabun  coast  has 
had  intercourse  with  Europeans  for  centuries,  and  it  is 
remarkable  that  the  negroes  of  Loango,  as  Felicien  Challaye 
relates  (Le  Congo  Frangais,  Paris,  1909)  sent  a  petition  to 
the  Government  that  their  taxes,  which  they  paid  very  willingly, 
might  be  expended  on  the  construction  of  roads,  bridges  and 
schools.  Gabun  possesses  vast  resources  of  timber  in  the 
district  of  the  great  lagoons  and  the  Ogowe  River,  w^hich  is 
navigable  for  several  hundred  kilometres.  Of  its  mineral 
resources  the  deposits  of  copper  east  of  Brazzaville  are  well- 
known. 

Th-e  main  part  of  French  Equatorial  Africa  stretches 
northwards  with  the  Chad  territory  into  the  Sudan;  round 
Lake  Chad  there  once  existed  empires  whose  history  can  be 
traced  back  to  the  year  1000  of  the  Christian  era.  The  ancient 
Sultanates  of  Wadai  and  Bagirmi  were  states  of  an  earlier 
Sudanese  civilization.  The  river-district  of  the  Logone  and 
Shari  has  been  characterized  by  Germans  who  know  it  as 
a  second  Mesopotamia.  At  any  rate  the  Shari  and  Logone 
districts  are  very  rich  in  resources. 


36     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

French  Equatorial  Africa  is  very  undeveloped;  that  is  not 
the  fault  of  the  colony,  however,  but  of  the  colonizers. 
France  has  been  too  much  occupied  in  North  Africa  and 
Senegambia  to  have  had  the  strength  to  animate  the  broad 
territories  north  of  the  Congo  as  well.  There  is  the  further 
consideration  that  the  Chad  territory  and  the  districts  Ubangi- 
Shari-Chad  are  the  hinterlands  of  the  Cameroon  coast  and 
not  of  Gabun.  The  route  by  the  Congo  and  Ubangi,  which 
the  French  use,  is  a  very  imperfect  and  expensive  means  of 
communication. 

Sleeping  sickness  is  as  widespread  in  French  Equatorial 
Africa — apart  from  the  northern  sections — as  in  the  Belgian 
Congo ;  it  is  indeed  a  very  unpleasant  asset  of  the  Congo 
territories.  And  to  fight  it  needs  considerable  financial 
means.  But  good  success  may  be  awaited  in  view  of  the 
present  state  of  science,  which  has  already  got  so  far  as  to 
render  the  victims  of  the  disease — especially  by  treatment 
with  the  new  Salversan  preparation — at  any  rate,  completely 
without  danger  to  their  neighbours,  even  if  they  are  them- 
selves past  saving.  Thus  the  risk  of  the  further  spread  of 
the  pest  is  to  a  great  extent  removed. 

And  is  it  not  possible  that  sleeping  sickness,  which  is  so 
rife  just  in  the  Congo  basin,  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  disease 
arising  from  malnutrition  and  bad  conditions  ?  We  are  accus- 
tomed to  the  fact  that  European  wars  bring  epidemics  in  their 
train,  or,  at  least,  have  mostly  done  so;  are  the  perpetual 
ravaging  of  the  Congo  basin  by  Arabs  and  Portuguese,  the 
slave-raids  and  the  expulsion  of  the  inhabitants  from  their 
homes,  the  rubber  atrocities  of  Leopold's  time,  likely  to  have 
remained  without  lasting  influence  on  the  population  of  the 
Congo?  And  is  it  not  to  be  expected  that  the  health  of  the 
people  will  improve  again  with  the  progress  in  civilization  and 
development  of  the  country? 

The  Belgian  Congo  has  from  8  to  9  million  inhabitants 
(4  to  the  square  kilometre),  French  Equatorial  Africa  has  5, 
the  Cameroons  3,  German  East  Africa  8  millions.  With  parts 
of  Angola  and  portions  of  the  British  possessions  which 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  37 


belong  to  Central  Africa,  we  shall  reach  a  total  of  at  least  30 
million  inhabitants. 

The  most  valuable  African  territories  lie,  of  course,  in  the 
bend  of  the  Niger  and  south  of  Senegal.  They  are  Sene- 
gambia,  Guinea,  the  Ivory  and  Gold  Coasts,  Togo,  Dahomey 
and  Nigeria.  These  countries  contain  at  least  32  million 
comparatively  highly  civilized  inhabitants  and  they  are  already 
v^ell  developed.  If  these  colonies  could  be  united,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  they  w^ould  be  of  great  importance  from  the 
political,  economic  and  also  military  point  of  view.  But  in 
political  and  military  value  they  will  certainly  be  surpassed  by 
Central  Africa,  which  equals  them  in  population  and  surpasses 
them  many  times  over  in  extent  of  territory. 


v.— THE  WHITE  MAN  IN  CTiNTRAL  AFRICA 

When  we  spoke  of  attracting  tens  of  thousands  of 
Germans  to  Central  Africa  we  were  counting,  above 
all — as  may  be  gathered  from  the  estimate  of  Central  Africa 
as  a  comparatively  well-populated  country,  given  in  the 
previous  chapter — on  the  Germans  organizing  the  30  million 
negro  inhabitants  to  supply  from  the  tropics  German  require- 
ments in  the  matter  of  the  products  of  the  soil,  and  directing 
their  labour  to  a  great  end.  This  end  is  our  acquisition  of 
the  raw  materials  which  we  lack. 

The  proof  that  the  white  man  can  live  in  Central  Africa 
as  an  official  and  organizer,  has  already  been  given.  We  can 
even  assert  to-day  that  in  most  parts  of  Central  Africa  the 
white  man,  and  even  women  and  children,  can  quite  well  stand 
four  to  five  years  on  end,  and  that  he  will  keep  his  health,  if 
he  has  the  opportunity  of  recuperating  his  strength  every  two 
or  three  years  in  a  temperate  climate.  It  only  remains  for 
us  to  show  that  Central  Africa  can  very  soon  give  a  home  to 
50,000  Germans,  and  after  a  few  years  even  to  100,000. 

We  must  look  at  tropical  agriculture  from  three  points 
of  view: — 


38     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

1.  It  is  a  question  of  exploiting  the  existing  resources  of 
the  soil  and  of  the  great  forests  (timber,  oil-palms,  rubber) 
with  the  help  of  the  negroes; 

2.  Those  kinds  of  native  cultivation  which  yield  pro- 
ducts for  export  are  to  be  encouraged; 

3.  We  must  pay  attention  to  cultivation  by  Europeans 
in  plantations  and  medium  and  small  holdings. 

Our  previous  colonial  policy  had  not  yet  determined  on  a 
fixed  goal,  and  had  not  done  so  chiefly  because  our  colonial 
system  stood  separate  from  our  home  system.  We  showed 
no  favour  to  our  own  colonial  products  through  special  tariffs 
nor  any  favour  either  to  German  imports  into  the  colonies. 
Because  we  claimed  the  Open  Door  from  England,  we  had  to 
allow  the  Open  Door  in  our  own  colonial  possessions,  and  that 
was  why  our  colonial  agriculture  made  but  laborious  progress 
and  was  perpetually  suffering  from  some  set-back.  We  are 
not  here  advocating  a  policy  of  colonial  Protection,  which 
would  favour  our  own  colonial  raw  material  by  exempting  it 
from  a  tariff  imposed  upon  all  other  tropical  raw  material 
imported  into  Germany.  That  would  result  in  a  rise  in  the 
prices  of  raw  material,  which  is  just  what  we  want  to  prevent 
by  a  colonial  policy  of  our  own.  On  the  other  hand,  we  must 
keep  clearly  before  our  eyes  that  the  tropical  agriculture  of 
South-East  Asia  and  India  has  at  its  disposal  vaster  human 
material  than  any  other  portion  of  the  world.  The  Indian 
and  Chinese  coolies  are  also  so  easily  satisfied  that  they  are 
content  with  the  lowest  of  wages.  Foreign  merchants  know 
the  rapid  rise  of  East-Asiatic  rubber  cultivation.  The  other 
rubber  countries  of  the  world  could  not  keep  pace  because 
South-East  Asia  could  undersell  all  competitors,  thanks  to  its 
abundant  masses  of  cheap  labour. 

It  would  be  quite  wrong  if  the  German  rubber  industries 
tried  to  draw  only  on  South-East  Asia  as  being  the  country 
of  cheapest  production.  It  would  be  more  profitable  to  us 
if  they  gave  the  preference  to  territories  of  more  expensive 
production,  provided  these  countries  were  in  a  position  to 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  39 


consume  the  more  expensive  products  of  the  German  indus- 
tries. In  other  words,  the  German  colonies  and  the  allied 
states  which  produce  raw  material  must  give  a  preferential 
tariff  to  German  industrial  products.  Then  the  German 
Empire  would  also  be  in  a  position  to  give  preference  to  their 
raw  materials.  If  such  a  well-balanced  preferential  policy  as 
that  is  carried  out,  our  colonial  Empire  and  the  allied  states 
which  produce  raw  material  will  show  steady  development. 
Our  plantation  and  farm  work  would  then  have  quite  new 
prospects. 

Hitherto  many  colonial  economists — especially  the  official 
ones — have  been  inclined  to  prefer  negro  cultivation  to  the 
policy  of  plantations  and  farms.  They  dreamed  of  a  develop- 
ment something  like  that  of  the  English  Gold  Coast  colony, 
where  black  farmers  and  landowners  produce  up  to  50,000 
tons  of  cocoa  for  export.  There  are  black  millionaires  in 
Accra,  who  keep  white  chauffeurs,  black  lawyers  and  black 
hotel-proprietors  with  white  servants.  The  conditions  in  the 
Gold  Coast  and  the  neighbouring  territories  are  certainly  con- 
vincing evidence  of  the  will  to  live  well  and  advance  on  the 
part  of  the  natives ;  but  it  cannot  be  the  object  of  German 
colonial  policy  to  produce  similar  conditions  in  German  Mittel- 
Afrika.  We  must  not  increase  the  value  of  the  soil  in  Mittel- 
Afrika  by  our  own  labours  in  order  to  give  the  negro  the 
pleasure  of  a  higher  rent  for  his  land.  The  native  shall,  of 
course,  share  in  the  increased  value  which  his  land  has  got 
owing  to  the  white  immigration,  but  it  would  be  absurd  to  let 
him  reap  all  the  advantage.  We  need  have  no  fear  that  it 
will  be  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  native,  if  we  claim  land 
for  white  immigration  in  the  future  in  far  greater  measure 
than  before  the  war.  The  chief  objection  to  the  system  of 
plantations  and  farms  is  met,  when  it  is  proved  that  for  a 
native  village  2,ocx)  hectars  of  land  in  a  colony  that  is  flourish- 
ing, owing  to  means  of  communication  and  European  admini- 
stration, is  more  valuable  than  10,000  in  an  African  village 
under  native  black  rule. 


40     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

In  future,  then,  we  shall  not  restrict  plantations  and  farms 
as  before  the  war,  but  favour  this  policy,  while  we  need  not 
at  the  same  time  do  away  with  native  cultivation;  but  just  as 
at  home  we  have  large,  medium  and  small  holdings,  so  a  wise 
policy  will  have  to  work  for  the  same  variety  in  our  colonial 
Empire. 

At  the  same  time  we  shall  have,  as  far  as  possible,  to  set 
aside  for  the  good  of  the  community  districts  in  which  it  is  a 
question  of  collecting  self-grown  products.  In  the  Cameroons 
great  stress  was  laid  on  each  native  village  ke-eping  its  oil- 
palms;  the  anxiety  of  the  Government  went  so  far  as  to 
prevent  the  natives  selling  palm-lands.  But  we  can  never 
arrive  in  this  way  at  a  proper  utilization  of  the  great  riches 
of  the  country.  Oil-palm  districts  would  have  to  become  state 
property.  The  Government  would  lease  them  to  white  com- 
panies, and  would  lay  down  what  proportion  of  the  yield 
should  be  handed  over  to  the  native  villages,  which  have 
hitherto  had  a  usufruct  of  the  forests.  Thus  the  natives  will 
have  their  rights,  but  at  the  same  time  the  rights  of  the  com- 
munity will  be  safeguarded. 

There  are  millions  and  millions  of  oil-palms  in  Central 
Africa.  This  source  of  wealth  has  hardly  been  exploited  at 
all.  In  1912  the  Cameroons  exported  16,000  tons  of  palm- 
kernels  and  3,593  tons  of  palm-oil ;  French  Equatorial  Africa 
something  over  500  tons  of  kernels  and  a  little  over  100  tons 
of  oil;  the  export  of  the  Belgian  Congo  amounted  to  6,821 
tons  of  kernels  and  1,989  tons  of  oil.  The  yield  of  palm-oil 
from  these  vast  territories,  comprising  4^  million  square  kilo- 
meters with  their  unbroken  forests  and  huge  resources, 
amounted  then  only  to  about  23,300  tons  of  palm-kernels  and 
5,700  tons  of  oil.  That  is  extraordinarily  little  when  one 
thinks  that  British  Southern  Nigeria,  with  its  208,600  square 
kilometres,  exported  in  1912  175,000  tons  of  palm-kernels  to 
the  value  of  £3,109,981  sterling  (over  62  million  marks),  and 
83,000  tons  of  palm-oil  to  the  value  of  £1,854,384  sterling 
(over  371^  million  marks).  Compared  with  these  results,  the 
yield  of  the  great  Congo*  territories  and  of  the  Cameroons  is 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  41 

infinitesimal ;  it  would  surely  be  an  easy  task  to  bring  the 
return  at  least  up  to  the  standard  of  Nigeria.  If  Mittel-Afrika 
were  only  to  produce  palm-kernels  and  oil  to  the  value  of  lOO 
million  marks,  several  thousand  white  men  would  be  able  to 
find  occupation  in  the  exploitation  of  its  vast  existing  quanti- 
ties of  oil-palms.  And  let  us  not  forget  t^at,  as  we  mentioned 
above,  Lever  Brothers  employ  50  white  men  in  their  settle- 
ment at  Leverville  in  the  Belgian  Congo,  which  can  deal  with 
12,000  tons  of  fruit  a  year.  12,000  tons  of  fruit  represent 
about  2,000  tons  of  oil  and  3,000  tons  of  kernels.  The  pro- 
duction of  175,000  tons,  therefore,  might  give  occupation  to 
50x60=3,000  white  men. 

We  should  have  to  follow  the  example  of  the  Northern 
Railway  in  the  Cameroons  in  the  treatment  of  the  great  exist- 
ing quantities  of  oil-palms  in  Central  Africa.  There  the  oil- 
palms  are  thinned  and  roads  made  through  them;  light  rail- 
w^ays  are  laid  to  carry  the  fruit  to  the  factories.  Similar 
works  can  be  carried  out  on  the  Congo,  the.Kassai  and  the 
smaller  rivers,  and  also  along  the  railways.  Very  often  it  is 
enough  to  clear  ground  round  the  existing  trees,  and  the  most 
beautiful  oil-palm  plantations  are  there  ready-made. 

The  existence  of  valuable  timber  in  the  tropical  forests 
is  almost  more  important  than  the  wealth  of  oil-palms.  The 
firm  of  J.  F.  Mtiller  and  Son,  in  Hamburg,  published  a  most 
interesting  report  on  the  subject  at  the  end  of  1914,  part  of 
which  was  printed  in  the  Tropenpflanzer  (Tropical  Planter). 
I  should  like  to  quote  the  following : — 

The  greatest  reservoirs  in  the  world  of  tropical  timber 
valuable  for  industrial  purposes  are  to  be  found  in  the  forests 
which  spread  over  West  and  Central  Africa.  The  most  im- 
portant country  for  the  suppy  of  timber  before  the  war  was 
Gabun,  the  part  of  French  Equatorial  Africa  which  ran  be- 
tween the  Cameroons  and  the  Belgian  Congo;  these  terri- 
tories produced  from  two-thirds  to  three-quarters  of  all  the 
African  timber  which  we  imported,  including  the  okoume 
wood,  which  was  indispensable  for  our  furniture,  paling,  and 
cigar-box  trades,  a  wood  which  is  otherwise  only  found  in 
Spanish  Guinea.  The  German  demand  for  this  wood  amounted 
to  100,000  tons.    Mahogany,  too.  and  many  other  valuable 


42     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 


woods  can  be  cut  to  any  extent.  The  vast  forest  resources  in 
the  great  lagoons  of  Fernan  Vaz,  Mayumba,  Iguela,  Sette- 
Cama,  and  also  in  the  Loango  and  Kwilu  districts  are  scarcely 
touched.  There  are  equally  huge  stocks  of  timber  in  the 
Cameroons  and  in  the  Belgian  Congo. 

In  spite  of  large  export  figures  the  trade  in  timber  is  still 
in  its  infancy.  Only  a  small  percentage  of  the  available  kinds 
of  timber  are  exported  and  only  such  as  stand  v^ithin  a  few- 
hundred  yards  of  possible  water  transport.  All  the  rest  are 
absolutely  untouched,  and  among  these  are  all  the  heavy 
woods  which  would  be  excellently  adapted  for  ship-building 
and  for  use  in  bridges,  harbours  and  wood  pavements.  Such 
building  woods  we  used  to  draw  from  Australia  and  Further 
India.  Mittel-Afrika  can  provide  us  with  a  full  supply,  if 
saw-mills  are  set  up  there  to  deliver  these  heavy  kinds  of 
wood  in  a  marketable  state  for  transport. 

There  are  vast  prospects  open  to  the  timber  trade  in 
Mittel-Afrika ;  it  could  yield  handsome  profits  to  a  great 
number  of  white  immigrants. 

The  utilization  of  the  great  existing  quantities  of  rubber 
in  Central  Africa  has  been  adversely  affected  by  the  develop- 
ment of  the  plantations  in  East  Asia,  but  by  no  means  crippled. 
The  success  of  the  French  Company  "Sangha  Forestiere," 
which  owns  property  in  French  Central  Africa,  and  in  the 
new  districts  of  the  Cameroons,  and  whose  rubber  has  been 
reckoned  as  equal  to  the  best  Para,  shows  that  Central- African 
rubber  can  hold  its  own  against  any  competition,  if  it  is  merely 
a  question  of  pure  quality  and  the  collection  is  not  too  costly. 
The  rubber  trade  could  furnish  a  living  to  a  great  number  of 
white  traders. 

When  we  have  won  our  way  to  our  fixed  goal — the  most 
perfect  incorporation  possible  of  Mittel-Afrika  in  our  home 
economic  system,  an  incorporation  which  means  that  we 
regard  the  self-grown  wealth  of  the  country  as  destined  for  the 
community,  and  look  at  the  rest  of  the  soil  of  Africa  as  some- 
thing which  may  be  improved  and  increased  in  value  by  our 
labour  and  from  which  we  are  entitled,  provided  we  respect 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  43 


the  rights  of  the  original  inhabitants,  to  draw  according  to 
our  needs,  by  the  right  which  our  labour  confers,  then  we  shall 
have  laid  to  a  great  extent  the  foundation  of  a  prosperous 
tropical  economic  system.  All  that  is  wanted  is  that  we 
should  approach  the  question  of  labour  and  of  the  natives  in 
a  somewhat  different  spirit  from  that  which  we  have  hitherto 
shown. 

Up  till  now  our  system  of  plantations  and  our  railway 
construction  have  caused  great  upheavals  among  the  black 
population,  have  upset  ancient  social  customs,  uprooted  in 
part  the  new  generation  and  depopulated  whole  districts.  It 
was  especially  the  missionaries  who  made  bitter  complaints 
of  this  effect  of  the  white  colonization  of  Africa.  The  com- 
plaints were  quite  intelligible.  The  missions  had  been  in  the 
country  long  before  the  administration  and  the  settlers;  they 
had  brought  the  region  round  the  mission  to  a  high  state  of 
civilization  by  long  labour.  And  now  they  had  to  see,  at  the 
arrival  of  officials,  officers,  and  above  all,  of  settlers,  the  field 
of  their  labour  emptied,  the  young  men  pouring  into  the 
plantations  and  railway  work,  just  as  at  home  the  younger 
country  population  pours  into  the  towns.  And  all  the  com- 
plaints which  we  have  heard  at  home  about  the  rural  exodus 
re-echoed  in  Africa,  too.  In  Africa,  as  at  home,  it  was  noted 
quite  accurately  that  in  general  the  changes  brought  little 
blessing  to  the  people.  Just  as  the  town-dweller,  as  opposed 
to  the  agricultural  labourer,  gained  nothing  except  in  externals, 
which  he  had  often  to  pay  for  with  his  health,  so  the  labourer 
on  the  railway  or  on  a  plantation  in  Africa  took  little  back 
with  him  after  long  labour  to  his  native  village  but  a  few 
gaudy  rags  and  diseases,  and  any  friend  of  the  people  was 
bound  to  feel  sick  at  heart. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  all  these  evils  will  be  multiplied 
as  soon  as  a  greater  number  of  white  settlers  come  into  the 
country.  But  there  is  no  help  for  it;  Mittel-Afrika  too  must 
go  through  the  melting-pot,  and  the  fortune  of  future  gener- 
ations must  emerge  from  the  sufferings  of  the  present 
generation. 


44     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

A  strong  agitation  has  been  conducted  on  the  strength  of 
the  high  death-rate  on  plantations  and  in  railway  construction. 
But  the  calculations,  according  to  which,  for  example,  up  to 
lo  per  cent,  of  the  imported  labourers  in  the  Cameroons  are 
said  to  have  died,  have  been  made  very  one-sidedly.  This  is 
proved  incontestably  by  accurate  statistics.  The  Government 
of  the  Cameroons  washed  to  have  no  labour  contracts  of  more 
than  one  year's  duration.  Sometimes  the  labourers  were  only 
six  months  at  work.  Supposing  50  men  in  1,000  died  in  this 
period,  it  was  calculated  that  this  represented  10  men  in 
every  hundred  in  the  year,  i.  e.,  10  per  cent.  But  statistics 
of  the  death-rate  at  railway  construction,  among  such  labourers 
as  could  be  kept  for  12  months  or  longer,  have  shown  that 
the  mortality  is  high  only  in  the  earlier  months  and  then  sinks 
rapidly.  Supposing  50  men  in  1,000  died  in  the  first  six 
months,  the  next  six  months  did  not  show  the  same  figures, 
but  a  death-rate  of  only  20,  and  in  the  third  half-year  only 
10  or  less. 

The  diminution  of  the  death-rate  is  due  to  various  causes. 
In  the  first  place  it  can  be  proved  that  many  sick,  weakly 
and  underfed  people  used  to  come  to  work  on  the  railways. 
The  chiefs  in  the  interior  used  not  to  supply  their  strong 
subjects,  when  the  Government  demanded  labour,  but  the  poor 
of  the  villages  and  the  countryside,  the  ill-fed  and  sickly. 
The  weakest  fell  victims  at  once  to  the  unaccustomed  coast 
climate;  the  others  recovered  with  good  food  and  regular 
work. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  state  of  health  of  the 
native  African  population  is  generally  bad.  The  native  villages 
even  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Government  stations  and  mis- 
sions are  by  no  means  idyllic  homes  of  healthy,  happy  human 
beings.  Disease  and  misery  are  rife,  and  fear  of  the  chiefs, 
who  are  often  cruel  tyrants  over  their  subjects;  infant 
mortality  is  high,  and  where  the  mission  or  Government  doctor 
does  not  intervene  with  beneficent  effect,  death  reaps  a  rich 
harvest.  The  advent  of  Europeans  has,  without  any  doubt, 
had  one  good  result — that  with  the  colonists  more  doctors 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  45 

have  come  into  the  country,  and  so  many  a  negro  who  would 
have  died  in  his  village  may  have  become  a  healthy  man  on  the 
plantation  or  railway  work. 

But  in  spite  of  all  this  the  consequence  of  the  advent  of 
a  great  number  of  Europeans,  with  their  demand  for  land  and 
for  the  products  of  the  land,  and  especially  for  labour,  will 
be  much  distress  among  the  native  population.  There  will 
be  great  shiftings  of  population,  with  a  multiplication  of  all 
the  inconveniences  which  we  have  seen  in  the  past  in  the 
Cameroons  and  in  East  Africa.  Yet  if  we  have  once  come 
to  the  decision  that  our  oversea  German  stock  is  no  longer 
to  be  "culture-manure"  (Kidturdiinger)  for  America  and  the 
British  colonies,  we  must  overcome  these  difficulties;  and 
we  shall  be  able  to  master  them. 

Provided  then  that  the  Government  of  German  Mittel- 
Afrika  will  really  carry  out  a  policy  of  supplementing  our 
home  economic  system  by  the  African  one,  and  will  ensure 
this  speedy  development  of  the  new  colony  by  attracting  white 
men  to  it,  6,000  white  men  will  soon  be  able  to  make  a  good 
lucrative  living  in  the  oil-palm,  wood  and  rubber  business,  as 
organizers,  agents,  buyers,  directors  of  saw-mills,  and  from 
investment  in  the  oil  and  rubber  industry.  Up  to  a  thousand 
white  men  can  be  employed  in  the  transport  of  the  various 
self-grown  products. 

If  we  really  mean  to  do  so,  we  are  bound  to  succeed  in 
inducing  10  million  out  of  the  30  million  negroes  of  Central 
Africa  to  cultivate  oil-bearing  products,  such  as  earth-nuts, 
sesame,  and  rhizinus,  as  well  as  cotton,  maize  and  rice  for 
export.  If  1,000  such  cultivators  provide  one  white  trader 
with  the  means  of  livelihood,  ten  millions  of  them  represent 
a  living  for  10,000  white  men. 

There  are  great  prospects,  especially,  for  the  cultivation  of 
rice  in  Africa.  The  low  ground  of  the  great  Central-African 
rivers  is  pre-eminently  suitable  for  the  cultivation  of  rice,  as 
is  proved  by  the  great  rice-fields  which  the  Arabs  created 
between  the  Lualaba  and  Lomami  in  the  Eastern  Belgian 
Congo,  and  the  idea  that  the  glossina  palpaiis,  the  disseminntor 


46     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

of  sleeping  sickness,  finds  an  excellent  breeding  ground  in  the 
rice-fields  is  mere  prejudice. 

Finally,  in  addition  to  the  work  of  white  men  in  organizing 
the  collection  of  the  self-grown  products  of  the  soil  and  the 
fruits  of  native  cultivation  for  export — in  which  work,  with 
various  side-occupations,  from  15,000  to  20,000  white  men 
could  find  employment — the  activity  of  the  white  men  them- 
selves on  plantations  and  farms  must  be  considered.  We  must 
kave  aside,  in  the  first  instance,  the  planting  industry  and  look 
at  live-stock  rearing. 

Cattle-breeding  in  Central  Africa  is  capable  of  very  great 
development ;  we  must  first  take  into  consideration  for  the 
purpose  the  wide  high-lying  plains.  These  now  carry  10 
million  h-ead  of  cattle  (with  6  million  cows)  and  40  million 
sheep  and  goats.  That  is  extraordinarily  few  if  one  com- 
pares the  vast  stocks  of  cattle  in  India.  In  British  India, 
without  Bengal,  there  were  estimated  in  1911-12,  iii^  million 
cattle  (28  million  cows),  23  million  sheep  and  283/2  million 
goats.  India  contains  4,667,280  square  kilometres,  Central 
Africa  7^  millions.  It  is  undeniable  that  Africa  has,  over  an 
equal  area,  just  as  good  cattle-lands  as  India.  The  only 
difference,  though  it  is  a  great  and  vital  one,  is  in  population. 
Central  Africa  has  30  millions  as  against  the  320  millions  in 
India.  But  Australia  shows  that  even  a  small  population  can 
produce  a  great  head  of  cattle.  The  5^  million  inhabitants 
(not  counting  the  natives,  who  are  not  to  be  taken  into 
account)  of  the  Australian  Federation  and  of  New  Zealand 
who  inhabit,  roughly,  8  million  square  kilometres,  had  in  1912 
in  round  figures  13M  million  head  of  cattle  (with  only  2^ 
million  cows)  and  107  million  sheep.  Central  Africa,  with 
its  6  million  cows,  is  far  in  advance  of  Australia;  the  breed- 
ing of  30  million  head  of  cattle  and  more  should  not  be  difficult 
and  will  certainly  take  place,  if  white  colonists  take  it  in  hand. 
Among  the  Central-African  negroes  there  are  good  cattle- 
breeders,  such  as  the  Masai  in  British  and  German  East 
Africa,  the  Wagogo.  Wataturu,  Watussi  and  Warundi  in 
German  East  Africa,  the  peoples  in  the  districts  round  the 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  47 

Central-African  Lakes  in  the  Belgian  Congo  and  Uganda,  the 
Fulbe  in  the  Northern  Cameroons,  and  the  tribes  of  the  French 
Sudan.  But  the  cattle-breeding  of  the  negroes  suffers  from 
the  fact  that  the  cattle  are  tribal  property  or  by  native  custom 
the  possession  of  the  chief ;  the  right  of  private  property  is 
not  clearly  enough  developed.  That  is  often  a  hindrance  to 
vigorous  breeding.  A  numerous  v^^hite  population  v^ould  pro- 
duce a  change  for  the  better  in  that  respect. 

Sheep-farming  for  wool  offers  a  special  field  under  certain 
circumstances  to  the  v^hite  immigrant,  as  it  has  been  already 
taken  up  with  some  success  in  British  East  Africa  in  the 
East-African  "rift"  at  an  elevation  of  about  1,500  metres. 
There  are  similar  districts  in  German  East  Africa  round 
Kondoa  Irangi,  Iringa,  in  Uhha,  Urundi,  and'  Ruanda,  also 
in  the  Northern  Cameroons.  In  191 1  British  East  Africa 
produced  169,000  marks'  worth  of  wool. 

An  increase  in  cattle-breeding  means  an  increased  export 
of  hides.  German  East  Africa  exported  hides  in  1913  alone 
to  the  value  of  million  marks;  Mittel-Afrika  would  soon 
achieve  a  figure  many  times  as  great,  and  hundreds  of  white 
men  could  find  employment  in  the  industry. 

The  developrfient  of  cattle-breeding  would  be  a  blessing 
for  Central  Africa.  In  the  forest  districts  the  lack  of  meat 
among.the  natives  is  so  great  that  they  will  pay  any  price  for 
the  much-desired  food,  and,  if  they  can  get  it  in  no  other 
way,  will  become  cannibals,  not  from  any  preference  for 
human  flesh,  but  because  they  can  get  no  other  meat.  In  the 
Southern  Cameroons  and  in  the  Sanga  forest  the  people  of 
my  caravan  devoured  herons  and  "flying  dogs,"  and  fought 
:l;or  them;  monkey  flesh  is  a  dainty  in  those  parts. ^  Enter- 
prising Haussa  traders  drive  cattle  in  the  Cameroons  from 
the  high  northern  parts  to  the  forest  villages,  where  they  have 
a  rapid  sale  at  high  prices.  The  breeding  of  large  cattle  is, 
of  course,  impossible  in  the  forest  districts ;  but  as  soon  as 
Central  Africa  is  opened  up  by  railways,  it  will  be  possible  to 
bring  cattle  and  meat  from  the  rich  grass-lands  into  the 


48     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

forests.  In  that  way  European  firms  will  have  an  excellent 
means  of  attracting  the  forest  population  to  the  districts 
where  they  want  them. 

There  is  no  n-eed  to  go  further  into  the  activities  of  large 
settlements;  they  have  already  justified  their  existence  and 
developed  a  great  export  trade  in  the  Cameroons  and  East 
Africa.  Settlements  with  an  ample  European  personnel  will 
develop  successfully,  when  the  labour  difficulty  has  been  over- 
come and  the  home  and  colonial  Governments  take  pains  to 
protect  them,  as  far  as  possible,  from  the  cut-throat  competi- 
tion of  South-East  Asia. 

We  have  also  had  m-edium-sized  plantations  for  tobacco, 
cocoa,  kokos-palms  and  cotton  in  East  Africa  and  the 
Cameroons ;  we  even  coquetted  with  the  idea  of  groups  of 
small-holders,  forming  as  far  as  possible  close  corporations, 
in  East  Africa  on  Mount  Meru  and  Kilima-njaro.  After  the 
war  it  will  have  to  be  one  of  our  chief  aims  to  carry  on  these 
beginnings,  and  to  extend  them  to  other  suitable  districts, 
while  preserving  the  German  character  of  the  settlements. 
There  must  spring  up  in  this  great  German  Africa  self-con- 
tained centres  of  healthy  German  life,  with  German  schools 
and  churches,  and,  if  possible,  a  permanent  population.  It 
is  only  so  that  we  shall  arrive  at  a  lasting  domination  of  those 
great  territories. 

The  small  farmer  of  South- West  Germany  and  the  middle 
West  has  been  admittedly  the  most  successful  colonist;  he  has 
done  wonders  by  his  own  labour  in  the  sub-tropical  districts 
of  AustraHa,  South  Africa  and  South  America,  up  to  25 
degrees  of  latitude  and  even  higher.  If  we  can  attract  some 
thousands  of  these  people  to  Mittel-Afrika  we  shall  have 
a  splendid  stock  for  the  starting  of  small  holdings.  We 
might  think  of  settling  such  people,  say,  in  Angola  between 
10  and  17  degrees  southern  latitude.  We  shall  have  to  try 
whether  the  high-lying  districts  on  Lakes  Tanganyika  and 
Nyassa  might  also  be  employed  for  such  settlements. 
Possibly  the  south  of  German  East  Africa  and  Mozambique 
might  be  suitable,  too.    At  any  rate,  after  the  war  a  serious 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  49 


attempt  must  be  made  to  create  an  agricultural  population  in 
our  chief  colony.  We  shall  be  able  to  draw  the  necessary 
men  of  tried  worth  from  South  America  and  Australia,  if  we 
purge  our  new  colonial  policy  of  all  petty  officialdom,  and  if 
the  system  of  small  holdings  is  modelled  on  that  of  Southern 
Brazil,  where  the  settlers  are  given  on  arrival  measured  plots 
of  land,  simple  houses  and  agricultural  implements. 

If  we  mention  now  the  great  mineral  wealth  in  Central 
Africa,  especially  in  the  Belgian  Congo;  if  we  bear  in  mind 
the  great  possibilities  of  communication  which  the  innumerable 
streams  in  the  Congo  basin  afford;  if  we  think  of  the  influx 
of  traders,  workmen,  hotel-keepers,  bank-officials;  if  we 
picture  the  6,000  officials  and  officers  whom  the  great  area 
will  need,  the  clergy,  schoolmasters,  lawyers,  doctors, 
engineers,  railway,  post  and  telegraph  officials,  then  we  see 
what  an  overwhelming  abundance  of  possibilities  of  liveli- 
hood Mittel-Afrika  will  afford.  It  will  be  easy  for  even  a 
hundred  thousand  white  men  to  make  a  living  th-ere  in  a 
few  years. 


Yl.— MITTEL-AFRIKA  AS  A  FACTOR  IN  THE  ECONOMIC 
STRUGGLE 

We  have  shown  that  it  is  possible  to  accommodate  at 
least  50,000  white  men  in  Mittel-Afrika  in  quite  a  short 
time;  40,000  of  these  are  to  be  men  with  some  capital.  If  we 
take  an  average  of  only  25,000  marks  per  head,  that  gives  us 
an  influx  of  capital  of  a  thousand  million  marks  in  round 
figures.  In  addition  men  with  big  schemes  will  be  attracted 
and  firms  from  foreign  countries;  the  stat-e-coffers  will  be  filled 
up  afresh.  A  strong  economic  life  will  immediately  develop 
in  Mittel-Afrika.  And  we  are  justified  in  expecting  that  an 
influx  of  private  and  state  capital  to  the  extent  of 
1,250,000,000  or  1,500,000,000  marks  will  immediately  bring 
in  its  train  at  least  an  equal  amount  of  commercial  capital  from 
home  and  from  neutral  countries. 


50     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

According  to  official  figures,  about  350  million  marks  of 
commercial  capital  and  some  80  million  marks  of  private 
capital  were  employed  in  our  African  colonies  in  1913.  The 
result  was  a  foreign  trade  on  th-e  part  of  these  colonies  of 
286  miillion  marks  for  that  year,  142  million  marks  in  imports 
and  144.14  millions  in  exports.  If  3,000  million  marks  are 
employed  in  Mittel-Afrika  instead  of  those  430  millions, 
surely  the  exports,  as  soon  as  all  the  necessaiy  conditions 
are  there,  will  rise  rapidly  to  seven  times  the  144.14  million 
marks,  and  the  imports  in  the  same  proportion. 

Mittel-Afrika  with  40,000  men,  possessed  of  capital  to 
organize  native  labour,  with  10,000  small-holders,  and,  in 
addition,  6,000  officials,  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers 
for  the  black  colonial  army,  would  be  an  economic  entity  with 
which  every  country  would  have  to  reckon. 

Mittel-Afrika,  South  America  and  Mexico  would  make  our 
industries  quite  independent  of  the  British  rubber  districts 
in  South-East  Asia.  We  should  procure  rubber  at  such  a 
price  that  the  produce  of  these  territories  could  hold  its  own 
against  the  competition  of  the  Malay  States;  in  return  they 
would  have  to  give  preferential  treatment  to  our  rubber 
manufactures. 

Before  the  war  we  needed  600  million  marks'  worth  of 
oil-bearing  products  a  year.  As  British  West  Africa  (mainly 
Nigeria)  provided  us  with  90^  million  marks'  worth  of  palm- 
kernels  alone  in  1913,  and  8^  million  marks'  worth  of  palm- 
oil,  Mittel-Afrika,  which  is  far  larger  and  infinitely  richer  in 
oil-palms,  must  be  able  in  a  very  few  years  to  supply  at  least 
ICQ  million  marks'  worth  of  palm-kernels  and  palm-oil,  if  we 
turn  our  attention  to  it.  All  that  is  needed  is  that  the  obstacles 
to  the  exploitation  of  the  stocks  already  there  should  be  got 
rid  of.  In  the  case  of  other  oil-bearing  products,  such  as 
earth-nuts,  sesame,  cotton-seed,  copra,  elipe  and  shi  nuts, 
Mittel-Afrika  will  certainly  be  able  to  supply  us  from  native 
small  holdings  with  20  million  marks'  worth,  and  considerably 
more  after  a  few  years  of  vigorous  work. 

All  the  same  only  a  fraction  of  our  needs  would  be  satisfied  "  ^ " 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  51 


by  this.  In  order  to  cover  the  balance  we  should  have  to  call 
on  Russia,  South  and  Central  America,  Hungary  and  the 
Balkan  States.  In  1913  Russia  supplied  us  with  oil-bearing 
products  to  the  value  of  58  million  marks,  the  Argentine  with 
over  100  million  marks'  worth,  and  Austria-Hungary  and 
Roumania  together  with  14  million  marks'  worth.  If  we  add 
the  Dutch  Indies,  from  which  we  import  to  the  extent  of 
50  million  marks,  we  arrive  at  a  total  value  of  222  million 
marks,  and,  with  the  anticipated  imports  from  Mittel-Afrika, 
of  350  million  marks.  It  is  only  necessary  for  us  to  assist  the 
development  of  these  territories  by  giving  them  preferential 
treatment,  in  return  for  which  they  would  grant  our  oil 
industries  a  special  tariff  for  the  oils  which  they  require  for 
table-consumption,  for  manufacturing  purposes  and  for 
vegetable  fatty  foods,  and  we  should  be  independent  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  in  the  matter  of  oil-bearing 
products. 

Let  us  consider  the  question  of  fibre-stuffs.  Our  most 
important  supply  of  flax  has  hitherto  come  from  Russia ;  we 
got  hemp  from  Russia,  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy.  Mexico 
supplied  us  with  pita-fibre ;  in  the  matter  of  ramie  and  sisal 
fibre,  etc.,  only  German  East  Africa  can  make  us  independent. 
For  jute  our  dependence  on  India  has  been  a  heavy  burden. 
But  other  vegetables  fibres,  which  are  procurable  from  Mexico, 
South  America  and  Central  Africa,  might  well  be  used  as 
substitutes  for  this. 

We  needed  382  million  marks'  worth  of  skins  and  hides, 
not  counting  the  very  high  re-exports,  and  here  we  can  cer- 
tainly get  on  without  the  Anglo-Saxons.  Russia  with  Finland 
and  Austria-Hungary  alone  supplied  us  to  the  extent  of  100 
million  marks.  The  Argentine  sold  us  74  million  marks' 
worth;  Brazil,  Chile,  Paraguay,  Uruguay,  other  South 
American  States  and  Mexico  had  a  share  of  over  55  million 
marks  in  our  imports.  Denmark  again,  the  Netherlands, 
Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Belgium,  Greece,  Spain  and 
Turkey  sent  us  nearly  70  million  marks'  worth  of  skins  and 
hides.    If  we  cultivate  these  connexions  and  develop  MitteU 


52     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

Afrika  vigorously,  we  can  do  without  any  imports  from 
France,  Italy,  Great  Britain  or  North  America. 

Austria-Hungary,  Russia,  South  America  and  Mittel- 
Afrika  can  supply  our  needs  in  the  matter  of  tannin;  we  can 
get  timber  in  ample  measure  from  Russia,  Austria-Hungary, 
Roumania,  Sweden,  Norway,  Mexico  and  Mitt  el- Afrika.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  will  be  extremely  difficult  to  make  ourselves 
independent  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  in  the  matter  of  cotton 
and  wool. 

The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  possess  a  world- 
monopoly  in  the  production  of  cotton.  Of  the  world-crop  in 
1913-14,  2iy2  million  bales  were  of  Anglo-Saxon  production, 
7^  million  came  from  other  countries,  Brazil,  China,  Russian 
Asia  and  Asia  Minor.  The  production  of  cotton  in  the 
German  colonies  was  infinitesimal,  in  spite  of  all  the  labour 
expended  on  it;  it  did  not  even  amount  to  3,000  tons,  while 
Germany  needs  a  supply  of  470,000  tons.  Even  th-e  whole 
of  Mitt  el- Afrika  will  hardly  be  able  to  supply  in  the  near 
future  more  than  10,000  to  20,000  tons,  however  great  an 
effort  is  made,  and  it  would  have  to  he  counted  as  waste  of 
money  and  effort,  if  great  sums  of  money  and  a  large  force 
of  labour  were  again  devoted  to  the  promotion  of  our  own 
cotton  cultivation.  It  is  far  more  important  to  exploit  the 
vast  r-esources  in  oil-palms  and  timber  in  Central  Africa  and 
to  create  monopolies  of  our  own,  by  an  intelligent  use  of 
which  we  could  force  the  Anglo-Saxons  to  supply  us  with 
goods,  in  which  they  have  a  monopoly,  at  a  moderate  price. 
We  might,  nevertheless,  try  to  increase  the  cultivation  of 
cotton  in  Nearer  Asia  (40,000  tons),  in  Brazil  (70-80,000 
tons),  and  in  Peru;  but  it  appears  to  be  impossible  for  us  to 
become  in  this  matter  independent  of  the  Anglo-Saxons. 

The  prospects  in  the  wool  market  appear  somewhat  more 
favourable.  We  need  370  million  marks'  worth  of  sheep's 
wool;  the  Argentine,  Uruguay  and  Chile  export  about  250 
million  marks'  worth.  In  1913  they  supplied  us  with  wool 
to  the  value  of  120  million  marks.  It  does  not  seem  outside 
the  bounds  of  possibility  that  they  should  raise  their  exports 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  53 

to  Germany  to  the  amount  of  200  million  marks.  And  we 
ought  to  succeed  with  the  help  of  South  America  in  freeing 
ourselves  partially,  at  any  rate,  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  yoke. 

As  regards  imports  of  vegetable  and  animal  food-stuffs, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  we  can  short-circuit  the  Anglo-Saxon 
with  the  help  of  our  allies,  Russia  and  South  America. 
Russia,  the  Argentine  and  Roumania  can  easily  supply  the 
quantity  of  wheat  which  we  used  to  buy  from  the  United 
States  and  Canada.  We  can  get  barley  from  Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary,  oats  from  Russia  and  the  Argentine,  maize 
from  the  Argentine,  Roumania,  Russia  and  Central  Africa. 
Our  imports  of  rice  can  fall  off  for  a  time  and  be  replaced  by 
tapioca,  shredded  barley  and  groats,  until  Mittel-Afrika  is  in 
a  position  to  send  us  enough.  Even  before  the  war  the 
countries  which  supplied  us  with  legumens  were  Russia, 
Roumania  and  Austria-Hungary.  We  were  very  dependent 
on  Italy,  France,  Belgium  and  Holland  for  vegetables. 
Holland  and  Belgium  can  remain  as  our  sources  of  supply; 
our  own  production  of  vegetables  must  be  increased.  For  the 
import  of  fruit,  figs,  raisins  and  almonds  we  can  rely  on 
Austria-Hungary,  the  Balkans,  Turkey  and  Spain. 

As  regards  luxuries  we  can  get  tobacco  from  Greece, 
Turkey,  Bulgaria,  the  Dutch  Indies  and  Brazil ;  coffee  we 
draw  from  Brazil,  Venezuela  and  Central  America  in 
abundance.  Mittel-Afrika  can  send  us  some  8,000  tons  of 
cocoa;  the  production  of  this  must  and  can  be  rapidly  extended. 
Brazil,  too,  Ecuador,  the  Republic  of  Dominica  and  Venezuela, 
which  sent  us  24,500  tons  in  1913,  will  provide  their  share.  We 
can  approximately  cover  our  demand  of  50,000  to  55,000  tons 
without  drawing  on  British  territories. 

We  used  to  get  meat  and  animal  fat,  especially  the  latter, 
to  a  great  extent  from  foreign  countries;  the  Anglo-Saxons 
had  little  share  in  our  supply  of  meat.  On  the  other  hand 
the  United  States  used  to  provide  us  with  112  million  marks' 
worth  of  lard  and  21  million  marks'  worth  of  margarine.  The 
pig-breeding  industry  of  the  United  States  was  the  largest 


54     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

in  the  world  in  1913,  with  over  61  million  head  of  pigs. 
Germany  came  a  bad  second  with  25^  million,  Austria- 
Hungary  stood  third  with  14  million,  Russia  fourth  with 
I2><  million  head.  There  is  no  substitute  for  the  American 
supply  of  lard.  We  should  have  to  make  more  extensive 
use  of  vegetable  oils,  and  try  to  give  preferenc-e  to  the  fattening 
of  pigs  in  Russia,  Hungary  and  the  Balkan  States. 

Our  dependence  on  the  supplies  of  mineral  raw  materials 
from  the  United  States  and  the  British  colonies  is  an  especially 
sore  point,  and  our  chief  lack  is  copper.  In  1913  the  United 
States  sent  us  294  million  marks'  worth  of  this  metal;  in 
191 2  we  took  no  less  than  177,600  tons  of  her  total  pro- 
duction, which  amounted  to  566,500  tons.  It  appears  to  be 
almost  impossible  to  satisfy  our  demand  from  other  sources 
of  supply.  Mexico  sent  us  only  73,000  tons  of  copper  in 
1913,  and  Spain  58,000  tons.  It  is  doubtful  whether  so  speedy 
an  increase  in  the  Mexican  output  as  to  satisfy  a  great  part 
of  our  demand  is  possible;  and  we  cannot  build  exaggerated 
hopes  on  the  copper  yield  of  German  South- West  Africa  and 
the  Congo  districts  (Katanga).  But  in  our  stores  of  potash  we 
have  the  means  ready  at  hand  to  force  the  United  States  to 
supply  us  on  acceptable  terms. 

Finally,  we  must  not  forget  that  in  191 1  the  United  States 
and  the  British  Empire  produced  no  less  than  559,284  kilo- 
grammes of  the  gold  output  of  the  w^orld,  which  amounted  to 
695,340  kilogrammes. 

If  we  take  a  survey  of  the  situation  in  the  light  of  the 
above-mentioned  figures,  it  stands  out  clearly  that  our  struggle 
for  a  position  as  an  independent  economic  World-Power  and 
for  freedom  from  the  Anglo-Saxons  is  by  no  means  hope- 
less. Of  course,  there  must  be  a  beginning  to  the  struggle, 
and  that  can  only  be  by  the  definite  assertion  of  a  strong 
far-reaching  colonial  policy.  We  must  avow  to  the  world  that 
we  mean  to  be  no  longer  the  ''poor  guests  and  parasites" 
(Zaungaste  und  Freitischler)  of  the  Anglo-Saxons.  We  must 
play  our  trump  card  of  Mittel-Afrika.  Its  value  lies  not  in 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  55 


itself  but  in  the  way  it  is  played.  If  we  state  to-day  that 
we  mean  to  have  the  Belgian  and  French  Congo,  as  connecting 
territories  between  our  old  West-African  and  East-African 
possessions,  and  at  the  same  time  keep  calculating  what  "new 
burdens"  we  shall  have  to  assume,  keep  talking  about  sleeping 
sickness  and  "swamps,"  the  card  we  play  is  valueless.  It  is 
only  if  we  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that  with  Mittel-Afrika,  in 
conjunction  with  Germanism  overseas,  we  mean  to  lay  the 
foundation  of  a  real  world- policy,  that  this  card  in  our  hand 
becomes  a  decisive  winning  card.  And  by  it  we  tear  North 
and  South  America  asunder,  we  make  its  effect  felt  in  India, 
Australia  and  East  Asia,  and  attract  the  attention  of  the  Arab 
peoples  of  North  Africa. 

German  Mittel-Afrika,  if  demanded  by  us  for  a  great 
colonial  policy  with  far-reaching  aims,  will  force  South 
America  to  come  to  a  decision.  If  it  wants,  in  spite  of  Mittel- 
Afrika,  to  cling  to  the  Anglo-Saxons,  then  the  cry  must  ring 
out  among  Germans :  German  Mittel-Afrika,  the  Arabs,  the 
Turks  and  Mitt  el-Euro  pa!  You  Germans  in  America  who 
wish  to  remain  German,  pour  into  Africa  and  seek  your 
livelihood  among  Germany's  allies!  Our  object  is  to  stand 
wholly  and  entirely  on  our  own  feet.  But  South  America 
will  not  desire  such  a  development,  because  it  cannot  desire  it. 
Mittel-Afrika  would  be  so  powerful  a  factor  in  the  great 
economic  world-struggle,  owing  to  its  political  importance  and 
to  the  economic  influence  which  we  and  our  allies  could  give 
it,  that  it  could  not  be  disregarded  by  anyone,  least  of  all  by 
South  America.  Neither  must  we  forget  the  great  part  which 
the  Arabs  have  played  in  Central  Africa.  If  they  were 
induced  to  devote  themselves,  their  funds  and  their  adherents, 
to  the  service  of  the  German  cause,  it  would  thereby  gain  a 
great  push  on  from  this  quarter  as  well,  and  would  win 
sympathy  as  far  as  the  coast  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  Even 
if  the  whole  world  should  range  itself  against  us,  there  are 
mighty  slumbering  forces  in  the  idea:  Mittel-Europa — Mittel- 
Afrika. 


56     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 


VII.— THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  GERMAN  MITTEL-AFBIKA 

As  one  must  build  on  existing  foundations,  we  will  start 
from  the  actual  economic  situation  before  the  war  in  the 
four  chief  districts  of  Central  Africa  (German  East  Africa, 
French  Equatorial  Africa,  the  Belgian  Congo  and  the 
Cameroons). 

We  can  lay  it  down  as  an  axiom  that  the  economic  and 
financial  position  of  the  two  German  colonies  was  very  satis- 
factory. But  we  will  give  a  few  figures  for  the  benefit  of 
those  who  have  no  accurate  information  on  the  subject. 

German  East  Africa  had  1,062  km.  of  railway  in  running 
ord-er;  large  steamers  with  a  total  tonnage  of  1,150  tons  plied 
on  the  620  miles  length  of  Lake  Tanganyika.  The  white 
population  had  risen  to  6,000  persons.  The  area  under  plan- 
tations was  106,292  hectars,  of  which  56,753  hectars  were 
productive.  Foreign  trade  had  swollen  to  a  value  of  89 
million  marks;  the  actual  revenue  of  the  colony  amounted 
to  more  than  16  million  marks.  It  could  itself  find  more 
than  6y3  million  marks  for  the  interest  on  railway  loans,  and 
was  engaged  on  the  construction  of  an  important  new  line  of 
communication  400  km.  long.  The  customs  brought  in  some 
5^  million  marks. 

The  Cameroons  had  long  remained  behind,  as  they  were 
ill-provided  with  means  of  communication.  But  the  colony 
had  a  trade  of  64  million  marks,  revenues  of  its  own  of  more 
than  II  million  marks,  and  its  financial  appearance  was 
thoroughly  sound.  In  the  budget  for  1914  a  sum  of  1,565,000 
marks  was  introduced  for  the  construction  of  roads  and 
bridges  alone. 

Germany  only  gave  the  two  colonies  subsidies  for  the 
military  administration,  which  amounted  to  an  annual  total 
of  3  to  3^  million  marks. 

In  comparison  with  the  clear  and  lucid  financial  appearance 
presented  by  the  German  colonies,  that  of  the  Belgian  Congo 
and  of  French  Central  Africa  can  only  be  described  as 
confused  and  complicated.    The  latter  has  a  general  and  a 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  57 

local  budget.  In  the  Budget  General  there  was  a  gross  deficit 
of  1,881,01775  francs  in  the  years  1906-1909.  By  the  budget 
reform  of  1910  the  revenues  were  raised;  in  1910  and  191 1 
881,017.75  francs  of  the  deficit  of  the  previous  years  could 
be  met,  and  a  further  707,258.69  francs  put  into  the  Caisse 
de  Reserve,  from  which  the  whole  contents  of  i  million  francs 
had  been  taken  in  the  years  of  deficit.  On  the  30th  June, 
1 91 2,  the  local  budgets  of  Gabun,  the  Central  Congo  and 
Ubangi-Shari  also  showed  balances  of  from  25,000  to  221,000 
francs  and  a  surplus  was  expected  in  the  Chad  district.  But 
this  was  only  an  apparent  surplus  in  the  local  budgets ;  they 
received  subsidies  from  the  General  Budget  in  1912  as  follows: 
Gabun  1,200,000,  Central  Congo  850,000  and  Ubangi-Shari 
400,000  francs.  And,  the  Budget  General  was  subsidized  by 
the  mother-country  (1,532,016  francs  in  1912). 

Nevertheless,  the  financial  development  of  French  Central 
Africa  is  on  the  road  to  improvement. 

The  same  cannot,  however,  be  said  of  the  Belgian  Congo. 
There  the  situation  in  1913  was  as  follows: — 

Conclusive  figures  for  191 2  were  not  yet  available.  The 
ordinary  budget  had  closed  with  a  provisional  deficit  of 
6,333,354.38  francs.  38-9  million  francs  of  loans  from  the 
extraordinary  budgets  of  the  years  1909-1912  had  not  yet 
been  taken  up  in  191 2;  20,220,234  francs  were  spent.  The 
ordinary  budgets  of  the  years  1908-1912  had  resulted  in  a 
surplus  of  6,075,780.29  francs;  but  there  was  no  revenue  to 
meet  the  expenditure  under  the  extraordinary  budget  which 
reached  a  total  of  60,840,000  francs.  That  was  covered  by 
the  issue  of  treasury  notes. 

In  the  years  191 3  and  19 14  revenue  under  the  ordinary 
budget  stood  at  40,418,100  francs  and  30,451,276  francs 
respectively  as  against  expenditure  to  the  sum  of  50,933,064 
francs  and  51,936,000  francs.  There  were  deficits  of  io>^ 
and  213^  million  francs.  There  was  in  addition  the  expendi- 
ture under  the  extraordinary  budget  covered  by  loans 
(11-14  million  francs  in  1914). 

The  consolidated  debt  of  the  colony  (principally  4  per 


58     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 


cent,  loans)  demanded  6,692,595  francs  for  interest  in  1914, 
only  5,487,535  francs  in  1913.  There  was  also,  on  the  31st 
December,  191 3,  a  floating  debt  of  4,720,250  francs,  and  an 
indebtedness  for  treasury  notes  of  90  million  francs. 

In  the  stat-ement  of  expenditure  for  the  year  1914,  giving 
a  total  of  51,936,000  francs,  there  were  items  of  13,972,845 
francs  for  interest  on  debt,  783,860  francs  for  subsidies  to 
the  missions,  227,115  francs  for  contribution  to  the  museum 
at  Tervueren,  1,574,150  francs  for  pensions,  19,000  francs 
in  subsidies  for  fet€s,  10,000  francs  for  a  representative  in 
Cape  Town,  56,123  francs  for  the  Colonial  Council,  20,000 
francs  for  the  Commission  for  the  Protection  of  Natives.  If 
we  deduct  these  sums  from  the  expenditure  of  the  year  1914 
(we  need  not  concern  ourselves  with  the  indebt-edness  of  the 
colony  which  is  due  to  former  misgovernment)  the  total 
expenditure  stands  at  35,272,847  francs  as  against  a  revenue 
of  30,451,276  francs.  The  deficit  amounted  to  just  5  million 
francs.  And  w^e  may  note,  too,  that  included  in  this  ex- 
penditure of  35/4  million  francs  is  an  item  of  6,473,400  francs 
for  the  colonial  troops. 

Further,  the  railway  between  Matadi  and  Stanley  Pool 
always  produced  a  huge  surplus,  but  this,  to  the  great  detri- 
ment of  the  colony,  went  to  private  speculators,  not  to  the 
public  revenues ;  the  railway  was  built  by  a  private  company ; 
as  far  back  as  1912  the  Belgian  Government  had  thoughts  of 
taking  it  over;  but  it  got  no  further.  The  dividends  of  the 
railway  amounted  to  no  less  than  40,417,000  francs  in  the  five 
years  1908  to  1912.  During  the  same  period  there  was  no 
revenue  to  meet  the  expenditure  of  the  extraordinary  budget 
to  the  amount  of  60,840,000  francs.  Such  inconsistencies 
could  not  exist  for  long  under  German  administration,  and  the 
financial  position  of  the  Belgian  Congo  also  would  soon  be 
satisfactory. 

We  said  all  that  is  necessary  about  the  economic  life  of 
the  Belgian  Congo  in  an  earlier  chapter.  French  Central 
Africa  was  still  in  a  very  undeveloped  condition  in  this  respect. 

A  careful  survey  of  the  few  figures  which  have  been  given 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  ^Africa  59 

must  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  a  simple  combination  of  the 
four  great  colonies  would  certainly  not  have  the  evil  conse- 
quences for  their  general  economic  prosperity  which  are 
always  anticipated  in  Germany,  even  in  colonial  circles.  A 
colony  of  Mittel-Afrika,  even  if  it  is  nothing  but  a  continua- 
tion on  a  greater  scale  of  our  old  bureaucratic  colonial  system, 
would  be  no  great  burden  to  the  German  Empire.  We  should 
manage  with  a  subsidy  of  ten  million  marks,  and  for  that  we 
should  have  a  colony  with  a  foreign  trade  of  som-e  300  million 
marks,  which  would  have  risen  in  a  decade  probably  to  about 
500  million.  That  would  be  the  result,  supposing  we  con- 
tinued our  work  just  as  before  the  war. 

But  German  Mittel-Afrika  is  to  be  something  quite 
different,  the  beginning  of  an  independent  German  tropical 
economic  system,  of  German  world-economics  and  world- 
policy. 

Forty  thousand  Germans  from  overseas  are  to  be  attracted 
into  the  country  in  the  first  two  or  three  years  after  the  war, 
and  are  to  bring  with  them,  roughly,  a  thousand  million  marks 
of  capital.  Indemnification  of  the  colonists  in  the  old  protec- 
torates and  of  the  railway  companies  would  bring  in  a  further 
two  or  three  hundred  million  marks.  Economic  activity  would 
awaken  with  giant  strength. 

Further,  in  the  parts  of  this  great  area  where  the  climate 
is  suitable,  as,  for  instance,  in  Angola  (of  which  we  must  under 
any  circumstances  have  a  great  part,  if  not  the  whole),  we 
should  settle  10,000  small  farmers,  people  with  a  little  capital 
from  Brazil,  Venezuela  (where  there  are  German  settlers 
working  with  their  own  hands  in  the  loth  degree  of  northern 
latitude!)  and  Australia.  Each  of  these  settlers,  as  is  proved 
by  experience  in  Brazil,  would  in  the  second  or  third  year 
offer  the  trader  for  sale,  and  even  for  export,  products  to  the 
value  of  some  thousands  of  marks.  If  each  one  can  produce 
3,000  marks'  worth,  there  will  be  a  quantity  of  maize,  tobacco, 
coffee  and  manioc  for  export  to  the  value  of  30  million  marks. 
The  small  holdings  of  the  natives  will  produce  at  least  double 
that  sum,  whil^  the  self-grown  products  of  the  country,  such 


60     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

as  rubber,  ivory,  copal,  palm-kernels  and  palm-oil — especially 
if  the  oil  industry  is  energetically  pushed — are  bound  in  two 
or  three  years  to  provide  exports  to  the  value  of  120-150 
million  marks.  The  Cameroons  and  the  Belgian  and  French 
Congo  exported  more  than  50  million  marks'  worth  of  rubber 
in  1912,  5-6  million  marks'  worth  of  ivory  and  6  million  marks' 
worth  of  copal.  The  exports  of  palm-kernels  and  palm-oil 
only  amounted  to  some  15  million  marks;  in  view  of  the  vast 
numbers  of  existing  oil-palms  these  figures  can  speedily  be 
multiplied  fourfold.  The  export  of  hides  alone  in  German 
East  Africa  reached  a  total  of  53^  million  marks.  The  Belgian 
Congo  produced  gold  to  the  value  of  3  million  marks,  and 
several  million  marks'  w^orth  of  copper  and  tin.  There  are  the 
additional  exports  of  the  cocoa,  sisal,  rubber  and  cotton 
plantations  (the  East  African  exports  of  sisal  alone  amounted 
to  10.6  million  marks).  If,  therefore,  the  output  of  tropical 
products  in  Mittel-Afrika  is  taken  energetically  in  hand 
immediately  after  the  war_,  we  can  count  on  exports  to  the 
value  of  at  least  300-350  million  marks  in  two  or  three  years, 
with  the  prospect  of  at  least  doubling  the  amount  in  a  further 
five  to  seven  years.  The  imports  will  correspond.  Soon 
after  the  war  Mittel-Afrika  will  take  imports  to  the  value  of 
500  million  marks  and  ten  years  later  of  800-1,000  million.  At 
the  beginning  the  imports  of  textiles  will  be  mostly  from  enemy 
sources ;  these  imports  might  pay  a  duty  of  20  to  25  per  cent, 
of  their  value.  If  we  take  an  av-erage  duty  of  10  per  cent, 
and  if  we  impose  it  on  imports  reaching  a  total  value  of  400 
million  marks,  our  customs  revenue  amounts  at  once  to  40 
million  marks. 

The  white  men  will  pay  taxes  and  licence-fees  of  all  sorts ; 
the  native  tax  will  be  raised.  Trade  licences  will  bring  in 
large  sums,  as  will  the  treasury's  share  in  the  railways  and 
the  shipping  on  the  .  great  rivers  and  lakes. 

There  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  Mittel-Afrika,  if  we 
go  the  right  way  to  work,  should  not  very  soon  have  a  revenue 
of  its  own  of  100  million  marks.* 

The  country  will  have  to  provide  a  great  colonial  army 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  61 

for  its  defence,  at  first  50,000  to  60,000  negroes  under  5,000 
commissioned  and  non-commissioned  officers.  Supposing 
these  cost  on  an  average  6,000  marks  a  head,  that  makes 
30  million  marks  a  year.  We  shall  have  to  estimate  the  cost 
of  a  black  soldier  at  from  400  to  500  marks  a  year;  that 
makes  another  25  to  30  million  marks.  The  colony  itself  could 
supply  40  to  50  million  marks  towards  the  cost  of  its  army; 
especially  since  in  the  first  years  after  the  war  the  German 
commissioned  and  non-commissioned  officers  would  have  to 
take  in  hand  a  great  part  of  the  administration.  But  our  aim 
must  be  the  speedy  transference  of  the  whole  country  to  civil 
administration  and  the  concentration  of  the  colonial  army 
in  a  few  large  centres  and  its  training  for  war. 

The  civil  administration  of  these  vast  territories  will  need 
a  great  army  of  officials,  of  government  doctors,  farming 
officials  (such  as  agriculturists  and  veterinary  surgeons),  and 
officials  connected  with  administration  and  communications. 
We  shall  have  to  count  on  an  expenditure  of  30-40  million 
marks  for  these.  Further,  we  must  provide  means  for  the 
payment  of  interest  on  loans ;  for  this  great  colony  would 
soon  have  to  borrow  large  sums  of  money  for  the  construction 
of  pioneer  routes  and  means  of  communication.  Peraianent 
burdens  to  the  extent  of  some  10  million  marks  have  already 
to  be  borne  for  German  East  Africa  and  th-e  Cameroons. 

The  new  colony,  therefore,  must  not  be  burdened  from 
the  outset  too  heavily  with  military  expenditure,  and  this 
should  be  met  in  the  proportion  of  half  from  home  and  half 
from  the  colony.  Germany  must  accustom  herself  to  regard 
the  colonial  army  as  part  of  the  German  armed  forces.  The 
colonial  troops  will  insure  us  against  African  forces  being 
brought  against  our  home  fronts  in  future  wars.  If  we  look 
at  the  question  from  that  point  of  view,  a.  demand  for  30  or 
even  50  million  marks  for  the  colonial  army  will  be  regarded 
as  a  matter  of  course,  and  this  expenditure  should  appear, 
not  in  the  colonial  budget,  but  in  the  Imperial  military 
vote. 

At  the  head  of  Mittel-Afrika  should  be  a  Viceroy,  a  man 


62     The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa 

of  princely  birth,  whose  personahty  would  be  a  guarantee 
that  there  was  no  friction  between  the  miUtary  and  civil 
administration.  The  Viceroy — whose  residence  should  be  as 
central  as  possible,  but  within  easy  and  rapid  reach  of  the 
coast — would  preside  over  the  central  Government;  under 
him  would  come  the  governors  of  the  provinces.  The  whole 
country  would  be  divided  into  four  or  five  provinces.  These 
would  be  as  far  as  possible  independent,  after  the  Brazilian 
pattern;  but  the  army  and  roads  and  railways  would  be 
under  the  central  administration.  Colonial  legislation  would 
be  in  the  hands  of  the  Viceroy,  who  would  be  responsible  to 
the  Emperor.  He  would  be  supported  by  a  Council  composed 
of  delegates  from  the  provinces.  From  the  very  beginning 
the  development  of  as  far-reaching  an  autonomy  as  possible 
must  be  aimed  at.  Every  settlement  of  energetic  Germans, 
whatever  their  religious  beliefs  and  their  political  bias,  should 
be  encouraged. 

Above  all,  official  nervousness  with  regard  to  the  intro- 
duction of  colonists  must  go  by  the  board.  This  is  nothing 
but  fear  of  the  difficulties  which  such  settlers  might  cause. 
Negroes,  Indians,  Arabs  are,  of  course,  much  easier  to  deal 
with  than  white  colonists ;  and  so  the  latter  are  unpopular 
with  officials.  But  that  must  not  determine  poHcy,  when  the 
future  of  our  country  is  at  stake. 

Dr.  Hans  Schafer,  who  was  employed  for  four  years  as 
railway  doctor  on  the  railway  construction  in  the  Cameroons, 
stood  up  for  the  view  that  even  tropical  Africa  will  be  a  white 
man's  country ;  that  the  negro  will  die  out,  and  that  labour  will 
be  secured  by  the  mechanical  use  of  water-power.  Schafer 
delivered  a  lecture  before  the  Medical  Society  of  Berlin  on  the 
7th  February,  191 7.  According  to  the  Berliner  Kleiner 
Wochenschrift  (1917,  No.  25)  he  proved  on  this  occasion  on 
the  strength  of  his  own  experience — and  he  had  conducted 
over  300  post-mortem  examinations — the  frightful  physical 
inferiority  of  the  negro. 

That  is  a  very  one-sided  observation.  It  is  not  always  the 
soundest  men  who  come  to  railway  work,  as  we  have  shown 


The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  63 

in  a  previous  chapter.  Dr.  Schafer  again  only  saw  a  part  of 
the  Cameroons.  There  are,  even  in  the  Cameroons,  very 
strong  and  healthy  negroes,  just  as  there  are  in  the  Belgian 
and  French  Congo  and  especially  in  East  Africa.  Yet 
Schafer's  concluding  remarks  cannot  but  meet  with  approval : 

What  the  first  Government  doctor  in  the  Cameroons, 
Friedrich  Plehn,  looking  far  ahead,  prophesied  twenty  years 
ago  has  come  true — that  the  Cameroons  would  be  one  of  the 
healthiest  tropical  countries  for  white  men,  when  we  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  the  better  of  malaria.  No  white  man  who 
lives  on  sensible  hygienic  principles  need  suffer  seriously  any 
more  from  malaria,  much  less  die  of  the  formerly  so  dreaded 
malarial  complication,  black-water  fever. 

The  common  opinion  that  the  white  man,  who  in  general 
is  far  tougher  and  stronger  than  the  negro,  cannot  live  in 
Central  Africa  is  merely  a  prejudice.  And  this  opinion  is 
largely  based  on  the  observed  results  of  a  habitual  excessive 
consumption  of  alcohol.  This  practice  is  common  where 
there  is  no  family  life,  and  th-e  white  man  is  driven  to  drink. 
It  will  not  be  the  case  in  self-contained  settlements  with 
churches  and  schools.  Alcoholic  excess  is  a  symptom  of 
undeveloped  social  conditions.  As  these  become  stabk,  the 
danger  vanishes. 

Let  us  conquer  our  prejudices  and  advance  with  cheerful 
confidence  towards  Mittel-Afrika!  It  will  soon  become  a 
prosperous,  wealthy  colony — the  sure  foundation  of  a  great 
German  world-policy,  that  policy  based  on  reality  which  must 
now  take  the  place  of  the  policy  of  illusion  which  we 
followed  up  till  the  outbreak  of  war. 

"Free  from  the  Anglo-Saxons!" — that  is  our  watchword; 
German  Mittel-Afrika  is  the  fulfilment  of  this  call. 


.  .            Date  Due 

DT34  .11 

The  German  empire  of  Central  Africa  as 


'  Princeton  Theological  Seminary-Speer  Library  ►         »  »^ 

iii  iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii  iiiiiiiiiii  iii^ 


THE  CRIM]  1012  00002  1842     ^^hor  of  **I  Accuse!" 

An  arraig       '  ^  than  "I  Accuse!"  of  the 

rulers  and  governments  of  Germany  and  Austria. 

Two  vols.   8vo.   Vol.  I.   Net,  $2.50 
THE  GREAT  CRIME  AND  ITS  MORAL    By  J.  Selden  Willmore 

A  volume  v^^hich  is  an  invaluable  library.   An  illuminating  summary  of 

the  immense  documentary  literature  of  the  war.  8vo.   Net,  $2.00 

BELGIUM  IN  WAR  TIME     By  Commandant  De  Gerlache  De  Comery 

Translated  from  the  French  Edition  by  Bernard  Miall 

The  authoritative  book  essential  to  an  understanding  of  the  history,  the 
position  and  the  sufferings  of  the  country  that  will  not  die,  the  title  of 
the  Norwegian  and  Swedish  editions  of  this  famous  work  set  up  under 
fire.  Illustrations,  maps  and  facsimiles.   8vo.   Net,  $2.00 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME  By  John  Buchan 

"Mr.  Buchan's  account  is  a  clear  and  brilliant  presentation  of  the  whole 
vast  manoeuver  and  its  tactical  and  strategic  development  through  all 
four  stages." — Springfield  Republicayi.     Illustrated.    12mo.   Net,  $1.50 

THE  LAND  OF  DEEPENING  SHADOW  By  D.  Thomas  Cur  tin 
Revealing  the  Germany  of  fact  in  place  of  the  Germany  of  tradition; 
telling  the  truth  about  Germany-in-the-third-year-of-the-war. 

12mo.    Net,  $1.50 

I  ACCUSE!  (j>ACCUSE!)  By  a  German 

An  arraignment  of  Germany  by  a  German  of  the  German  War  Party. 
Facts  every  neutral  should  know.  12mo.    Net,  $1  50 

THE  GERMAN  TERROR  IN  FRANCE  By  Arnold  J.  Toynhee 
THE  GERMAN  TERROR  IN  BELGIUM    By  Arnold  J.  Toynhee 

"From  the  facts  he  places  before  his  readers,  it  appears  conclus-ive  that 
the  horrors  were  perpetrated  systematically,  deliberately,  under  orders, 
upon  a  people  whose  country  was  invaded  without  just  cause." — Phila- 
delphia Public  Ledger.  Each  Svo.    Net,  $1.00 

TRENCH  PICTURES  FROM  FRANCE       By  Major  WnUam  Redmond,  M.P. 

Biographical  Introduction  by  Miss  E.  M.  Smith-Dampier 

A  glowing  book,  filled  with  a  deep  love  of  Ireland,  by  one  of  the  most 
attractive  British  figures  of  the  war.  12mo.    Net,  $1.25 

WOUNDED  AND  A  PRISONER  OF  WAR    By  an  Exchanged  Officer 

The  high  literary  merit,  studious  moderation  and  charming  personality 
of  the  author  make  this  thrilling  book  "the  most  damning  indictment  of 
Germany's  inhumanity  that  has  yet  appeared."  12mo.    Net,  $1.25 

THE  GERMAN  FURY  IN  BELGIUM  ByL.Mokveld 

"Some  of  the  most  brilliant  reporting  of  all  times  was  done  by  a  few 
quiet  individuals.  Among  the  men  who  did  the  most  brilliant  work, 
Mokveld,  of  the  Amsterdam  Tijd,  stands  foremost." — Dr.  Willem  Hen- 
drik  Van  Loon.  Net,  $1.00 

MY  HOME  IN  THE  FIELD  OF  MERCY      By  Frances  Wilson  Huard 

MY  HOME  IN  THE  FIELD  OF  HONOUR  By  Frances  Wilson  Huard 

The  simple,  intimate,  classic  narrative  which  has  taken  rank  as  one  of 
the  few  distinguished  books  produced  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

Illustrated.    Each  12mo.   Net,  $1.35 


GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY     Publishers     New  York 

PUBLISHERS    IN    AMERICA     FOR    HODDER    &  STOUGHTON 


